Resilience Planning in the Asia-Pacific

     This paper aims to reflect on the conflicts between the Maori and the Christchurch government agencies’ disaster response and recovery initiatives during the Canterbury earthquakes in order to better inform disaster mitigation and preparedness initiatives. Disaster studies traditionally involves an analysis of the four areas of disaster management: disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation.  While it may seem simpler to focus on physical systems and built capital, this conventional approach can miss deeper connections between communities and their natural environments. An alternative is to use community assets (i.e. both physical and social assets) as a starting point for mitigation and recovery planning can lead to a deeper understanding of what makes a community more resilient and how to improve the disaster recovery process.  In addition, pre-disaster recovery planning can help a community to also recognize its pre-disaster hazard mitigation and preparation needs.      A United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction report indicated that the Canterbury earthquakes catalyzed a revitalisation of traditional values and practices, which were operationalized by Māori to facilitate emergency management and disaster mitigation.  These cultural technologies constituted a dynamic and holistic framework, a holistic network for ensuring urban community recovery, social resilience, and regional sustainability, which benefited both Māori responders and the wider non-Māori community. In this paper, we define resilience as a community’s ability to “bounce back” after a major shock such as a natural disaster. In recent years, the idea of community resilience has become increasingly popular, and literature appears to suggest that more community participation in the disaster framework can lead to a more resilient community. This paper strives to investigate how the Christchurch, New Zealand disaster response team and the Maori community worked together in response to the Christchurch earthquakes in 2010 and 2011.      The relationship between the Maori community and those involved in disaster response is noteworthy due to the challenges that the present-day Maori community faces, as they tend to live in poverty, marginalization, disconnection from the educational system, and more likely to be institutionalized than non-Maori.  My research uncovered that language and cultural barriers, distrust of outsiders and poor understanding of bureaucratic processes can hamper recovery efforts. Furthermore, efforts to build trust and capacity must occur prior to disasters. Interestingly enough, the Maori showed the same resourcefulness as other marginalized groups, and had the ability to rebuild much quicker due to their extensive networks that supported the recovery effort.

Research Frameworks      In this paper, I will be using several frameworks in order to address the issue in a holistic way. First, I will be referring to the traditional disaster studies model that shows a circular flow between disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. This paper will focus on the role that the Maori community played in the disaster response and recovery processes, and lessons that can be translated to the other phases of disaster planning. The Traditional Disaster Planning Framework

     Next, I will be referring to the co-management framework as outlined by Berkes in his article, “Evolution of co-management: Role of knowledge generation, bridging organizations and social learning.” This framework is helpful in understanding and managing the dynamics between the government and civil society groups, particularly groups that have been historically disenfranchised and underrepresented. According to Berkes, this co-management framework  can be examined as a problem solving process involving negotiation, deliberation, knowledge generation and joint learning, which in turn can be translated into power sharing, institution building, and trust building. In the Canterbury earthquake context, we can use this framework to strengthen the relationship between the Maori and the New Zealand government agencies.

     Lastly, I will be referring to the ARUP City Resilience Index, developed by the Rockefeller Foundation. This framework was created to measure a city’s enable cities to measure and monitor the multiple factors that contribute to their resilience and to  measure relative performance over time. In using the Resilience Index, I hope to make the connection between strengthening the relationships between the Maori community and the City of Christchurch, to the resilience of the city as a whole. This provides a holistic articulation of city resilience, structured around four dimensions, 12 goals and 52 indicators that are critical for the resilience of our cities. This structure also forms the foundations of the Index, which through the online platform, cities will be able to access and operationalise.

Between 2010 and 2011, the region of Christchurch, New Zealand, experienced multiple earthquakes between the magnitudes of 5.8 and 7.1. The most serious earthquake occurred on February 22, 2011 when a 6.3 magnitude earthquake killed 185 people and caused $11 billion dollars in damages to buildings and infrastructure. In addition, from September 2010 to September 2011, there were an estimated 9,000 aftershocks and earthquakes, some of which caused buildings to collapse and cut power and water to thousands of residents. The effects of the earthquakes and aftershocks are long-lasting as the damages  erased 1.5% of the country’s GDP over a five-year span.  As the earthquake has destroyed one-third of its central business district, Christchurch  faces up to 20 years of rebuilding.

In addition to the significant loss of lives, the earthquake greatly impacted the lives of Christchurch citizens as schools were closed for about two weeks after the earthquake.  Power, water, telecommunications, and mobility were all affected. Although most Christchurch residents in the urban areas of Christchurch had access to electricity a few days after the quake, those living in rural areas had to wait for several days. Tap water had to be boiled for at least a week in order to be safely consumed, and the rural areas again had to extend this practice for much longer than the urban residents. Mobility was greatly affected as railway lines buckled and had to be repaired before trains were operable, thereby stranding those who did not have other means of transport. The eastern side of Christchurch, an area that was primarily dominated by communities with limited socio-economic resources, was the region most significantly impacted by the earthquakes. The urban Māori community (25,725) which at the time constituted 7.3% of the urban population was concentrated in the eastern suburbs. The geospatial concentration of Māori in the severely impacted areas suggested that in comparison with the wider community, Māori were disproportionately affected in terms of reduced financial resources, access to basic necessities, sanitation, power, transport and support from frontline responders.

Maori Community’s Disaster Response and Recovery Efforts      The expansive literature analyzing the Maori disaster response to the Canterbury earthquakes has been overwhelmingly positive, with their efforts having been recognised by the United Nations as an exemplar of community-led disaster risk management. The Māori community-led response to the earthquakes in Canterbury was the impetus for the creation of a Māori Recovery Network, which linked with the mainstream emergency management infrastructure to ensure the inclusion of, and accessibility to resources and support for the diverse communities in Christchurch. Although the Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu (a Maori tribe) was a minority group within the Canterbury Māori community, this tribe bore the responsibility of guardianship for the region and thus had a moral obligation to protect and ensure the wellbeing of the Canterbury environment and the wider population. Immediately following the February 22, 2011 earthquake, this tribe took leadership in developing the coordinated Māori response to the earthquakes. The Chairman of the tribe, Sir Mark Solomon, invited Māori tribal leaders, as well as Māori representatives from central government and private organisations, to an earthquake response strategy development meeting, and the Māori Recovery Network was established within 24 hours.  The rapid assessment of the emergency response was possible primarily due to the adaptive capacity of Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu to apply its resources urgently and to work collectively with a huge variety of Maori and non Maori organisations from local, national and international networks. Other examples of effective disaster response and recovery efforst include when 13 Māori doctors, 18 Māori nurses mobilized from Rēhua marae as barefoot medical teams providing primary health care services to the most inaccessible suburbs of Christchurch.

     Historically, Māori community centers (“marae”)  have provided a sense of place that is central to Māori collective identity and well-being, while at the same time operating as centers of support that unite Māori communities in an efficient way. Thus, the Ngāi Tahu community center opened immediately following the February 2011 earthquake and provided shelter, food, water, social support and hospitality to both the Maori and the wider community. Maori families (“whānau”) are considered the core units of Māori cultural capital, and are the ones that run the operations of the community centers. Extended familial networks then help in sharing resources, providing emergency accommodation, ensuring the safety of family members, staffing the community centers, securing and/or clearing damaged property and assisting Christchurch residents to negotiate the bureaucracy of responding government agencies. At the municipal level, approximately 2% of the population provided material, social and financial support to 20,000 households. The 12 Ngāi Tahu communities in the Christchurch area were able to feed and accommodate up to 4,000 individuals, making them key players in the region’s disaster response and recovery efforts.      Other disaster mitigation initiatives included establishing a 24-hour telephone hotline, coordinating financial support, managing the logistics of donated goods through makeshift offices at a former military base, logistical support for Māori wardens and serving as liaisons with government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the media.

Conflicts between the Maori and the Civil Defence      Despite the positive outcomes in disaster response and recovery that the Maori community was able to provide to its community and the broader community as a whole, Māori involved in the response efforts identified several areas of conflict between them and the Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group (CDEM), and government agencies in general. The areas of conflict included the delay and lack of coordination between Māori agencies and emergency services, the lack of Maori representation in agencies charged with emergency preparedness and response planning, and a lack of cultural sensitivity on the part of the government agencies. Each of these areas of conflicts had significant negative impacts. For example, after the 22 February 2011 earthquake, coordinating an integrated response with emergency management was delayed as communication with Civil Defence took eight days to be established and required external mediators, thereby extending the state of emergency for those who did not have immediate access to resources. In addition, unfamiliarity with Māori capability and capacity resulted in delayed linkages to the formal emergency management infrastructure, as well as difficulties integrating Māori volunteers into the disaster response system. The lack of Māori representation within national and local emergency management agencies meant that Māori community needs, resources, and capabilities were overlooked in disaster preparedness and response initiatives. In addition, the lack of Māori representation within Civil Defence created barriers to the inclusion of Māori perspectives in emergency response initiatives, which meant that there was inadequate guidance regarding cultural protocals, thereby creating more tension between the Maori and the government.      Lastly, systemic cultural insensitivity within Civil Defence meant that Maori people in need of assistance may have decided to not receive aid due to how they felt they were being treated.  There were accounts of how Civil Defence welfare centers (i.e. emergency shelters)  were not welcoming to the Maori, which disincentivized them from going to these centers, even if they needed the assistance. There were also accounts of being turned away from the welfare centers due to what appeared to be systemic bias. After the September 2010 earthquake, a Maori Party leader called the Mayor for a public apology over the treatment of a Christchurch Maori family (the Martin family) that was evicted from an Earthquake Welfare Centre. The family were publicly labeled as "repulsive" by Christchurch City Mayor Bob Parker based on police reports that family members were intimidating others and that they had falsely claimed their houses as being uninhabitable, which proved to be untrue. One of the family members, Grandmother Martin remarked, "We've gone from being victims of the earthquake to victims of the people who were helping us out. I wouldn't use the facilities again, I would just stay home." Grandmother Martin added that she was more traumatized by being publicly humiliated than by the earthquake itself. She concluded that the Maori community would be too scared and embarrassed to utilize the City’s relief services.     

