LBoomsky

This I is distinct from the thought itself. I observe red is not self referential for I is not the thought "i see red" it is instead something else. Perhaps an observer which extrapolates this information to a brain or mind; or a mind observer composite.

There is extremely high intuitive response; nay; near necessity; or perhaps it is so close an extrapolation to conciousness that it is axiomatically required; that the observer; this eye we see our experience through; is indeed "our" experience. It is "my" experience. The experience observed by the thing best defined as oneself among all conceptual things.

To say that which is is does not mean anything surely just assumes is cannot be comprehended; yet clearly we are making meaningful statements about is. Its even more egregious to claim that because we can only define things in terms of relationships within its own system of itself that we cannot articulate meaningfully anything about it; especially if that which we have attempted to articulate about it is directly intertwined with this physical reality like "killing humans is bad". Just because killing humans could never be good; does not mean this statement isn't meaningful. The normative flows throughout the physical and makes points so obvious I have a thousand moorean shifts i'm willing to make of easily understandable material that I can only think you are joking or too deep into the rabbit hole to answer "what? what do dis mean!??!?!" "bad?" "killing is this?" It's just something of a different substance from what ur used to. We understand everything metaphysical or metalogical from it just seeming to be the case. I can say directly from my conscious experience i have seen red; not as a sense of sight but as some sort of thing which is of observation. My intuitions do not suggest that merely the sense data or the physical transportation of this red data is identical to the qualitative experience of red; but this red i speak of can only be spoken of in terms of conscious experience which can only be spoken of in terms of its existence and its relation to other metaphysical concepts. My only problem however is that I have a higher prior belief in the existence of my own conscious experience than in the existence of anything including the general reliability of or even existence of my sense data. If such a thing is meaningless; it would appear that his definition of meaninglessness is actually in itself meaningless; because it doesn't represent the nonsenicability of the articulations; which are not only pragmatically useful but a high pillar of rational articulation and understanding of existence; as parts and a whole? Even if we disagree on the separations of conscious experience; like that; it would take a lot of gutting the concept of conciousness to the state where all it defines is just itself is. First Qualia is Observed by the self. Qualia has a relationship with that which observes the qualia and that observing force appears to be someone. You could squish qualia and observation into one thing; then have the mind as the self be that which does the act of observation and observation being a metaphysical recombobulation of sense data; but we cannot reduce infinitely to obliterate the apparent uniqueness or the presentness of the phenomena in general. "Colors just happen to be what the brain is feeding it" DOES have some intuitive plausibility; but oftentimes these reductions of the metaphysical justified by physical explainations do not sufficinetly justify themselves against the prima facie observation of their apparent distinctions. Say we reduce all objects of sight into one now; its just a blurry blob of data; wait- we just articulated it in a way which can be understood! It is something that which appears as a plate of if not atomic qualia parts; but a sense data representative qualia gunk. This still tells us something about it! Well pretend it DOESNT for a second. Imagine now maybe the distinctions between sound and touch and taste qualias are nonmeaningful distinctions; it could just as well be all one whole object of qualia. This still tells us qualia can take shapes that represent sense data either as a property of the conciousness or as a property of the sense data. Ignoring that...! we finally have our uber obliterated conciousness. Now, how likely is that if we don't assume our conclusion?

Why does the physical world have the privilege of being shown rather than just said? I think the world is quite inherently logical and even the idea something could be different can be logically comprehended. Both sense data and shit our brains tell us on the spot are not actually pure reality; they just come into our minds with some trust level we accept. Does Wittgenstein just lay preference of meaningfulness into merely this world instead of all possible worlds; yet clearly we can say If X was done differently Y would occur. It seems like the ONLY distinguishing factor between his "meaningful facts" and the rest of things prima facie evident to be facts is that they could be true or false in a particular world; which really doesn't seem to be the deciding factor in anything besides empirical analysis which really doesn't seem to actually be the most meaningful sort of thought in any other sense of the word. I tried arguing like; well since logic deals with all possible worlds and the facts about all possible worlds if no individual possible world exists yet or if every possible world exists or if there is one superdetermined nessesary world and you reside in it then the facts about such a world cannot actually be other than what it is the case that they are therefore they are logical; but because we actually do reside in a world which could be different I must concede that there is a distinguishing factor regardless of how arbitrary and sneaky it is. ALTHOUGH; perhaps this articulation in itself is a subjectivity assumption wherin imagine if every possible world exists; if i asked if "john ate an apple" I would implicitly be asking "in this world; did john eat an apple" which is a direct weird subjective slant on the question which seems like it could introduce some weird irregularities and imprecisions among our attempts at perfect logical articulation. If we ask this question as a matter of how it is the case independent of any particular agent or world (although this is a multiverse metaphysic so i'm already way jumped the shark) any question not asked to a particular world would have a certain answer of "well uh, in 10,000 possible worlds yes and 10,0000000000 possible worlds no" or if asked to an individual in one, one particular world; the answer would also be certain, if the world is certain; and we dont ask about future events yet to have happened. RAHHHH modal logic hurtie my brain

Essentially im saying I dont care much for reality if his definition of reality presupposes a collection of things wheras my collection of things is composed of multiple distinct areas of substance and comprehension which are dealt with in distinct ways.

