Spin This

Roberto Lavagna’s campaign dilemma

In January, Argentinean prospective presidential candidate Roberto Lavagna posed at his home with chief Peronist whip Miguel Ángel Pichetto for a photograph. The occasion marked the beginning of talks between the pair in order to form a ticket on which to run for the 2019 elections. Here were two heavyweights of Peronism: Lavagna, the longest serving minister of Economics during the present century, and Pichetto, the longest-serving chief whip of the historical party. What caught the eye of the public was not the nature of the talks, but rather Lavagna’s unfortunate outfit. Wearing open-toed sandals, high white socks and shorts, he looked like a confused old man from another time. The contrast was only sharpened with Pichetto by his side, wearing hip skinny jeans and a denim shirt, which was frankly off-putting in its very own way.

Months later, Pichetto has become president Mauricio Macri’s running mate, and Lavagna has teamed up with Juan Manuel Urtubey, and went on to achieve a rather pale 8.2% in the Argentinean primary elections, against Fernández’s 47.7% and Macri’s 32.1%. Two days ago, Federal Consensus, Lavagna and Urtubey’s party, emphatically called for a halt in the campaign given the dire economic and social situation of the country. A bold gesture, by any standards, but was it an effective one?  

Taking his place in the spotlight

It seems as though the preponderance of the two main contestants in the media cycle is unstoppable. Macri’s side seems to be a gaffe machine, with the President exuberantly promising solutions to floods, or with his side posing for a selfie while standing, and painfully leaving out current VP Michetti, a wheelchair user, from the frame. The usual memes and internet rounds ensued. Evident bots tweeted on behalf of the sitting President’s side in foreign languages, or in cringe worthy pseudo-Spanish, also leading to considerably hilarity. The Fernández’s (flesh and blood) online presence is considerable, and the pair never fail to get exposure, even with small gaffes such as Alberto’s dental inconvenience during Cristina’s impassioned speech. In such a hostile environment, is Lavagna’s attempt so ill-conceived? In an eight-minute video, the presidential candidate stressed the weight of the crisis, and by proxy, called out the other candidates on their irresponsibility for campaigning in such an situation. Lavagna’s full team stood behind him awkwardly as he delivered his speech, and he has taken stick for his ill-fitting suit and Urtubey’s awkward hand gesturing during the speech. For a brief minute, though, Lavagna controlled the news cycle with his announcement. And he has stressed his position: he is impartial to the civil war between Kirchnerists and Macrists. Lavagna portrayed himself as someone who will get things done. As someone who is no power thirsty politician, but a simple civil servant.

The undeniable weight of numbers

Een kerncentrale aan de Eemshaven?

Deze week werd bekend gemaakt dat het kabinet het oude plannen om een nieuwe kerncentrale in Groningen te bouwen opnieuw overweegt. De VVD heeft posters over de voordelen van kernenergie op social media gedeeld, en het CDA blijft haar bondgenoot trouw steunen. De oppositie liet snel van zich horen. SP en GroenLinks reageerden meteen om hun ongenoegen duidelijk te maken. Ook de provincie en gemeente Groningen protesteerden direct.

De nucleaire plannen zijn niet nieuw. In 1977 presenteerden ministers Lubbers (CDA) en Gruijters (D66) een voorstel met tien mogelijke locaties voor een kerncentrale aan het kabinet. Vanaf dat moment bleef de nucleaire kwestie in de politieke agenda hangen. De Eemshaven bleek een geschikte locatie vanwege de aanwezigheid van koelwater en de grote afstand tot bewoonde gebieden. Uit hetzelfde rapport bleek dat ook de Maasvlakte en Borssele geschikte locaties waren.

Is het zo’n gek idee om een nucleaire oplossing voor te stellen? Sommigen denken van niet. De VVD meent dat kernenergie schoon, veilig, en goedkoop is. De Belgen hebben al jaren actieve kerncentrales. Arjen Lubach hield op zijn talkshow een vurig pleidooi voor het complementeren van schone wind en zon energie met kernenergie om drastisch de CO2-uitstoot te verlagen: volgens hem gaat de overstap naar duurzame energie veel te traag.

Anderen denken van wel. Vorig jaar waren er negen nucleaire incidenten in België. Een groot deel van de Nederlandse bevolking herinnert zich de kernramp van Tsjernobyl nog. En ook de ellende van Fukushima. Moderne kerncentrales produceren veel minder nucleair afval dan voorheen, maar het afval is nog steeds gevaarlijk en decennialang radioactief.