Co-Management Approaches Moving Forward      According to Berkes, co-management is a range of arrangements, with different degrees of power sharing, for joint decision-making by the state and communities about a set of resources or an area. For an arrangement to be considered, “co-managed,” it must have at least one strong vertical linkage involving the government and a user group, and some formalized arrangement for sharing power and responsibility. Furthermore, mere  public participation is not considered co-management, as it  requires some institutionalized arrangement for intensive engagement of parties in the decision-making process.      Here we address the use of a specific type of co-management called “adaptive co-management,” which is defined as a process by which institutional arrangements and ecological knowledge are tested and revised in a dynamic, ongoing, self-organized process of learning-by-doing. In the real world, adaptive co-management has three themes: horizontal interaction among stakeholders, vertical interaction of communities with multilevel actors, and iterative learning. Using the Berkes framework in the Christchurch context, there are three ways in which adaptive co-management can be applied:

     Bridging knowledge:  Increasing the number of Maori representation into the disaster management agencies will help to incorporate multiple knowledge systems which will enhance decision-making in a disaster scenario. Currently, Māori are not engaged enough to generate in-depth response to many technical aspects of disaster recovery, being underrepresented and less likely to achieve equitable outcomes in this field. One way to institutionalize the representation of Maori into disaster management agencies is through the  creation of a formal partnership between the Christchurch Civil Defence and the Maori communities.  This formal partnership can facilitate the combining of complementary knowledge, skills and capacities of both groups, which thus can create a broader range of knowledge to draw from during a disaster or other types of crisis situation. The use of indigenous knowledge systems with the government’s knowledge systems will also add legitimacy to the indigenous knowledge systems, which though has shown its effectiveness, has historically not been validated by formal institutions. Protocols for engagement must be followed by stakeholders and long-term relationships formed with Māori to develop responsiveness in this field.

     Cooperation-building: Creating multiple opportunities for engagement between the disaster management agencies and the Maori community can strengthen the relationship between the two groups. Berkes suggests various tactics such as (1) continuous physical presence; (2) regular contact with people close to decision-makers, (3) maintenance of multiple programs for different groups, and (4) hyperflexibility in resource allocation and schedules. Continuous physical presence can include regular meetings (both formal and informal) that bring together government agency personnel and the Maori. Next, the Maori community should feel that they have access to decision-makers to voice their concerns. The Maori participants who were interviewed indicated that a closer relationship with Civil Defence would have been more beneficial to the disaster response and recovery. The diversification of programs offered can assist in engaging various groups and levels of stakeholders, which can be utilized for different purposes during a disaster scenario. Another significant finding was that co-management programs, once successful, tended to become involved in broader issues, which can help solve problems beyond disaster planning. Participatory research: According to Berkes, research that includes rural and indigenous communities as equal partners has the potential to build social capital and enhance the community’s capacity for problem solving and designing culturally-appropriate resource management strategies. Further, community-based participatory research (CBPR) is a research approach that facilitates relationships of trust with community research partners, and is an effective method for promoting the wellbeing of Indigenous communities. This CBPR approach was utilized after the Canterbury earthquakes, designed and implemented in accordance with Kaupapa Māori research principles. The Māori research methodology Te Whakamāramatanga shaped the establishment of a research partnership between the Joint Centre for Disaster Research (Massey University) and the tribal administrative body as well as the implementation of a culturally appropriate and contextually relevant approach to conducting the research. In this approach, Māori values and principles constituted methodological concepts, which included genealogy, building relationships, protection/ ensuring safety, creating trust, respectful negotiation, equity, advocacy, self-determination, empowerment, and agreement. According to the researchers undertaking the CBPR, they will collectively draw on research findings “to advocate for improvements to urban, civil defence, emergency services and disaster preparedness planning throughout New Zealand in the longer term.” Further, this CBPR approach should continue to be used in disaster mitigation and disaster preparedness planning.

     Cultural Education: While Berkes’ framework is helpful in addressing the lack of coordination and representation that we saw in the Canterbury earthquakes, his framework falls short in addressing the lack of cultural sensitivity that was needed in that context. Furthermore, the co-management framework should include education on indigenous culture throughout the disaster management agencies and other government agencies that work with the Maori communities. Education would include learning about Maori history, cultural values, cultural norms and protocols, as well as learning some basic Maori words.        This cultural education can be helpful in a disaster context in three ways. First, the education could help in preventing culturally insensitive practices from taking place, as disaster management personnel are more aware of Maori values and protocol. Second, in seeing a greater level of education about their practices among the disaster management personnel, the Maori will feel more comfortable in using the services that are available to them. Third, the cultural education will allow disaster management personnel to have a broader perspective in other areas of disaster planning, such as in disaster preparedness and in disaster mitigation. Agencies need to better understand Māori realities and then the outcomes of doing a good job for Māori (both agency and Māori aspirations). Public information, for example, still retains an emphasis on individualised emergency preparedness and response which may be counterproductive to the development of strategies that are inclusive of communitarian cultures.

Disaster Mitigation & Resilience Strategies for Christchurch      Resilience as we define it here is a community’s ability to “bounce back” and improve its capacity after a shock or a stress. The ARUP City Resilience Index was developed by the Rockefeller Foundation and adopted by over 100 cities around the world in order to assess each city’s vulnerabilities and take steps to increase its resilience. Christchurch is one of the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities (100RC) and in 2016 created its own resilience strategy based on the ARUP framework. By using this approach to evaluate and set priorities, Christchurch hopes to achieve what it calls the “Resilience Dividend.” That is, instead of investing to reduce impacts from a single hazard or improve a single metric, the city will make strategic decisions to improve its overall strength and endure multiple shocks and stresses. The hope is that investing in resilience can save money, save lives, and build a more equitable and prosperous city. This strategy incorporates Maori cultural values and ideas such as “whānau” which means extended family, and “kaitiakitanga” which means stewardship, which were referenced throughout the document. Christchurch’s resilience strategy broadly outlines the nine resilience challenges the city faces, which includes building social cohesion, building trust between the government and its stakeholders, and addressing social issues like housing affordability. It appears through the city’s comprehensive resilience strategy that its leaders are attempting to make thoughtful choices for its city in the long-term view. Notwithstanding, it is important to draw a distinction between merely enduring a disaster, which is something that indigenous peoples have done through generations of colonization, and absorbing and then rebounding from shocks and disturbances. According to Lambert, broad resilience to urban disaster by Mäori can only come from better strategies of reduction and readiness, initiatives which must take place before any disaster. Without tackling these underlying socio-economic issues, only so much can be done in the realm of disaster preparedness, recovery, and response. The true disaster mitigation measures will address these underlying issues that keep the Maori in a perpetual state of poverty. Indeed, a crucial component of this resilience will be for Mäori to be empowered in accessing more options and opportunities to improve their economic conditions. Māori tend to have higher unemployment rates, to be concentrated in unskilled work and to earn lower average hourly wages than their European counterparts.  New Zealand should also increase its efforts to address the overrepresentation of indigenous people in prisons and to reduce recidivism, in particular its underlying causes, as they represent over 50% of those incarcerated in the country. As Lambert asserts, “Disasters recur; they are inherent within our world. Indigenous economic marginalisation and consequent vulnerability are not.”

