[N]either the narrative of historical necessity nor the split that haunts it has disappeared in an absolute reign of the present. What the present offers us is a rearrangement of the interplay between necessity, possibility and impossibility. While the end of the Marxist grand narrative was loudly trumpeted, capitalist and state domination adopted its hard core â the principle of historical necessity â for their own purposes. Submission to this necessity, and comprehension of it, were more than ever made the sole route to any future happiness. This happiness, it is true, no longer took the forms of reversal and rupture. On the contrary, it took the form of an optimization of the existing order. But we did not thereby find ourselves in the kingdom of the sheer present. Historical necessity received a new name. It was now called globalization. And globalization still seemed to involve a time determined by its immanent end, which was no longer revolution, but the triumph of the global free market. Yet that triumph could not be left exclusively to the âfreedomâ of this market. It demanded sacrifices. It did not simply mean adapting to the ebb and flow of the market. More profoundly, it involved synchronizing two times: the rational time of the global process of capitalist production and distribution of wealth and the empirical time of individuals used to the temporality of things that happen âone after anotherâ â for example, the moment of pay after hours of work and the time of retirement after years of work. Obviously, it was the second that had to be synchronized with the first. The set of measures directed to this end received a name in the new grand narrative that was the counterpart of ârevolutionâ in the old one. It was called âreformâ. The meaning of this singular noun must be underscored. It used to be commonplace to contrast the empirical modesty of reforms with the abstractions of revolutionary programmes. But âreformâ in the singular, as understood today, is something quite different from a set of empirical measures. It has become another master-signifier, another symbol of historical necessity and its necessary conflict with temporalities that are not in harmony with it. Here, once again, the so-called liberal narrative has slipped into the temporal forms of the Marxist narrative. In the nineteenth century, Marx and Engels frowned on those artisans and petit-bourgeois who were attached to outdated social forms resistant to the development of capitalism, thereby delaying the socialist future of which it was the bearer. At the end of the twentieth century, the scenario was revised in such a way as to change not the form, but the characters. The condition of future prosperity was the liquidation of the legacies from an archaic past that went by the names of labour codes, employment legislation, social security, pension systems, and public or other services. Those blocking the road to the future were workers who clung to relics from the past. To punish this sin against the new justice of the time, it was first necessary to rename it. The social conquests of the past were re-baptized âprivilegesâ, and war was waged on the privileged egotists who were defending their inherited benefits and short-term interests against the future of the community as a whole.
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Iâm reposting a two-part essay on Poptimism that I posted on Wordpress back in 2012, but I am not re-reading it:
Part 1: We Need to Talk About the (The Intrinsic Fascism Of) Manufactured Pop Music
This piece derives from years of simmering misgivings about how some music critics have been writing about the mass-market, Top 40 pop music which, we are told, has experienced a renaissance in the last decade, what could be called, and will be here, âmanufactured pop music.â It is more specifically a response to âPop Utopianism: A Manifesto,â written by Trevor Link (@loosejoints) and posted on the Occupied Territories tumblr, where it accompanies an MP3 and video mixtape called âWe Need To Talk About K-Pop.â Iâll try to provide a brief summary of what I think âPop Utopianismâ is about, but the following will still make more sense if you read that first; it should be said that is of some length. This work is shorter, but, mercifully, it contains no references to Freud, which should count in its favor.
âPop Utopianismâ is an impassioned explanation of why Link finds K-Pop enthralling, placed in the context of wider plea for what he refers to pop music. The four foundational points of Pop Utopianism are, in brief:
(1): Pop music is at its most utopian when rooted in our experience of pleasure. This is because pleasure confronts us with an inescapable sensation of how we would like life to be like, a glimpse of utopia.
(2): Pleasure in itself is hardly controversial, but in order for this pleasure to be truly utopian or transformative, it must be ecstatic pleasure without imposed limits.
(3): Popâs unrestrained sense of pleasure strongly aligns it with play, as well as fantasy.
(4): Perhaps more than most forms of music, pop music (including disco) is not only rooted in the body but is also embodied.