De onoverbrugbare kloof in dit debat is echter niet die van kernenergie als een antwoord op de energiekwestie. Dit is slechts een beleidsissue. De kloof betreft de locatie van de centrales. Door het voorstellen van Groningen als mogelijke locatie voor zo’n centrale tonen de coalitie partijen hun onbegrip voor de politieke stemming in het hoge noorden. De gedupeerden lijden dagelijks. De rest van de Groningse bevolking is hun bestaanszekerheid kwijt: niemand weet of de prijs van hun huizen plotseling zal zakken. Het gezamenlijk erfgoed van de provincie loopt gevaar, en sommige historische panden zijn te ernstig beschadigd om ze nog te kunnen herstellen. Er is weinig vertrouwen in het plan van de coalitie om huizen te versterken en de gaswinning af te bouwen. De bouw van een mogelijk gevaarlijke energiecentrale in provincie Groningen voelt als nog een nagel aan de doodskist van de Groningers.

Sicco Mansholt’s European project

 One of the most prominent figures featured in Frank Westerman’s tour de force De Graanrepubliek -  and in Groninger history - is that of Sicco Mansholt: president of the European Commission, minister of agriculture, mayor of Wieringermeer, resistance fighter and last but not least, Groninger farmer. Mansholt, who promised to be the Groninger golden boy, the one to bring the north closer to The Hague, still remains a controversial figure, twenty-three years after his passing. Mansholt, the red farmer, the evergreen contrarian who saved the Dutch farms from falling prices and international competition, had to see in 1971 a black coffin with his name painted on, carried by farmers protesting in the wake of his European agricultural plan. An excellent character for a Spin This dilemma, then. The main questions: are principles universal? Can one as a politician expect mercy from a disfavored constituency? 

Minister of agriculture: nooit meer honger

Post-war Netherlands was far from being a happy place. Apart from the misery of war, it was of paramount importance to restore economic stability and boost production for a growing population that had too little for too long. A content volk was key to avoiding another European war, a central concern. As minister of agriculture, Mansholt saw the need to protect farmers and provide them with certainty. This, he envisioned in a classically socialist way: he established a minimum price for grain, which reassured farmers, providing them with the ability to plan ahead and, in turn, greatly encouraged them to invest more and mechanise. Part of this policy was protectionist, imposing heavy levies to protect the sector from the growing foreign industry that produced at a considerable lower cost. Mansholt’s recipe was a resounding success. Partly thanks to the broader economic bonanza, production soared and large scale farms mechanised at great speeds. He went on to serve as minister of agriculture from the end of the war until 1958, when he was appointed European Commissioner.

Mansholt Plan: the European years

The experience during his time as minister of agriculture made Mansholt the perfect candidate for EU common agricultural policy. Prime Minister Drees, when told of his appointment, famously cried ‘Finally we are rid of him’. Dutch politicians could finally go about their business without the pig-headed, stalwart socialist Mansholt. 

As vice-president of the Commission, Sicco had to tackle an existential threat to the future of European integration: the over-supply of produce, partly a consequence of his previous policies on the national level. The solution he brought to the Commission rested on three pillars: old school socialist central planning, protection of large scale, efficient farmers, and an elimination of five million small scale farmers. Early retirement plans, ample vacations and subsidized education for farmers that were to change professions were all encompassed in the Mansholt plan. When the European farmers took it to the streets in 1971 to protest the plan, a sign held by a protester read ‘Hitler exterminated the Jews, Mansholt exterminated the farmers’. In a way, they were being robbed of their livelihood and their tradition.

The upheaval created by this plan made the Commission reject it in its original state and only pass it after heavy editing. Concretely, the systematic favouring of large scale, mechanised farms meant that though many of the European farmers did retire early or changed professions, the surplus problem remained: technological innovation and economies of scale exponentially increased production of the remaining farmers in the long run. A truly mixed bag.

Could the German electorate end the reign of the most powerful woman in the world?

Angela Merkel has been in power since 2005. She is seen by many as the evergreen, strong leader of the massive economic and cultural power that is Germany. Merkel is the widely-respected champion of the EU, and after the election of Donald Trump as US president, some even claim she is the new leader of the free world. In September, she will face yet another federal election.