References Disaster-related articles: New Zealand: Christchurch Facing 20 Years of Earthquake Repairs https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/world/asia/27briefs-christchurch.html http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/news/media-releases/2016/nzdf-thanks-foreign-crews-for-supporting-relief-effort.htm https://my.christchurchcitylibraries.com/christchurch-and-canterbury-earthquakes/ http://ketechristchurch.peoplesnetworknz.info/canterbury_earthquakes_2010_2011#.Wt6U-4jwaUk Earthquake Could Cost New Zealand $11 Billion 6 March 2011 https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/business/global/07new-zealand-quake.html In Earthquakes, Poverty, Population and Motion Matter BY ANDREW C. REVKIN  SEPTEMBER 7, 2010 https://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/in-earthquakes-poverty-population-and-motion-matter/

The Maori Role in the Earthquakes: Resilience? Contested meanings and experiences in post-disaster Christchurch, New Zealand A Winstanleya*, M Hepib and D Wood Consultant (Applied social science for community well-being), Christchurch, New Zealand; bInstitute of Environmental Science and Research, Christchurch, New Zealand (Received 15 January 2015; accepted 22 June 2015) A Māori love story: Community-led disaster management in response to the Ōtautahi (Christchurch) earthquakes as a framework for action Christine M. Kenney, Suzanne Phibbs UNISDR Scientific and Technical Advisory Group Case Studies – 2014 Māori Community-led Disaster Risk Management: An effective response to the 2010-2011 Christchurch Earthquakes Dr Christine Kenney; Sir Mark Solomon Lambert, Simon. Māori Community-led Disaster Risk Management: An effective response to the 2010-2011 Christchurch Earthquakes Policy instruments for Indigenous Peoples and Disaster Risk Reduction- A Case Study of Māori participation in Disaster and Emergency Management, Aotearoa New Zealand (https://blogs.lincoln.ac.nz/maori-resilience/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2015/04/Disaster-Policy-Framework-3.0.pdf) Webber, Chris. A Summary of Māori Issues for Disaster Recovery in the Environmental Health Field (https://journalindigenouswellbeing.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/02Webber.pdf) Iwi Resilience? The Maori Response Following the February 22, 2011 Christchurch Earthquake. M. Kipa R. Potangaroa S. Wilkinson (https://www.library.auckland.ac.nz/external/finalproceeding/Files/Papers/46530final00159.pdf) Community-led disaster risk management: A Māori response to Ōtautahi (Christchurch) earthquakes Christine Kenney, Suzanne Phibbs, Douglas Paton, John Reid, David Johnston(https://researchers.cdu.edu.au/en/publications/community-led-disaster-risk-management-a-m%C4%81ori-response-to-%C5%8Dtauta)

The Maori Context in New Zealand: Human Rights Commission Committee against Torture: Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of New Zealand  (2015) https://www.hrc.co.nz/files/2814/3192/5666/CAT_Report_May_2015.pdf https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/15/regaining-maori-identity-and-keeping-them-out-of-new-zealands-jails https://www.iwgia.org/en/aotearoa-new-zealand   https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/te-manu-korihi/308960/bias-against-maori-in-education,-justice-children's-commissioner   https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/should-te-reo-maori-made-compulsory-in-new-zealand-schools https://www.risingholme.org.nz/Courses/Languages/Te-Reo-Maori-Level-1/   http://www.justspeak.org.nz/ Whānau Taketake Māori: Recessions and Māori resilience. A report for the Families Commission.

Hurricane Harvey is worth studying diligently, not only due to the storm’s magnitude, but because it serves as a flagrant example of what happens when neither disaster mitigation nor adaptation measures are implemented.  In this paper, I will discuss the origins of the hurricane and its impacts on Houston and Harris County, and discuss how the disaster was managed from the local, state and federal levels.  Throughout the paper, I will point out examples of vulnerabilities that exacerbated the damage.  My hope through writing this paper is that it will serve as a wake up call for our country to do more in mitigation and adaptation, and to make disaster preparedness a priority.

Hurricane Harvey, which struck the southeastern coast of Texas in August 2017, was considered the most extreme rain event in U.S. history.   According to experts, Harvey's extreme slow movement over a five-day period (August 26-30) resulted in catastrophic flooding that is estimated to cost $200 billion in damages.   Harvey was classified as a Category 4 Hurricane with winds of 130 mph near Rockport, Texas.   Though the winds were devastating, most people underestimated the rainfall, which actually caused the most damage.  According to scientists, the warm water in the Gulf of Mexico intensified the rainfall, and the scarcity of wind in the upper atmosphere meant that there was nothing to steer the storm away from land.  In addition, the storm surge elevated Galveston Bay which blocking drainage of the rain and created rivers out of roads.  The result is the death of 70 people, 28,000 square miles of Texas is estimated to have been flooded, and 42,000 people have been displaced from their homes and living in shelters. 

Rainfall (inches) due to Hurricane Harvey

Source: Washington Post 

Hurricanes in Texas are relatively commonplace.  The most significant one its history was Hurricane Galveston in the year 1900 which killed 8,000 people.  Evidently, the residents and tourists of the town did not heed warnings that a strong storm was on its way, and thus, most people did not evacuate, leading to the high number of deaths.  In the most recent 21st century past, Hurricane Allison (2001), Hurricane Rita (2005), and Hurricane Dolly (2008) all left Texas with billions of dollars in damages.  However, the most recent devastating storm was Hurricane Ike in 2008 was considered between Category 2 and Category 4, and damages totaled $19.3 billion.  The accompanying large storm surge obliterated the communities of Crystal Beach, Gilchrist, and High Island. The storm knocked out electrical power to 2.6 million people across Texas and Louisiana, and there were 20 direct and 64 indirect deaths. 

The emergency messaging and evacuation messages were mixed, thus eliciting a mixed public response.  Though thousands evacuated, thousands more did not.  Evidently, many believed they were safer to stay home than to attempt to venture out, and in some ways, these feelings were warranted.  After all, over two-thirds of flood-related deaths occurred in vehicles as people attempted to escape.   On the local level, numerous flash flood emergencies were issued for the Houston and Beaumont, Texas, metropolitan areas, and for Bastrop County and nearby communities.  On the federal level, so six people at the National Hurricane Center started helping to reach out to reporters, coordinate with media outlets and blitz social media.   On Thursday, August 24, the storm was categorized into Category 1; then became Category 2; The 4 p.m. headline warned of “life-threatening and devastating flooding.” On Friday, August 25, it was upgraded to Category 3, with sustained winds nearing 120 miles an hour.  Storm surge is an abnormal rise of water generated by a storm, over and above the predicted astronomical tides.  The center issued separate storm surge warnings and included them in each of its bulletins about Harvey, warning of catastrophic flooding. 

In purely geographic terms, Houston is considered to be an area highly vulnerable to storms.  It is a low-lying city situated on Galveston Bay, on the Gulf of Mexico. The city center is only 50 feet above sea level, and much of the city was built on top of marshes and swamps.  Its wetlands historically served as a natural flood barrier absorbing rainfall, but due to significant urban development over the last 25 years, the city has lost almost 50 percent of its wetlands to development.  Its lax (if not completely absent) zoning policies have allowed the city to become a concrete jungle, paving over 166,000 acres in the past 15 years.  It is easy to see that the urban environment paved the way for this disaster to create the amount of damage that it did.

The city’s demographic makeup has also brought up issues surrounding environmental justice.  Houston has a population of 2.5 million people and is the 4th largest city in the United States in terms of population size.  Since 2000, the city of Houston and Harris County have undergone a population explosion and over the past several decades, a demographic one. Harris County has climbed from 3.4 million people to 4.6 million in 2016 — a 35 percent increase, with growing immigrant and refugee populations.  In fact, over one million residents of this area are foreign-born, and Pew Research estimates that more than a half-million people in the Houston metro area are undocumented immigrants.   Natural disasters are known to affect low-income communities the most, as they do not have the resources to relocate and it is much harder for them to resettle and rebuild their lives.  According to ABC News, 1.3 million people in Houston are lacking health insurance and 22.5 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.  In addition, the city’s historical lack of zoning laws allowed for residential housing to be built in areas that were prone to flooding, and not surprisingly, these were areas of low-income communities.  The income disparity in the city also begs the question of environmental justice issues.  According to a Huffington Post article, Houston flooding always hits poor, non-white neighborhoods hardest.  In addition, unsanitary conditions such as the flooding of water treatment plants and sewage, has caused sickness and death for those who live in these low-income neighborhoods.  For example, a woman died of E. coli bacteria which was found in the floodwaters in her home.   

The other issue that is not covered as much by the media is the exorbitant amount of air and chemical pollution that Hurricane Harvey unleashed.  The petrochemical plants, oil refineries and shipping lanes that run adjacent to neighborhoods of color on Houston’s east side spread toxic waste each time the city floods, adding to the woes of those communities.  Not only do the floods devastate the people most affected by storms by destroying their homes, but the nearby petrochemical plants also pollute the water and cause more health hazards for them.  According to The Guardian, “Communities face surging toxic fumes and possible water contamination, as refineries and plants report more than 2,700 tons of extra pollution.”  The chemical spills are linked to heightened cancer risk, gastrointestinal ailments, and other illnesses.  As Houston has not met national air quality standards since the introduction of the Clean Air Act in 1970, it will be interesting to see if public outcry will be enough to alter Houston’s behavior.  A civil society group, Residents Against Flooding, is suing the city in hopes of getting certain flood protection projects built.

Houston’s Oil Refineries

Source: The Washington Post 

The leadership in Houston, in both the public and private sectors do not support climate change initiatives, as they benefit from the status quo of promoting the economic interests of oil production. The ongoing perception is to deny that climate change is exacerbating these storms (these are just “freak occurrences”) and the belief that the city can engineer its way out of disasters.  According to Pro Publica, Houston’s two top flood control officials state that the current zoning laws are mostly sufficient and that the city’s biggest challenge is not managing rapid urban growth but retrofitting outdated infrastructure. In a place where climate change is not seen as a threat and priorities are elsewhere, It is easy to see then, how this city has not prepared itself for Hurricane Harvey’s visit.  