Link connects his argument to past debates about whether Disco was reactionary, Capitalist, inauthentic when compared to folk and rock music (this was preceded by debates about folk vs. rock, a âbody musicâ in its time, to be sure) and to the concept of ârockismâ in which music critics treat other genres as fundamentally unserious. The arguments, both borrowed and original, are convincing enough, however I donât think they are convincing when used to make the arguments Link does about modern pop music. Debates about folk vs. pop (the distinction being entirely artificial, pop music simply being folk music written after the introduction of recording and mass media) rock vs. hip-hop and pop vs. the academy should be long buried by now. We all, or at least anyone remotely interested in discussions such as these, accept Pop in its many forms. Link, however, wishes to actually narrow what can be considered pop to the Top 40, its direct stylistic forebears and its transglobal cousins, such as K-Pop. âSophisticatedâ music which âstrives for the pleasureableness of pop music but which intellectualizes this pleasure and subdues itâ is disqualified as providing only âsafe, intellectually satisfying half-pleasures, âclever, yet ultimately tepid.â Link goes on to say that those who enjoy this âsophisticatedâ put themselves âaboveâ pop music âbecause it cannot serve their fascistic, anti-social, and narcissistic (not to mention non-pleasureable) aims.â Well, now that the F-word is out of the box, thereâs no point in resisting it:
We need to talk about the intrinsic fascism of manufactured pop.
Now, I canât stress enough that Iâm not suggesting that Trevor Link is a fascist or that his passionate enjoyment of K-Pop is fascistic. Itâs telling, though, how his manifesto and mixtape are sprinkled with fascistic language. Weâve already seen the denunciation of sophisticated intellectuals and their devitalizing intellecualization. In writing about K-Pop, the songs are described with words like âundeniable,â the performers as âcommanding,â Link often asks in bewilderment how anyone could not like a particular song, and what might possibly be wrong with someone who doesnât. Pop music defined in this manner is that music which speaks directly to a some pure, untainted and authentic human nature, presumed to be shared by the mass of society. Those who lack this nature or would turn against the spirit of purely pleasurable music are perverted intellectuals. This music is in turn performed by pop singers who âare constructs pulling together material from a kind of collective unconscious, the actualization of social desire,â which would also function as a concise description of the theory behind the FĂźhrerprinzip.
If the pop music Link is talking about encompasses certain pleasurable musics but not others (the âtepidâ ones) then we need to find a good way to distinguish what exactly the pop under discussion in the Pop Manifesto is; it will also serve as a good definition of âmanufactured pop.â
I suggest that manufactured pop music is characterized by a central concern to maximize two attributes: âhookinessâ and forcefulness. Forcefulness commands the body to join in certain physical rituals; hookiness commands the mind to return again and again to certain sets of tunes. The myriad hooks in any particular manufactured pop track serve a second purpose of making it even more indistinct: not sticking with any single element for long enough to distinguish the song, the entire body of contemporary manufactured pop becomes an inseparable set of hooks and commands.
I label it âmanufacturedâ not because it is made with computers or other machines It is manufactured because it is made in an assembly-line process to function as an interchangeable commercial commodity. The use of machines only determines its manufactured quality to the extent that technology is used a) to increase efficiency and b) to increase the power of command. Synthetic sounds can be given an overwhelming power; new production methods attempt to subdue the listener, keeping ahead of its audience as the public ear becomes accustomed to an ever wider range of sounds. Motown could be seen another assembly-line system for creating pop music, and should be seen as a historical predecessor of modern systems of pop music manufacture, of studio systems in both Korea and the US. An important difference for the listener is that Motownâs sound was finely-tuned decades before the loudness wars, so while the songs may have been created purely to illicit the most direct forms of pleasure, the forcefulness of the music was not overloaded, and it was not yet necessary to have four âhooksâ per song. This is a quantitative difference which I think becomes a qualitative difference: Motown and other pop-music factories of the past may have been making manufactured pop music, but it was different in kind from the music we are increasingly being asked by critics to openly embrace.
This recent contestation that we should all be listening to manufactured pop music because it efficiently delivers certain narrow forms of pleasure, that if we refuse there is something wrong with us â this is a distinctly fascist impulse. That is not to say that I believe that manufactured pop music creates fascists, or that Trevor Link is consciously or unconsciously acting as a fascist, or even that I have no interest in K-Pop or any song to be found on American charts. I find K-Pop fascinating enough as a specific instance of manufactured pop music that each time I discover a K-Pop song I can actually listen to, Iâm filled with a particular delight. Any pop music that we discover anywhere can be included in our personal or social utopic visions and used along the path to them. If you like a song, thatâs fine. If you like an entire genre, good for you. We can listen to pleasurable, worthwhile music from production centers in Motown or the Brill Building in decades past or a new hit pumped out of YG Entertainment last month. However, privileging a particular form of pleasurable popular music as the only legitimate form of Pop (Link executes a simple reversal of rockism by implying that the inauthenticity and artifice of pop music is actually what makes it authentic) denies listeners the choice of which qualities in music, in which combinations, are important to them: the hookiness and forcefulness of the music is instead held aloft as the supreme values for pop music, the songs with the most force and the strongest hooks are judged better than other songs in an imagined competitive arena (and performers can literally be judged in competitive arenas which are then broadcast on television.) This is an attempt to strangle the wonderful, messy heterodoxy that has emerged with the Internet. At the time that Richard Dyer wrote his âIn Defence of Discoâ (itâs the article that comes right after two defences of paedophilia in the summer 1979 edition of Gay Left) it would have made sense to simply appropriate the pop music that was widely available for purposes of pleasure, spontaneous community creation, identity play, and the like. There is no reason to accept this state of affairs today. We have as both listeners and producers of music an unmatched power to create a thriving ecology of pleasurable music on local and global scales.