This week’s dilemma is thus, is it worth it to fix something that isn’t broken? Will progressive Germans opt for an alternative to Merkel? How well can the country cope with the uncertainty that comes with new leadership?

Germans are used to very long terms which allow leadership to pursue long-term strategies. Before Merkel, Schröder served as chancellor for 7 years and before him, the giant of German reunification, the late Helmut Kohl, served for 16 years. The past 12 years of CDU government have brought economic prosperity, an almost absolute control of EU economic affairs and a centre stage position in world affairs. Younger voters cannot even remember a Germany without Merkel. It brought too, an ever closer European Union. With a GDP of 48839 USD per capita and an unemployment rate of 4%, the economic performance of Merkel’s Germany is beyond any doubt.

On the other hand, Merkel is perceived by the left wing as the antiquated, conservative face of an EU that has much to improve. Last week’s vote on the proposal for the legalisation of same sex marriages shows precisely this other side of the coin. Although it is an often forgotten fact, Merkel is the head of the Christian Democratic Union, and holds traditional values dear. Her negative vote on the proposal disappointed many, including other EU members. This suggests that perhaps Merkel’s views are not entirely fit for modern times or younger, liberal voters. The surge of Eurosceptical populism, though tamed by electoral defeats in the Netherlands and France, still poses a threat to Merkel. For most Europeans, Merkel is the unofficial head of the Union, and the critique to the immigration and refugee policy, democratic deficit and lack of accountability is all attributable to her. Even after Macron’s big win, the mainstream EU project is a hard sell for a national campaign and could bring problems for the CDU’s aspirations.  

The contender: Schulz and the Social Democrats

Martin Schulz, chairman of the Social Democrats, has had a bit of a rollercoaster in the build-up to this election. In February, the ex-president of the European Parliament had a spectacular surge in the polls, even surpassing favourite Merkel; something that hadn’t happened in more than ten years. Schulz lost his lead lately, with the status quo gaining terrain and placing Mutti comfortably ahead. With his momentum lost, Schulz is attempting to present himself as similar to Merkel but ostensibly more 2017: staunchly pro-EU, socially liberal and closer to the German youth. His chances, though, don’t look as promising as they once did.

Popular opinion barometer for Mauricio Macri’s Cambiemos

Since 2009, Argentina’s primary elections are held openly, simultaneously, and obligatorily, in a new sort of electoral contest called the PASO. This new contest brings more participation to the usually obscure, undemocratic way in which candidates are chosen within some parties in Argentina. The PASO affects disproportionately traditional parties with larger bases than newer ones. The latter ones have smaller bases that depend more on the personal appeal of their leaders and are likely to present only one candidate, assuring their election. At their best, the PASO offer transparency and a bigger role for the electorate, which is now able to not only vote for/against the ruling party but to give feedback for parties to which individual voters might be sympathetic towards but not necessarily a member thereof. Party membership is not necessary for participation in the PASO. At their worst, the PASO create an irrelevant election which produces low turnouts, is costly, and does not stop any candidate at risk of losing an election from breaking away from party lines into a new organisation, ensuring their participation in the general elections.

Cambiemos

Led by President Macri, wide government coalition Cambiemos has mainly presented one candidate for the most important spots, rendering the PASO internally irrelevant. For Cambiemos, this election is a first indication of how things are going for the Macri administration. Given the strong polatisation of the Argentine society, divided into kirchneristas and anti-kirchneristas, Macri can still count with a big portion of society which dreads a possible return of Cristina Fernández to power for support. Essentially, the biggest problem Cambiemos faces is one of economic performance. Macri’s plan of trade liberalisation and re-inclusion into the global arena is taking longer than expected to bear tangible fruits and the people are growing impatient. Long standing conflicts with trade unions are compromising the day-to-day operation of the country. Thankfully for Macri, ex-president Cristina Fernández decided to make a grand comeback, running for senator in her own political space. This gives Macri considerable leeway, given he can present Cambiemos once again as the opposition to Fernández’s politics, surely galvanising more votes his way.

On the other hand, fissures have emerged within the ruling coalition. Patricio Lousteau, once rising star of the UCR and former ambassador to the US for Cambiemos, has rebelled and set up his own political organisation to run against veteran Elisa Carrió for deputy for the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, with decent chances of winning.