It seems extremely difficult to derive a specific deontological conclusion directly from teleological ends. The method they seem to go through is by first having a primary goal; then a "typical creature" then how that activity relates to that typical creature or circumstance in accordance with that goal; and then applies it blanketly to the rest of beings which share the same essence. Legs that don't grow properly are still "intended to walk" because a proper leg is intended for walking. (which then this walking was intended insofar as being useful for partaking in acts which satisfy yet and yet closer ends to the primary) So while we can deduce most propositions from typical circumstances in something like a platonic hypothetical voidspace wherein everything is perfect and all beings are the same; we must agree on what the base "perfect" is. For instance on homosexuality; we must agree that direct sexual love between 2 men is not expected to be partaken in or intended- although this seems to be entirely based on 2 primary propositions; one of which seem very difficult to justify outside of a religious revelation, being that men and men cannot reproduce together and one purpose of sexual activity for reproduction- which is supplemented by the idea that we are intended to multiply; secondly that men and women and only such combination are intended to be united in union; and that sexual activity is intended as an activity for unions. Essentially we must accept that proper sexual activity is that which somehow following from the teleology is a sort which is ordered towards reproduction and uniting unions. Although even catholic ethicists further complicate this; by expanding the exact ethical consideration to be "intended by the parties to produce children" or mentally open to pregnancy; which while fully addressing the hardest knockdown objection to catholic sexual ethics being "what about infertile people", is a primary example about how the hypotheticals relating to the perfect teleology can very easily produce multiple yet distinct conclusions that seem both to reasonably follow from the same premises prima facie. Secondly it seems difficult even if we establish some sort of alignment among ones intended activity; whether one is recommended or obligated for an activity; or if an activity not expected to be replicated by the perfect being is neutral or immoral.

I do not think that natural law is subject to a naturalistic or is ought fallacy; for it does not merely "smuggle" normative conclusions out of non normative premises about the world; but freely and openly proposes for all to hear the normative premises which are intertwined with facts about the world. It does not conclude the existence of normative facts from merely the relations of physical facts; but it proposes such to align with moral intuitions; the existence of certain moral facts which happen to align with nature. I can see the appeal; that if all follow from one basic premise; this significantly simplifies the reasonability of the position than a massive overarching and complex deontology which takes each intuitive moral proposition on its own merit. And if the most basic natural and rational interpretation of the reasoning which follows from the primary end provides us all the following facts in their most interpreted state; that is fair. And I must say; many people who do come to natural law ethics on their own do conclude the specific rules about homosexual acts with much less difficulty than I do; just prima facie interpreting the most reasonable following of the teleology to understand not that it is not "not expected but not wrong"; but indeed "directly wrong".

If this is indeed a problem which cannot be sufficiently addressed; it does pose a problem for catholicism because it seems to be that which was intended as a synthesis between a theology of a single "ultimate goal" for which all follows; and a necessity to find it in the natural order. While it is good for being so top light; it gets messy at the bottom when we cannot accept or conclude very specific or precise conclusions in the middle to resolve reasonable disputes. I do not know how reasonable a proposition within the catholic framework to suppose that gods moral law reveals itself not always NATURALLY; DIRECTLY; to the exact source (as in it does reveal to the direct source; and that everything after is naturally evident; but that at these "base goals" to the "base goal" level is a seperate sort of intuition not following directly from intertwining propositions about the physical world or "natural or rational analysis") but instead that these things are broken apart into separate systems of base acceptable propositions which can be known by intuition alone, including fundamental rights; obligations; systems and the greatest acts of union. Building an entire moral system like this would take literally forever; but until I do I am not even sure if this synthesis can adequately address Surely the propositions which I propose would be the "base reasonable and divinely related propositions which seem most reasonable" for instance about marriage; and also facts about the act of sex; in accordance with the fullest and most intuitive nature of the facts about marriage. It is quite clear what I have proposed is basically a multivirtue teleological system which is basically just more complicated natural law theories but re religiousized. Essentially there is quite present a collection of light fuzziness at the final stage of moral dispute; the nature of acts in themselves at the very bottom. These can be resolved; from the bottom on a case by case interpretation of specific activities at the bottom or from reframing the top; but it does cost some of the simplicity we worked so hard to build up. A final critique I can give is if you can really get anything from the same premises is it really any better; any more rational than the other ethical theories? This is why I rip the bandaid off and have the most complicated deontological system ever; only simplifying a multitude of moral propositions into a single fact from which all follow once I am certain that all moral intuitions within its bounds match from its conclusion- I of course believe these moral facts stem from god and his nature in some fashion; although it puts me at odds with basically the rest of catholicism. I wonder if my biggest issue is the sort of "end in itself" language I apply to each normative proposition on the ladder which I think is more of a linguistic dispute that isn't meaningfully distinct; as I think "good" is both a single directive; and something that is featured in all normative activity. I just dont think every single jump on that list can be directly deduced from each other; although from intuition we can conclude almost everything and the totality of human beings intuition tends to align with it outside of extreme circumstances like mass propaganda. "Good" is multiple virtues and activities. Which I would not be supersede if they feature some sort of direct essential and metaphysical relation to each other that is unique or in some ways "incomprehensible" to humanity at the moment.