This is further exacerbated by the fact that though scientists are increasingly able to link some extreme weather events to climate change, the causes and magnitude of hurricanes are still very hard to determine. Kenneth Kunkel, a researcher with the North Carolina Institute for Climate Studies, stated that even without climate change as a factor, oceans are normally warm this time of year, and that the Gulf of Mexico has been warmer than average lately (some estimates show 5 degrees warmer), most likely strengthening the storm.  Kunkel was concerned when he saw public statements of relief that the storm had been downgraded from Category 4 strength to a tropical storm because the change in technical terminology may have confused the public and led local officials to lose focus on the greater threat, which was the heavy, ongoing rainfall that lasted several days.

The hope is that the communities of Texas and the United States as a whole will be impacted by the stories of trauma, death, tragedies, and victories of the people who have been affected.  Scientific data is not enough.  “We are scientists, and we are used to numbers and quantitative ways and technical ways of speaking,” quotes Mr. Brennan. ”When the numbers from a major storm start rolling in, the scientists and media coordinators stiffen. Phrases like “Category 4” and “40 inches of rain” and “stalled hurricane” and “unprecedented flooding” start to have life-changing consequences for the people in the hurricane’s path.   Indeed, despite the numerous “public service announcements,” many people did not really understand the gravity of the disaster, and suffered tremendously because of it.  

There seems to be a glimmer of hope.  We are starting to see a movement throughout cities across the U.S. where city leaders are engaging their emergency management offices to update or create their hazard mitigation plans.  But this may not be enough; long-term disaster recovery plans need to be considered as well.  The majority of residents of Houston did not have flood insurance because many were technically not living in a regular flood zone.  It is up to municipalities to carry the responsibility of equipping their citizens for disasters.  We have seen time and again that the federal government is cumbersome and is unable to show up to disasters in a timely manner.  Disasters have now been categorized as local incidences, further washing away federal responsibility.  Communities must begin to prepare for the worst, and to expect the unexpected.

References

Almuktar, Sarah, Bloch, Matthew, Carlsen, Audrey, et al. “Mapping the Devastation of Harvey in Houston.” New York Times. 29 August 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/28/us/houston-maps-hurricane-harvey.html?mcubz=1 (accessed September 30, 2017).

Alvarez, Lizette.  “From Forecast to Disaster: A Timeline at the National Hurricane Center.” New York Times. 30 August 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/us/hurricane-center-timeline.html (accessed September 30, 2017).

Astor, Maggie and Niraj Chokshi. “Hurricane Harvey: The Devastation and What Comes Next.” New York Times. 28 August 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/us/hurricane-harvey-texas.html?mcubz=0 (accessed September 30, 2017).

Blinder, Alan, Fernandez, Manny, and Julie Turkewitz. “In Houston, Anxiety and Frantic Rescues as Floodwaters Rise.” New York Times. 27 August 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/27/us/hurricane-harvey-texas.html (accessed September 30, 2017).

Cameron, Darla, Alcantara, Chris, Florit, Gabriel, et al. “Flooding persists as Harvey downgraded to tropical depression.” Washington Post. 1 September 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/national/harvey-impact/?utm_term=.79f4ecdf1006 (accessed September 30, 2017).

Chuck, Elizabeth. “Hurricane Harvey: How Many Billions of Dollars in Damage Will Historic Storm Cost?” NBC News. 30 August 2017. https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/hurricane-harvey/how-many-billions-damage-will-harvey-cost-s-anyone-s-n797521 (accessed September 30, 2017).

Dolce, Chris. “At Least 234 People Have Been Killed By Flooding in the U.S. in Nearly 18 Months.” Weather.com. 26 June 2016. https://weather.com/storms/severe/news/flood-deaths-united-states-near-200 (accessed September 30, 2017).

Friedman, Lisa and John Schwartz. “How Hurricane Harvey Became So Destructive” New York Times. 28 August 2017 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/climate/how-hurricane-harvey-became-so-destructive.html (accessed September 30, 2017).

Gallagher, JJ.  “Hurricane Harvey wreaks historic devastation: By the numbers.” ABC News. 1 September 2017. http://abcnews.go.com/US/hurricane-harvey-wreaks-historic-devastation-numbers/story?id=49529063 (accessed September 30, 2017).

“Historic Hurricane Harvey's Recap.” 2 September 2017. Weather.com. https://weather.com/storms/hurricane/news/tropical-storm-harvey-forecast-texas-louisiana-arkansas (accessed September 30, 2017).

Kaufman, Alexander. “Houston Flooding Always Hits Poor, Non-White Neighborhoods Hardest.” Huffington Post. 29 August 2017. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/houston-harvey-environmental-justice_us_59a41c90e4b06d67e3390993 (accessed September 30, 2017).

Lauer, Claudia and Paul J. Weber. “Hurricane Harvey Death Toll Hits 70.” NBC News. 6 September 2017. http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/Hurricane-Harvey-Death-Toll-Hits-70-442918503.html (accessed September 30, 2017).

Mccarthy, Morrigan.  “Harvey in Pictures.” New York Times. 27 August 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/27/us/harvey-pictures-hurricane-storm.html (accessed September 30, 2017).

Mejia, Brittny. “How Houston has become the most diverse place in America.” 9 May 2017.http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-houston-diversity-2017-htmlstory.html  (accessed September 30, 2017).

Milman, Oliver. “'Your eyes start itching': pollution soars in Houston after chemical industry leaks.” The Guardian. 2 September 2017.  https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/02/houston-hurricane-harvey-pollution-petrochemical-plants (accessed September 30, 2017).

Passel, Jeffrey and D’Vera Cohn. “20 metro areas are home to six-in-ten unauthorized immigrants in U.S.” Pew Research. 9 February 2017. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/09/us-metro-areas-unauthorized-immigrants/ (accessed September 30, 2017).

Roth, David. “Texas Hurricane History.” National Weather Service.  https://www.weather.gov/media/lch/events/txhurricanehistory.pdf (accessed September 30, 2017).

Satija, Neena. “Boomtown, Flood Town.” Pro Publica. 7 December 2016.  https://projects.propublica.org/houston-cypress/?utm_campaign=sprout&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&utm_content=1503846942 (accessed September 30, 2017).

Scutti, Susan. “Woman dies from flesh-eating bacteria from Harvey-flooded home.” CNN. 29 September 2017. http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/28/health/houston-flood-flesh-eating-bacteria/index.html (accessed September 30, 2017).

Simmons, Ann.  “The Impact of Harvey’s Wrath By The Numbers.” Los Angeles Times. 30 August 2017. http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-hurricane-harvey-by-the-numbers-20170830-htmlstory.html (accessed September 30, 2017).

(my lovely view)

     We have witnessed the intensification of climate change already having triggered weather catastrophes across the globe and we can anticipate more dire emergencies in years to come. In response, more and more cities are creating resilience plans to address and mitigate risks and to build adaptive capacity. Unfortunately, not all of these snazzy, colorful resilience reports thoroughly address the management of their community’s vulnerable populations.  Vulnerable populations include women, children, the frail and elderly, ethnic minorities, illegal immigrants, refugees and people with disabilities.[1] Here in Hawaii, the Micronesian migrant population is a case study of a vulnerable community to climate change. As their home islands become more and more uninhabitable due to radiation levels and sea level rise, thousands are moving to the United States under the Compact of Free Association (COFA) agreement.  In fact, there are currently 75,000 COFA migrants residing in the United States, with 12,000 of them residing in Hawaii.[2] Unfortunately, when Micronesians arrive in Hawaii, they usually do not have the resources to efficiently assimilate into the community, and many live in a cycle of poverty as a result.  

     The Micronesian community in Honolulu is experiencing high levels of exposure and sensitivity, and though currently there are moderate levels of adaptive capacity, it is not sustainable long-term.  Currently, the State of Hawaii nor the City and County of Honolulu does not have a resilience plan in place to address vulnerable populations such as the Micronesian community.  I believe that our community needs to come up with sustainable ways to mitigate risks and build our adaptive capacity in order to address this issue.  In my Community Resilience class, we analyzed over thirty community resilience plans to compare the quality and scope of each plan.  Out of all the resilience plans we studied, Nashville was the only one that I believe made it a priority to address the resilience for vulnerable populations within its community.  Nashville’s community resilience approach includes collaborative planning across diverse stakeholders, a clear vision for its resilient future, and uses tools like spatial mapping in order to address its vulnerable communities.  From analyzing Nashville’s approach to their vulnerable populations, we can use this as a starting point for Honolulu’s own approach to making the Micronesian community more resilient, as this community is likely one of the most vulnerable populations in Hawaii. I will take the action steps that Nashville has laid out to attain its own resilience goals and show how we can tailor those action steps to address the Micronesian migration issue in a sustainable way.

Here is a link to Nashville’s Resilience Plan

How we can use Nashville’s Resilience Plan to Address Honolulu’s Vulnerable Populations

     How can Honolulu learn from Nashville in terms of making vulnerable populations more resilient? First, Honolulu needs to have a clear vision for what its resilient future looks like.  Nashville’s vision for its future self is to become a city that is resilient to the climate and non-climate stressors facing the region, where government, business, the natural and built environment, and people are minimally impacted by these risks, and the region supports livable, prosperous, sustainable, and diverse communities.[3]  Nashville’s future vision includes ensuring opportunity for all, expanding accessibility, creating economic prosperity, fostering strong neighborhoods, improving education, championing the environment, and preserving Nashville’s character.[4]  These are all ideals that Honolulu too can aspire for.