CFK & the Partido Justicialista

Ex-president Cristina Fernández opted to run outside of her party, the Partido Justicialista, to avoid a costly leadership showdown. Opposition Partido Justicialista now has to open up their primaries to the public, while still hurting from the presidential defeat of 2015 and facing leadership challenges for many key positions. Their ace is Florencio Randazzo, frustrated presidential candidate in 2015. Cristina running proves again the fact that popular candidates can avert potentially embarrassing campaigns by, basically, flying solo.

The PJ’s position is increasingly precarious, still licking their wounds and not being able to show themselves as a mature, more progressive alternative to Cambiemos. Cristina’s candidacy effectively killed most of its general appeal and a rude awakening is in order for them, as their image of the party for the people is increasingly in jeopardy.

Massa’s 1País is another force to reckon, with Margarita Stolbizer’s backing, providing Argentinean Peronists with an alternative outside of their own party that is proving to be significant in the polls.

Europe’s new global position: with or without the anglophone world?

Yesterday, Trump announced the United States will be leaving the Paris climate accord. The world will suffer greatly from such a decision, as the accord will be severely crippled with the absence of the world’s foremost superpower and second biggest pollutant. Global leaders both from the private and public spheres decried Trump’s decision, but the staunchest disapproval came from old friend and ally Europe. The newly elected president Macron used Trump’s slogan against him, calling for the importance of ‘making the world great again.’ Merkel called for European unity and showed no fear of proceeding without the US by its side. Juncker bitterly ridiculed Trump for his lack of international legal knowledge, remarking that the US can’t just walk away from an international agreement with no consequences. Europe is on edge, and it’s about to lose its best friend forever. Global power relations are once again shifting, and Europe sees the UK and the US walk away from their liberal cosmopolitan ideals, triggering this week’s dilemma: what is Europe to do if the friendship goes sour?

Further EU integration

 The picture of Theresa May walking through the White House hand in hand with Donald Trump could make even the strongest European anglophile cringe. Europe could see further integration as a way of taking distance from these two nations that seem to share so little with it lately. There are calls from Member States of the EU for delegating foreign policy to the European level, and even to create a common European army – something that would have been simply inconceivable a couple of years ago. Certain policy areas like refugees and policing of borders would become considerably easier with a single European foreign policy. Doing this would reduce NATO’s importance in the global stage, giving independence to the EU by severing its Atlantic ties.

On the other hand, a common EU army could be a tone deaf message to local constituencies across the continent. After all, the fact that Trump appals Europeans doesn’t take away the fact that Europe is still facing a populist and nationalist tide, and that EU sceptics will fight any attempt to give the EU more power. The Wilders, the Le Pens, the Petrys of Europe will raise hell, and it is futile to deny their growing importance in Europe, even with the new mandate given by the election of the pro-EU Rutte and Macron.

Strategic patience

Alternatively, the EU could take a deep breath and be patient with the UK and US, having in mind that these are troubled times and that no leadership lasts forever. No matter how unpredictable and erratic the US can be as an ally, it’s impossible that it perceives losing Europe as a desirable outcome. Europe gives NATO legitimacy and consensus in the global scene. Closer to home, the UK is also looking for friends. Perhaps cooperation and a kind Brexit could yield gains for Europe as well.

Has the British youth accepted Brexit yet?

 ‘Not another one!’ cried internet celebrity Brenda from Bristol when confronted with the news that Theresa May, Prime Minister of the UK, had called for a snap election after repeatedly promising not to. In a way, Brenda had hit a nerve: some of the British public are indeed exhausted of the ongoing campaigning that has taken place ever since former PM David Cameron called for a Brexit referendum. This new campaign felt especially like a chore given that, according to most polls, the Conservative party was expected to win by a landslide. For the right wing part of the electorate, this election is pretty straight forward. It is not unlikely that the once burgeoning UKIP will lose all of its seats, with their votes essentially all going to the Tories. For the rest, it’s a whole different story, especially for the youngest. The attempts of both Lib Dems and Labour to woo the young electorate make it clear that this demographic is the key to this snap election. According to Politico UK, 75% of the electorate aged 24 and under, voted to remain in the EU. The trend is undeniable – young people resent Brexit and that puts them at a crossroads: if their main concern is Brexit, then Farron or Corbyn? Lib Dem or Labour? 