WE FINNA BE EATING GOOD

It's kind of weird that when I talk about my position of sexual ethics as a gay person i'm either like hated for a perceived sad contradictory existence or they inexplicably massively respect it 🙏 I mean i understand the hated part that's like. probably fair in this world

Does something being contrary to its purpose make it an inherently wrong activity? Is there a distinction between this particular sort of teleological "impropriety" and wrongness? This is probably the strongest objection to any natural law argument concerning LGBTQ issues. We identify of course that the wrongness of incest best explained with a sort of teleological or natural law objection; and that relates to sexual activity; but this does not automatically mean that therefor all improper (as to be contrary to the evident purpose of the teleologically important act being-) sexual activities should not be done. Maybe you could make an argument collecting all activities deemed morally relevant in a teleological framework and identify that no thing that can be improper is under usual circumstances a sort of thing that is not morally dubious; I would have to do a deep analysis for that (if it was the case; it would significantly decrease the strength of this objection because prima facie one could conclude its impropriety to make it wrong to do). Another objection is that for certain types of teleologically relevant activities the nature of the activity is grave matter itself (rather than venial matter or neutralbutitsstillagoodtodoitthepourposefulway) are the sort that for all the types of improper activity related; the moral consequences are grave. Under such view wherein the type of activity constitutes the seriousness of a violation of the intended methodology of the act; incest would point to such activities discussed being of a grave morally relevant matter.

This however I should not merely assert. I should do a full analysis of both the wrongness of each teleologically relevant situation (all of morality lol) and see if there are things which are quite evidently improper yet do not even with full culpability constitute a morally wrong act, then check if the sort of wrongness among each individual type of morally relevant act contains the same sort of moral consequence with each violation of normative rules tied to the purpose of the acts. I wonder how my belief that many particular objects and activities are not actually morally meaningful because they are just arbitrary or linguistically useful/cultural games (chairs do not exist, they also do not have any purpose) will tie into how many things I actually catalog as being teleologically relevant. On my own I probably cannot being intellectually honest, declare my intuitions on this subject sufficient on its own merits considering these facts I do not know yet. Ultimately the reason I believe what I believe on this issue is because its what the church God gave us says.

I lowkey haven't thought about this for so long I forgot about the objection to the objection about infertility in hetero couples. It was something like that 1 the activity itself is intended between a woman and mans no no squares independent of the physical capability of conception even if it is totally absent, because it relates to acting with thought for the usual case of 2 beings with fundamental essences to appeal to independent of accidental irregularity. I was going to write about how I came up with another argument that kind of explains it; for it would seem prima facie that sex is intended to be done by people who are married. like married ppl should do like that stuff. generally there's an ick factor or sense of emptiness of this occurring outside of some form of couple intuitively. Like; I mean, that's why I exist and shi. And of course; god said man and woman something something marriage

After I thought of this however; I realised this is like trivially the case; as at least within the religious framework that im gunning for (sunk cost booYAH) because under this view there's just an underlying silent clarifier under 1 saying "for those who are married" But I guess I could say if we accept there is some sort of normative metaphysical chain that binds 2 beings in the sense of a marriage, then it would seem intuitively such beings would be intended to partake in sexual activity; independent of the actual capability of procreation. SO basically it's just an intuition argument that sounds reasonable- although it presupposes metaphysical marriage with is a concept much harder to argue for within only a natural law framework; it feels like a religiously revealed thing.

But essentially im saying someone could accept that some natural law normative rules do exist concerning the wrongness and rightness of acting for and against some purpose of an activity; but that not ALL purposes; even of those related to sexual acts, if an act is done contrary to its purpose; result in a wrong.

According to her emergency appointments "do not exist for adults". Clearly this is not self evident, maybe she should have spent 2 minutes of the last 18 years to explain this to me.