     Secondly, Honolulu must make it a priority to address its vulnerable communities and the social and environmental injustices that continue to perpetuate these vulnerabilities.  The Nashville plan asserts the importance of focusing on these vulnerable populations because they “have traditionally been overlooked during disaster preparation and response or are disproportionately impacted by the effects of climate change.”[5] In addressing its vulnerable population, the Nashville plan defined what constituted vulnerable populations through indicators that included: socioeconomic status (income, poverty, employment, and level of education), disability, household composition (single parent households, the elderly, and households with dependents), minority status, English-language proficiency, housing, and transportation access.[6]  Honolulu could do the same.  In addition to having social equity as one of our community’s core values, we should call out which communities are vulnerable so that we can better draw attention to them.  Third, Honolulu should map out where these vulnerable populations reside and to create plans on how to service these communities should a disaster occur. Nashville used spatial mapping to show populations of low, moderate, and high vulnerabilities for different categories that included separate maps for the Spanish-speaking communities, the elderly, carless households, and populations that live in hazard-prone areas such as flood zones. According to Nashville’s assessment, their utilization of spatial analysis was very useful to understand regional trends, growth patterns, and concentrations of vulnerability in the region.[7]

     Lastly, Honolulu like Nashville, could use metrics to monitor and evaluate its progress in increasing the community’s adaptive capacity, particularly for vulnerable populations.  It could create short-term and long-term goals, then create action plans to move towards these goals.  In the next section, I discuss some of the action steps that Nashville’s resilience plan has laid out, and choose the ones that can be employed by Honolulu’s own resilience plan.  

From Framework to Implementation – Using Collaborative Planning

     Though Nashville’s resilience plan is still in its nascent state, the city’s progress is admirable, and Honolulu can learn from Nashville’s collaborative planning approach.  According to Nashville’s resilience plan, the core team of stakeholders comprised of, “representatives from organizations that engage with the elderly, disabled, low income persons, immigrants, and homeless populations in both urban and rural areas, and environmental policy and natural resources experts from the government, nonprofit, and private sectors.”[8] Honolulu must create a similar public-private partnership to include those intimately involved with its vulnerable populations.  As an example, one of the groups involved in the Nashville resilience planning was the Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition (TIRRC).  Honolulu could bring together like organizations to better serve the Micronesian community.  Secondly, Honolulu must address its housing shortage.  The Nashville plan acknowledged that through their vulnerability needs assessment, there was a shortage of emergency shelter locations.  As a response to this, the city significantly increased the number of emergency shelter locations, “with a specific emphasis on the areas of the city with the highest concentrations of vulnerability.”[9]

     Nashville’s plan concluded with tables of actionable items that addressed each of its four goals.  Honolulu can glean some of Nashville’s actionable items as low-hanging fruit to come up with solutions to address its vulnerable populations efficiently. For example, from Nashville’s first goal of, “Adaptation and response to extreme weather events are planned, coordinated, timely, and enacted on a regional scale,” Honolulu could adopt the following actions:

Conduct detailed transportation infrastructure vulnerability assessment to extreme weather within the Honolulu urban area

Map service gaps of storm shelters throughout the region

Ensure that all emergency response and hazard mitigation plans consider the impacts of climate change to the region and are including this information in their plans

Conduct workshops for vulnerable populations on emergency preparedness and access to services

Ensure adequate maintenance of existing transportation infrastructure

From Nashville’s third goal of, “The region’s growth and development promotes equitable prosperity and is sustainable for people and natural resources,” Honolulu can adopt the following actions:

Identify and map environmentally sensitive areas in the region at high risk of being developed

Prioritize the development of mass transit for the region, and continue to invest in sidewalks, greenways, and bike infrastructure to encourage active mobility. Improve connectivity issues, especially for vulnerable populations

Create equity atlas for the Honolulu region

Research the economic benefits of green infrastructure and jobs training for low income people

Explore options for integrating renewable energy technologies, such as solar, to serve low-income housing to decrease the burden of energy bills

 Lastly, from Nashville’s fourth goal of, “The region works collaboratively and effectively in all resilience actions,” Honolulu can adopt all of the action items:

Explore effective government/nonprofit partnerships to expand government’s capacity to affect change

Create a Regional Resilience Working Group to meet regularly to monitor and evaluate resilience progress and increase partnerships between government, nonprofits, and business sectors

Maximize the utilization of volunteers to perform direct action resilience efforts.

Conduct outreach on the findings of this plan throughout the region to create engagement with and support for the action plan

Monitor and review progress and success and continuously reprioritize goals and actions to represent need, capacity, and opportunity

Final Thoughts

     Of course, this discussion begs the question of, “Why does Honolulu have to follow another city’s resilience plan? Why can’t Honolulu just make its own plan?” Good point - and indeed, Honolulu’s issues are so unique that it could be argued that it cannot be compared to any other city in the world.  I’m not arguing against Honolulu making its own resilience plan.  I’m saying that we need one - and soon.  Nashville’s plan simply gives us an example that we can use.  I am hopeful that with the newly created Office of Climate Change, Sustainability, and Resiliency under the City and County of Honolulu, that we will see impactful progress in this area.

References

Blair, Chad & Cory Lum. “An Untold Story of American Immigration.” Honolulu Civil Beat. 14 October 2015.  Accessed 22 July 2017. http://bit.ly/2qggwSc

Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment for Makassar, Indonesia, United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2013.

Healey, Patsy. 1998. “Collaborative Planning in a Stakeholder Society.” The Town Planning Review 69 (1).

Letman, John. “Micronesians in Hawaii face uncertain future- COFA Agreements provide US regional control in exchange for limited access to America.” Al Jazeera website. 2 October 2013. Accessed 22 July 2017. http://bit.ly/2pVzdcO

Lincoln, Mileka.  “State officials: Majority of Kaka'ako homeless are COFA migrants. Hawaii News Now. 12 May 2015.  Accessed 22 July 2017. http://bit.ly/1IBeQDK

Reghezza-Zitt, et al. 2010. “What Resilience Is Not: Uses and Abuses.” Cybergeo : European Journal of Geography

Roy, Ananya. 2005. “Urban Informality: Towards an Epistemology of Planning.” Journal of the American Planning Association 71 (2): 147–58.

Umemoto, Karen. 2001. Walking in Another’s Shoes: Epistemological Challenges in Participatory Planning. Journal of Planning Education and Research 21(1): 17- 31.

U.S. Relations With the Federated States of Micronesia Factsheet. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. State Department. 25 February 2016.  Accessed 22 July 2017.  http://bit.ly/2pbAf5p

Wiener, Aaron. “America’s Real Migrant Crisis is the One You’ve Never Heard Of.” Mother Jones Independent News Organization.  29 December 2016. Accessed 22 July 2017. http://bit.ly/2hzg3qb

Wisner, Ben et al. 2006. “At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability and Disasters (Second Edition).” Routledge.

[1] Wisner, At Risk, p. 42

[2] It is difficult to determine exactly the number since they are able to travel back and forth without a visa or green card.

Lincoln, Mileka.  University of Hawaii at Manoa Department of Urban and Regional Planning, 2015.

[3] Building Resilience: A Climate Adaptation Plan. Nashville Area Metropolitan Planning Organization, 2015,

p. 11.

[4] ibid, p. 75.

[5] Building Resilience: A Climate Adaptation Plan. Nashville Area Metropolitan Planning Organization, 2015, p. 75.

[6] ibid, p. 25.

[7] Ibid, p. 66.

[8] Building Resilience: A Climate Adaptation Plan. Nashville Area Metropolitan Planning Organization, 2015, p. 19.

     Planning scholar Karen Umemoto wisely wrote, “It would be naive to think that one could know the world from someone else’s shoes” (2009). Epistemology is the study of seeing the world from multiple perspectives, the theory and nature and the grounds of knowledge (Umemoto, 2009).  Umemoto asserts that studying epistemology is very important in planning because of the existence of epistemological differences between cultural groups, and the planner’s role in reconciling and accommodating these standpoints in the planning process (2009). Planners must be mindful of epistemology because when working with communities, they will encounter multiple epistemic standpoints, and must take those standpoints into consideration into the decision-making.  Appreciating multiple epistemologies does not necessarily mean that a planner will not reach consensus.  Rydin asserts that the purpose of planning is to handle multiple knowledges.  Indeed, “Knowledge is inherently multiple, with multiple claims to representing reality and multiple ways of knowing” (Sandercock, 1998). Rydin also acknowledges the importance of relying on both deliberative and collaborative approaches, she, along with other scholars acknowledge challenges with different epistemic standpoints (Rydin, 2014).  

     Before discussing epistemology, it is important to make the distinction between knowledge and information or data.  According to Rydin, what differentiates the former from the latter is the causation that is importance in knowledge.  Planners must understand the causal relationships between action and impact, which may be implicit in the data (2014, page 53). In the history of social sciences, epistemology has undergone significant change, from a modernist perspective to a post-modernist one.  In the modernist era, knowledge was seen as a unit that was held by experts or institutions, but over time, planners discovered that knowledge was generated through social networks and practitioners, not just academics and experts.  Now, it is accepted by planning practitioners and academics that diversity in planning is not just a fad, it is a necessity.  Umemoto offers that diversity in planning can be categorized into several main areas including theories of difference in planning, diversity in planning processes, models for planning in multicultural society, and the impact of planning and identity politics in communities of color.