The contenders

The Lib Dem’s USP and strong suit is undoubtedly their promise of holding a second Brexit referendum, giving Britons a chance to reject a hard Brexit, or potentially avoid it altogether. For hard remainers, this is the last hope of averting a potentially disastrous Brexit, with dire social, economic and geopolitical consequences. A policy proposal that seems to be tailor-made for the younger demographics is the creation of a legal and regulated market for cannabis, but this seems rather ornamental. Probably welcome but won’t sway most voters. A big source of concern for them is the stubbornly consistent polling. They’ve been stuck at around 10% for weeks. The Lib Dem’s biggest weakness is that Labour keeps surging in the polls.

Corbyn’s party looks like they’re hungry and ready to fight. From being almost universally disliked, – he’s only truly popular among the young and the hard left of the party – Corbyn’s image changed drastically with the leak of his manifesto. Media outlets who intended to heavily criticize Labour’s manifesto, claiming it would take Britain back to the 1970s (in the words of the Daily Mail,) in the end gave Corbyn a huge PR boost. From 25.4%, when May called for the snap elections, Labour is polling now at around 33% (Telegraph). Content-wise, Brexit is less of a priority for Labour. The British people have spoken and Britain is leaving.  While hardly enthusiastic about it, Corbyn agreed to leave, but unilaterally granting the rights of EU citizens living in the UK– a clear sign of goodwill to deescalate the tense conflict between Juncker and strong and stable May. Labour also has a number of measures to appeal to the youngest voters, such as the banning of unpaid internships, lowering the legal age to vote to 16, and most importantly, the scrapping of university tuition fees. It is the rest of the manifesto that propelled this strong comeback for Labour. It is unafraid, and miles away from old Blairite politeness. It has learnt its lesson from the demise of the French PS and the Dutch PvdA. Tame doesn’t do it anymore. The manifesto has broad promises of nationalisation (rail and energy), the scrapping of tuition fees, a ‘fat cat’ tax, and an extra 30 billion for the National Health Service. It is bold, and most importantly, it is perceived as such. It could take May down. 

Groenlinks and the Dutch Cabinet formation

GroenLinks, the Dutch green left party has won an astounding 10 extra seats at the Dutch legislative elections last March. That alone would have marked a great victory for Dutch progressivism, yet the outcome feels gloomy for the left in general. The foreseeable yet still somehow surprising electoral defeat of Dutch Laborism, the PvdA, is not central to the Dutch cabinet negotiations but still casts a long shadow in the mind of the negotiating parties. Jesse Klaver, GroenLinks’ young and energetic leader, has seen how the tone deaf message of the PvdA during the campaign combined with four long years of co-rule with Rutte from the right wing VVD delivered an almost deadly blow to Laborism. The PvdA campaign, led by Deputy Prime Minister Lodewijk Asscher, saw the amount of seats held by Labour diminished from 28 to 9. It was widely expected that the PvdA would have an unfavourable result, but polling at 12, the results proved to be devastating. Klaver, boy wonder of the Dutch left, knows that he could potentially share this fate should he decide to take part of a new Rutte cabinet. As it stands, he would share a coalition with the right – with the exception of Wilders’ infamous PVV. No party seems to be willing to pay the political cost of another coalition with an erratic, extreme partner such as the PVV again.

The ‘allies’

D66, the Dutch liberals, are another big winner of the elections. They share much with the French president elect Macron: a pro-European platform which holds civil liberties dear but is essentially right wing economically. It would be Klaver’s closest ally in this cabinet. This is an awkward spot for the new kid in the block, as he would also share a coalition with the conservative Christian Democratic Appeal, who ran an identity-heavy campaign based on instating the obligatory military service and bringing back the Wilhelmus, the Dutch national anthem, to the secular, largely tradition-free Dutch schools. Sybrand Buma, leader of the CDA, has repeatedly shown disdain for Klaver’s green measures. Another coalition party would be the ruling VVD, led by Prime Minister Rutte, who has based his campaign on a firm rejection of Wilders’ PVV but strangely cosied up to its anti-migrant rhetoric. Rutte famously penned a letter to the country on all major newspapers inviting citizens to ‘doe normaal’ – a letter which seemed addressed to foreigners, tacitly telling them to act normally or go home. All of these messages clash starkly with Klaver’s humanitarian view on immigration and tradition: he seems to be gaily walking into the lion’s den.

The dilemma: influence or saving face?