     Naturally, there are difficult challenges when working within communities different from one’s own epistemology.  Umemoto writes, “We generally understand that there are culturally specific norms, values, and ways of interpreting the world that, if not understood, can hinder the participation of historically marginalized groups, even in the most well-intentioned planning efforts” (page 18).  Nevertheless, she strongly believes in planning in the midst of multiple knowledges.  She writes, “It is not unrealistic, however, to create the foundation for social learning that emphasizes multiple epistemologies within planning processes” (page 21).  Umemoto discusses five challenges that includes: (1) traversing interpretive frames embedded in culture, history, and collective memory; (2) confronting otherness in the articulation of cultural values and social identities; (3) understanding the multiple meanings of language; (4) respecting and navigating cultural protocols and social relationships; and (5) understanding the role of power in cultural translation (page 19).  However, despite these challenges, Umemoto also offers practical advice for planners to counter these challenges.  In the first challenge, a community might have a strong collective memory of its history and culture.  If a planner enters the community as an outsider in terms of the planner’s own ethnic or cultural background, this can taint how the planner is viewed and how the community interacts with him or her.  Umemoto urges planners to study the history of the community before entering, in order to gain a better understanding of how actions may be interpreted (page 21).  In the second challenge, Umemoto succinctly writes, “Trust is a critical component of the creation of a safe environment for the articulation of cultural values (page 22).  Due to the lack of collaboration that communities have encountered with planners (and developers) in the past, there is a suspicion of working with planners, much less sharing or articulating the community’s needs or values.  In the third challenge, Umemoto discusses the weight of our words.  She writes, “Language carries with it the power to discourage or encourage, express or release, legitimize or degrade” (page 23).  It is important that planners understand that even how they say something can make an impact (whether positive or negative) in the community they are working with.  She argues that although it might be impossible to know where the language discrepancies may be, that planners should be conscious of its existence, and be active in discovering which words or ideas may or may not resonate with a community.  

     The fourth challenge is respecting and navigating cultural protocols and social relationships, which can range from how people address each other in the community, the giving or receiving of appropriate gifts, to abiding by the community’s hierarchy which may be implicit.  The dilemma is when these protocols may go against widely held moral or ethical beliefs, or the beliefs of the planner.  In this scenario, Umemoto advises, “Depending on the role the planner sees himself or herself playing in view of the various traditions of planning, one may choose to respect cultural protocols or, in other instances, challenge them” (page 25).  Whichever route the planner goes, Umemoto advocates for planners to acknowledge existing protocols as much as possible, as ignoring or disparaging them may undermine their efforts.  The final challenge that Umemoto discusses is how cultural interpreters have power to either bridge the divide between planners and the community in question, or to widen the gap between them due to the interpreters’ own bias or moral code. This might be the most difficult of challenges, as sometimes, planners are at the mercy of these interpreters to have the opportunity to reach the community.  Umemoto acknowledges that the best-case scenario is a community leadership that is inclusive and believes in the good of the entire community, not just one sector (page 26).  Watson also asserts that, “Questions around knowledge are at one and the same time questions about power, and planners working in indigenous communities are unavoidably implicated in inter-subjective as well as intergroup power relationships” (page 123).  What she means by this is that the simple act of a planner going into a community has already created a power dynamic, for better or worse.

     According to the UN, disasters and conflicts uprooted more than eight million people in the Asia-Pacific region since 2013, and at least 3.5 million people are now refugees residing all over Asia.[1]  Though devastating natural disasters like tsunamis and hurricanes can induce a refugee crisis, not all are escaping their countries of origin due to natural disasters. For example, the Rohingya people, a group that the UN has coined as, “one of the most persecuted people in the world,” have been fleeing their home country of Myanmar by the thousands to escape oppression by their government[2].  The crisis reached a boiling point last year when approximately 8,000 Rohingya refugees were stranded at sea in poorly-equipped boats because Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia refused to grant them asylum.  Thousands died at sea, and thousands more were finally granted temporary asylum in squalid refugee camps across Southeast Asia.  Their future status remains unknown, as asylum countries struggle to find solutions on their own.  

     While the international community watches in disbelief at ASEAN’s reticence to this game of “human ping-pong,”[3] ASEAN continues to look the other way under its philosophy of non-interference and constructive engagement.  It begs the question: What role should ASEAN play in a humanitarian crisis that may or may not be provoked by natural disasters?  ASEAN needs to have a course of action in either scenario, complex emergency or not. The region’s vulnerability to frequent and devastating natural disasters can exacerbate already unstable sociopolitical conditions and create complex emergencies, negatively affecting the entire region as refugees struggle to find asylum.  The Rohingya situation is a perfect example of a dire issue that will only become worse for all member countries if ASEAN chooses to ignore it. Further, if ASEAN wants to remain a relevant and respected regional and international institution, it must deal with the refugee crisis directly and without delay.  The key to effectiveness is in the organization’s approach, which should be centered on protecting the region’s security and economic well-being.  This framework will allow the organization to uphold its principles of non-interference and constructive engagement, thereby maintaining effective working relationships between its members and continue to bring peace and prosperity to the region, which is at the core of its mission.  

     Regarding the Rohingya refugee crisis, expert opinions vary greatly on the issue. Lilianne Fan, a researcher on humanitarian rights, insinuates ASEAN involvement as she advocates for coordination and oversight at the regional level for the countries that are involved, particularly Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia.  She notes that these countries, “are very torn by this issue. It is not an easy decision for them to say they don’t want the boats to come.”[4] Another expert, David Manne, executive director of the Australia-based Refugee and Immigration Legal Center, advocates for Australia showing regional leadership through providing emergency, logistical, financial and humanitarian assistance.[5]  Charles Santiago, chair of the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, advocates for ASEAN to put pressure on the Myanmar government to make changes to their domestic policies, which he acknowledges is a long-term solution.[6]  I think a combination of what the experts recommend would be effective.  It is clear that ASEAN coordination is in order, and the organization could use the help of other outside entities such as Australia and NGOs to assist with the immediate humanitarian needs of the refugees.  

     Why should ASEAN take a more active role in addressing the refugee crisis?  Because it is in its own security and economic interests to do so.  The common understanding is that ASEAN is simply a free trade association, and because of its economic focus, ASEAN’s ten member states could logically argue that addressing politically-charged conflicts is not what the organization was designed to do.  Yet as trade and migration increase as a result of economic development, so does the need for regional entities to take a more active role in other areas as well, such as security issues and humanitarian assistance, which directly affects each member’s economic well-being.  Other regional entities, like the EU, have had to expand its scope well beyond the economic needs of its members, in order to protect its economic well-being.  For example, the Syrian refugee crisis affected many, if not all of the European Union and it is taking a highly-coordinated effort on the EU members to deal with the volume and complexity of the emergency. The European Union understands that finding peaceful solutions is imperative in order to secure its members and protect its own economic well-being – ASEAN must follow suit.  

     ASEAN has made significant contributions in facilitating coordination before, during, and after natural disasters, which has already set a precedent for what they should be doing now.  In 2003, the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) was established, which brought together the national disaster management organizations of all ten member states to oversee the coordination and implementation of humanitarian activities in the region.  When the Indian Ocean tsunami hit in 2004, ASEAN ratified the Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), which was the first legally binding agreement on disaster risk reduction in the world.  Over time, ASEAN’s role in responding to natural disasters in the region has expanded and has become more frequent, as it has been involved in the response to Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (2008), Typhoon Ketsana which hit several Southeast Asian countries (2010), Typhoon Bopha in the Philippines (2012) and Typhoon Haiyan again in the Philippines (2013).  Further, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (the AHA Centre) was established in 2011, which further developed the organization’s commitment to humanitarian efforts.   In all of these scenarios, ASEAN proved to be effective in delivering humanitarian aid, even though it is not considered a donor organization.  It is therefore evident that ASEAN realizes that this coordination is crucial as these natural disasters threaten economic stability in the region.[7]  

     In terms of human rights, which in the Rohingya case would apply, ASEAN also has made some progress.  Its members signed its own Declaration against Trafficking in Persons (2004) and the Declaration on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers (2008).[8]  ASEAN member countries agreed upon the terms for the human rights body stipulated in the charter, known as the Asian Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), in 2009.  Unfortunately, this organization does not have a human rights court associated with it, thereby rendering it practically useless as the court has no enforcement mechanism.  At this point, ASEAN is not ready to take a strong stance on human rights issues, possibly since many of the member countries have some human rights skeletons in their closets.  Furthermore, it is no surprise that the organization would rather stick to their long tradition of non-intervention.  

     What is meant by the principle of “non-intervention”?  In the Asian culture, it signifies the non-confrontational culture.  Finger-pointing is frowned upon.  Any hint of intervening in another member’s political affairs is seen as patronizing and could easily upset the relationship between each country and the dynamics of the organization.  Indeed, it is important to remember that each ASEAN member state has a distinctly different history, culture, language, and set of values.  Further, colonialism affected each country in its own way, for better or for worse.  Vietnam was a French colony, Myanmar was British, the Philippines was Spanish, and for those that had similar colonial powers, their post-colonial histories are even more diverse.  Some countries had democratic governments, other had military coups, and still others had dictatorships, or a mixture of all three.  It is easy to see why each member nation would rather not talk politics. It is important too to note the political history of the region; that democratic processes are relatively new for most of these countries, so change takes a long time to happen.

     One must understand the framework in which ASEAN operates in order to generate feasible solutions that the organization can actually adopt.  ASEAN countries are motivated on an economic level than they are on a human rights level. Many regional countries, particularly China, conducts a significant level of business with Myanmar, which makes taking a tougher stance on human rights abuses difficult.[9]  Bangladesh, though ethnically and culturally tied to the Rohingya, are unwilling to allow in more Rohingya refugees into their country for a number of political and economic issues.   However, these economic issues should not deter ASEAN from stepping in and taking more responsibility, because the refugee crisis is also a huge security issue. As the illegal drug trade and insurgent groups wreak havoc along many of these countries’ borders, the Rohingya are increasingly being pulled into terrorist and extremist networks, which is a security risk for all ASEAN countries.[10]  Anna Shea, a refugee researcher at Amnesty International, said, “With the monsoons over in Southeast Asia, traffickers and smugglers will undoubtedly resume their trade.”[11]  ASEAN countries will see an increase of violence due to security issues caused by inaction.

     It is clear that ASEAN has the capacity to step up when disaster hits the region, and has shown remarkable abilities in facilitating humanitarian efforts, as was the case in Myanmar with Cyclone Nargis in 2008 where it was successful in providing humanitarian aid without making a political statement.  If ASEAN can address the refugee issue through an economic lens instead of a political one, it will succeed in delivering much-needed assistance to refugees. Through cooperative engagement, the members can find the economic incentives, show how the situation will benefit or negatively affect each country, in order to build consensus.  When ASEAN collectively sees the refugee crisis as an economic issue that affects their countries, they will be more likely to find a solution.  One solution could be for its Human Rights working group to come up with a standard protocol that addresses what ASEAN countries will do when a humanitarian emergency occurs.  The protocol might outline which countries would take in the refugees, set up a timeline, and distribute the responsibilities between the countries in a fair and reasonable way.  In this way, ASEAN will not be making a political statement by assisting the refugees but simply addressing a crucial issue that affects the region’s security and economy.   Granted, this is not an easy task, but in many ways, ASEAN is fortunate.  For the most part, its members have a good working relationship with each other and the organization has the ability to be more agile and take decisive actions since there are only ten member countries, not 28 like the EU, or 193 members like the UN.  Though ASEAN is small and may have more limited resources, it could engage with other non-ASEAN countries such as Bangladesh, Australia, and other regional players, for the refugee crisis impacts the entire region, not just ASEAN.  

     ASEAN can no longer ignore problems related to refugees and statelessness, as it affects each country’s economic and social stability, as well as regional security as a whole.  There is a way to address these issues while upholding ASEAN’s values of non-interference, which is through addressing this issue through an economic perspective, as that is ASEAN’s primary concern.  If ASEAN’s primary mission is to, “promote peace and prosperity in the region,” it cannot continue to ignore humanitarian emergencies that occur within its domain.  The intensification of climate change and other climate events will create more dire emergencies.  Effective regional mechanisms must be put into place, preferably before the disaster occurs in order for the situation to not get out of control and cause further damage to the region.[12]

 References

 Arendshorst, J. The Dilemma of Non-Interference: Myanmar, Human Rights, and the ASEAN Charter. Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights. Volume 8 Issue 1.

 Creach, Y., & Fan, L. (2008, December). ASEAN’s role in the Cyclone Nargis response: Implications, lessons and opportunities. Humanitarian Practice Network.

 Edwards, A. (2015, May 19). UNHCR Warns of Growing Danger for Stranded People in Southeast Asia. UNHCR.

 Fan, L. & Krebs, H. (2014, September). Regional Organisations and Humanitarian Action: the case of ASEAN. Humanitarian Policy Group.

 Fleming, M. (2015 June 5). UNHCR Seeks $13 Million to Step Up Response to South-East Asia Boat Crisis. UNHCR.

 Ganguly, S., & Miliate, B. (2015, October 14). Refugees and Neighbors: Rohingya in Bangladesh. The Diplomat.

Experts’ Note on the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. (2008). American Bar Association.

Missbach, A. (2015, August 19). Towards a Real Solution to Southeast Asia’s Refugee Crisis. The Diplomat.

Petcharamesree, S. (2009). The Human Rights Body: A Test for Democracy Building in ASEAN. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Pitsuwan, S. & Parameswaran, P. (2015, July 23). Why Southeast Asia’s Refugee Crisis Matters. The Diplomat.

Staff writer. (2015, June 1). The plight of the Rohingyas. The Economist.

Staff writer. (2015, May 15). How to solve the Asian migrant boat problem – expert views. The Guardian.

Staff writer. (2015, November 13). Myanmar’s Rohingya could be the world next major refugee crisis. The World Post.

(2014). Ending Statelessness in 10 Years (Report). United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Rochanakorn, K. (2016, May 2). Displaced Villagers Return Home in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Spindler, W. (2015, December 1). Thousands of Stateless People Granted Nationality in Thailand United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Tan, V. (2015, December 4). Bay of Bengal Boat Flow Manageable with Regional Cooperation. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Wade, F. (2013, April 22). The Monks Who Hate Muslims. Foreign Policy.

Zweynert, A. (2015, May 15). Boat People Crisis’ a test for ASEAN humanitarian resolve. Reuters.

(2014, December). The World’s Stateless (Report). Institute on Stateless and Inclusion.

 [1] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) website. www.unhcr.org

[2] Myanmar’s 1982 citizenship rule stripped the Rohingya of their citizenship, rendering them stateless.

[3] Missbach, Antje, “Towards a Real Solution to Southeast Asia’s Refugee Crisis” The Diplomat August 19, 2015

[4] “How to solve the Asian migrant boat problem – expert views” The Guardian, May 15, 2015

[5] ibid

[6] ibid

[7] Southeast Asia is the most vulnerable region in the world when it comes to natural disasters such as typhoons, cyclones, tsunamis, landslides, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, floods, and other devastating catastrophes

[8] Experts’ Note on the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, American Bar Association 2008

[9] Zweynert, Astrid, ‘Boat People Crisis’ a test for ASEAN humanitarian resolve, Reuters, May 15, 2015

[10] Ganguly, Sumit and Brandon Miliate “Refugees and Neighbors: Rohingya in Bangladesh” The Diplomat Oct 14, 2015

[11] Myanmar’s Rohingya could be the world next major refugee crisis.” The World Post November 13, 2015

     According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2016 was the fifth consecutive year of large-scale movements of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar (Burma), bringing the estimated total since 2012 to 168,500. Though this refugee situation has been going on for years, the moment that got significant media attention was in 2015, when at least 5,000 people were abandoned by smugglers off the coast of several Southeast Asian countries, where many died on the boats, and 55% of arrivals to Indonesia were children.  Naval authorities from the neighboring countries did not allow abandoned vessels to disembark, and even sometimes pushed them out further to sea.   This situation is a clear example of the lack of international humanitarian law (IHL) implementation and monitoring throughout many countries in Asia.  Almost 100,000 refugees have left Bangladesh and Myanmar since 2014, many are victims of human trafficking.  Smugglers are abandoning ship due to their inability to disembark the passengers in Thailand or Malaysia.  

Despite this tragedy, the international response has been promising.  The international NGO communities submitted a 10-point plan of action that includes:

1.     Strengthen Search and Rescue Operations

2.     Establish effective, predictable disembarkation to a place of safety

3.     Establish or enhance reception facilities

4.     Identification and treatment of those with international protection needs

5.     Facilitate solutions for persons in need of international protection

6.     Support for returns of those not in need of international protection

7.     Reinforce the gathering, sharing, analysis and use of information related to movements by the sea

8.     Capacity building in countries of transit and first asylum

9.     Expand legal alternatives to dangerous movements

10.  Humanitarian, human rights and particularly development needs in source countries

     Some of these steps are intuitive, such as strengthening search and rescue operations.  However, there are steps that will be very challenging, such as getting countries to gather, share and analyze data, which requires an incentive for each country to do so – a tall order.  Capacity building is also a huge challenge, especially for developing countries that do not have the resources, manpower or political will.  Expanding legal alternatives would be a big political move for such countries, particularly where the people are strongly against migrant communities.  The final step of expanding humanitarian and human rights needs in the source countries is possibly the most challenging.  Obviously, this migration problem would not be so bad if the quality of life in their home country was good enough to stay. Perhaps more resources need to be allocated towards building the economy of the countries that have the most refugees (Bangladesh and Myanmar).  However, this process could take years, if not decades, to really see the results. In the meantime, the international community will have to work towards strengthening the initial points of the plan.

     International humanitarian law (IHL) is a branch of public international law during times of armed conflict, which protects people who are not or are no longer directly participating in conflict and to control means and methods of warfare. Henry Dunant, a Swiss businessman, and Guillaume-Henri Dufour, a Swiss military officer, were instrumental in establishing the Red Cross, and even further, the development of the Geneva Convention of 1864, which created procedures to care for the wounded and sick, was open to all states, and demonstrates respect for and marking of medical personnel, transports and equipment using the Red Cross emblem.  IHL goes into effect only in armed conflict, but in both the international and non-international level.  In international conflicts, IHL protect civilians and combatants hors de combat while in non-international conflicts, civilians not involved in hostilities are protected.  States, non-state armed groups, and national liberation movements are bound by IHL. Whether peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations are covered under IHL is still very controversial and require a strict adherence to the facts of the situation in order to make the determination.  Human rights law is quite different from IHL because it is a set of rules that individuals can claim that must be respected and protected by their own states, through international conventions that cover everything from genocide, racial and gender discrimination, protection of children and migrant workers, and people with disabilities.  The governing bodies for human rights law include the Human Rights Committee for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Court for Human Rights for the European Convention on Human Rights.  Refugees, or a group of people displaced outside of their home country because they are in danger, are protected under the mandate of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees are protected by IHL if involved in an armed conflict. Interestingly enough, there is no universal treaty that specifically addresses the safety and security of refugees, which we can see is an issue with the current Syrian refugee crisis.  

I had the wonderful honor to meet and listen to urban planning scholar and thought leader John Friedmann speak in a very intimate gathering of planning students and scholars at the University of Hawaii’s Department of Urban and Regional Planning in February 2017- this was just a few months before he passed.  Here is my reflection of his thoughts regarding the ongoing challenges of our contemporary super cities - from Beijing to New York. 

     As John Friedmann aptly remarked, “We are planning in a context of a world in movement.” This hasn’t been more so the case than it is today. In this setting, Friedmann described several challenges that are unique to this era of development. First, he mentioned the surge in population and productivity growth. Though both population and productivity will eventually taper off, productivity is bound to plateau well before the population does. A surge in population can be difficult for supercities, and more so as people are living longer. New issues to address the aging population and marginalized populations will be the focus of this era. What is unfortunate currently is that many cities are not including crucial stakeholders in the planning process. For example, those involved in the informal economy are frequently left out because this group lacks legitimacy in the eyes of policymakers. In addition, the old problems in planning are still a reality today – agencies not sharing critical information with each other, lobbying, misinformation, withholding information, and of course, corruption in all levels.

     The second challenge is planning in a context of radical uncertainty. The rise of terrorism has made cities that were once considered safe, a target for terrorist attacks, which kill innocent people and destroy a city’s infrastructure, costing millions of dollars of repairs and hurting the city’s reputation and economy. Also, as terrorist organizations are non-state actors, there is no clear state “enemy” like there once was (i.e. Russia, Germany). This invisibility makes it difficult for cities to prepare for such an attack. Complicating all this are the negative externalities being generated by the market economy, the stability of the entire system is being threatened. This applies in the political, social, and environmental realm. Nation-states are reappearing and populism is reappearing all over the world.

     It is argued by planning scholars that market economies oftentimes fail to address the public interest, which validates the need for effective planning. Klosterman asserts that, “Specific government actions to reduce conflicts between incompatible land uses, coordinate private development and public infrastructure, preserve open space and historic buildings, and examine the long-range impacts of current actions can similarly be justified as needed to correct market failures revealed in the physical development of the city.  Planners are thus needed to advocate and develop initiatives such as affordable housing to address this issue.  

     However, planning scholars are divided as to when and how the government should intervene.  The first predicament is defining what the public interest, or the public good is. Michael Brooks discusses how widely invoked the term, public good is, while it is still ill-defined.  His conclusion is inconclusive, and he ultimately advocates for seeking the community interest, through assessing the values of that specific community.  According to Deborah Stone, the public interest (or public good) could be three things, such as individual interests held in common (e.g. high standard of living); goals where there are consensus (thereby temporal); and lastly, things that are good for the community, such as defense.   In her polis (a political system as opposed to the pure market system), communities assume collective will and effort, as opposed to in the market system where participants acting on their own behalf compete with each other for scarce resources. Therefore, while in a market economy, public interest is an afterthought; in a polis, it is intentional.  Furthermore, cooperation is essential, and these collective action problems should be addressed on an ongoing basis, as problems are never absolutely solved in the way that orders are fulfilled in the market.  So what are public goods?  Stone differentiates the public good from public goods by defining the latter as things that can serve many people at the same time, like schools, parks, social safety nets, and our justice system.  Public goods could also mean intangible assets, such as community and trust, which are essential or solving planning issues. Meanwhile, Klosterman defines public goods as things that simultaneously benefit particular individuals and provide shared, non-rationable benefits to society as a whole.  He does not define the public good, or public interest, stating only that, “the case for planning in a modern market society cannot be made in the abstract but requires a careful evaluation of planning's effectiveness relative to alternative institutional mechanisms for achieving society's objectives.” In this way, perhaps his definition of the public good is synonymous with society’s objectives.  But case in point, that defining the public good is an ongoing struggle in planning.

     The second predicament is defining in which circumstances justify government intervention (i.e. centralized planning).  Klosterman points out that government regulation and planning could be deemed unnecessary because they stifle entrepreneurship and innovation, and create extraneous administrative burdens.  This is the argument of free market theory, or classical liberalism, conservatism, laissez-faire and the like. Klosterman also plays devil’s advocate against planning, in mentioning the pluralistic model philosophy, where political competition, like market competition, eliminates the need for independent government action, planning, and coordination, since the various groups of stakeholders are already moving towards their interests, thereby advancing the public’s goals. However, he acknowledges that just like the economic model of perfect market competition, that the political arena is dominated by those who have power, and that minority and low-income individuals are systematically excluded (7).  Klosterman also demonstrates that in the Marxist theory, there would be no need for planners; indeed, a complete overhaul of the current system – a revolution is more urgently needed.  However, despite these arguments against planning, Klosterman identifies that the fundamental societal problem, “lies in the interdependence between individual actions and the accompanying disjunction between individual benefits and costs versus social benefits and costs.” Meaning, that as individuals make decisions that are best for them, that it inevitably will clash with the public interest. The example he provides is that of a landlord in a dodgy part of town.  Should the landlord invest in beautifying the building? If he improves it but no one else in the neighborhood improves their property, what good would it do him? However, if he allows his property to become in even worse shape, then the entire value of the neighborhood suffers.  Consequently, Klosterman asserts that the only solution is for government to deal with the public and external effects that are neglected in the pursuit of individual gain.  In this particular example,  Klosterman offers, “Solutions for declining neighborhoods include compulsory building codes, public acquisition and improvement of entire neighborhoods, and "enveloping" – public improvements to neighborhood exteriors that will encourage private investments.”  In short, the government must make rules, regulations, and policies to counter actions based solely on self-interest.  

     Speaking of self-interest, the difficulties in addressing inefficiencies center on this very issue, which is the third predicament.  As Stone asserts, people have both self-interest and altruistic motives.  So how do planners develop policies and regulations that address these motives? The commons problem (or collective action problem) states that it is difficult to motivate people to undertake private costs or forgo benefits for the collective good.  In a market system, it is assumed that people are rational and self-interested, but in the polis, real people can be forgetful, spontaneous, confused, optimistic. In addition, people are easily influenced, and intangible, unquantifiable things like loyalty has a powerful effect.  Indeed, dealing with messy and unpredictable factors like people’s emotions and society’s values are a constant challenge for planners.  Also, as people and groups pursue their self-interest, quantifying the externalities poses a difficult challenge.  Stone defines externalities as spill-over effects which affect people and the environment that are outside of the exchange, and that negative externalities can be corrected if people consider the social costs and harmful effects on others, thereby justifying the imposition of a  pollution taxes or cigarette tax.  Meanwhile, Klosterman makes the argument that there can be both positive and negative externalities in a given context.  For example, while land developers can ignore the negative externalities of congestion, noise, and loss of privacy that high-intensity development imposes on neighboring landowners, the positive external economies include the increased land values associated with the construction of new transportation links and other large-scale improvements, which adjoining landowners can enjoy without compensation.  And, as Stone acknowledges, “All production and consumption have impacts.”  So, how are planners to assess which externalities should be addressed, and which are given more weight?  This question is perhaps the one that keeps planners all over the world awake at night.

     It is evident that scholars are divided in defining many fundamental issues, from defining the public good, when the government should intervene, and how to effectively deal with inevitable externalities when decisions are made, in both the market and the polis. However, the literature appears to support that a certain level of government intervention is needed, in order to protect and preserve the public good.  Stone affirms that the classical laissez-faire approach does not prove successful as nations that have more equal income distributions do as well or better than more unequal nations on economic prosperity.  In addition, Mike Berry asserts that a free market approach eventually hurts society, and that, “a well-conceived and well-implemented government programmes that deliver productivity growth over the long term on a consistent basis will be self-reinforcing and self-financing, raising living standards in consequence.” Perhaps the field of planning is more important than ever, to help bridge the deficiencies between the market and the polis, taking into account both the market forces and the complicated people making these markets work.  In this way, planning indeed can be considered, as Diane Coyle aptly puts, as the soulful science.

References

Berry, Mike. 2014. “Neoliberalism and the City: Or the Failure of Market Fundamentalism.” Housing, Theory and Society 31 (1): 1–18.

Brooks, Michael. 2002. Planning Theory for Practitioners. Chicago: Planners Press. [“Rationales for Public Planning,” pp. 50-61]

Klosterman, Richard E. 1996. “Arguments for and Against Planning.” In Readings in Planning Theory, eds. Scott Campbell and Susan Fainstein. Cambridge, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.