So, there: Iâm bothered by being told that I should be listening to more Top 40 pop, and that if I donât enjoy it, Iâm stuck up, over-intellectual, and just plain wrong. âPop Utopianism: A Manifestoâ and this piece and Linkâs are both the results of immediate reactions: Link would never think to write such a lengthy exposition on K-pop if he did not find the direct experience of K-Pop to be exceedingly pleasurable, and I would find no need to label manufactured pop âintrinsically fascistâ if I didnât find the experience of listening to much of it to be viscerally unpleasant. Again, if those K-Pop songs do bring Link pleasure, and that pleasure holds up to later scrutiny, as it seems to have done, then good for him, and plentiful thanks for creating an annotated mixtape that serves as a nice introduction to the genre for outsiders â a number of these songs I hadnât heard before, and a few of them I can even tolerate or enjoy (if youâre curious, âNu ABO,â which is toned down just enough to be listenable, and âLucifer,â which sounds like it comes from an alternate universe.)
That being said, while the enjoyment of manufactured pop is defensible, I donât think the idea that it can serves as a utopian model withstands scrutiny. The utopian model of manufactured pop is false because it is based on a âlimitless pleasureâ which is only poorly simulated by maximizing and overloading a few narrow pathways of pleasure, just as the huge amounts of high-fructose corn syrup in a soda assaults our receptors of sweetness, and a fast-food hamburger latches on to our umami receptors while overloading our senses with a bevy of added chemicals. In both manufactured food and manufactured pop, we see a product designed to be a commodity which will impel its consumers to return again and again. This sort of utopianism based on the illusion of limitless pleasure fails because any inspiration to think of a better future is rerouted to a media that invites us to the false, shallow utopia it has constructed in the present day. The actual products that Coca-Cola and McDonaldâs sell may do work on the body to prepare us, but itâs the advertisement that they and other corporations broadcast that really insist that these commodities function as a direct link to utopia. In K-Pop this link to images and in turn to the broader consumer society are very clear: K-Pop videos are even more overloaded than the songs that accompany them, and most of them are little more than a hyperactive succession of the alluring limitless number of colorful, shiny, and novel material objects that a commodity-producing world economy promises us; the experience of watching could only be replicated by candy-flipping in a haute shopping center.
Deflecting criticism of manufactured pop music by making dated claims that such critics are over-intellectual elitists who hate or misunderstand pleasure and the body is akin to branding a critic of fast food a health nut or giving the label of teetotaler to anyone who points out that methamphetamine is too powerful a stimulant. The idea that consumer goods, pop music among them, are appropriated by consumers in creative ways was an important one when it was introduced many decades ago, but since then we have seen that these activities have their limits. A commodity system cannot be defeated by the many small actions of consumers integrating products into their lives and personal narratives in ways unintended by producers. Capitalism is entirely capable of adapting to such.
Manufactured pop music cannot serve as a utopian model because it is already part and microcosm of the dystopian economic model of the present.
It may also fail as a model for utopia, but Iâd like to briefly present another musical form that has existed for some time now but is only very recently receiving broad attention and increased critical appraisal, and which I think is intrinsically more transgressive.
Juke, even more than K-Pop, is centered around a dance culture. Unlike the dancing that one encounters in a K-Pop video or the dismal setting of a typical American club playing manufactured pop, where dancing is routinized, directly or indirectly choreographed, the âfootworkâ dance culture surrounding juke involves explosive, unbounded bodily self-expression (point number two in the manifesto) in a social setting. With its unconventional rhythms, abrasive textures, and counter-intuitive structures, it demands little but attention to the ways in which it subverts expectations. The lyrics of manufactured pop are generally agreed to be fairly meaningless (not a problem in itself) the words instead functioning as âvocalized beatâ which add to the hookiness of each song. Juke, built upon unceasing repetition of words, phrases, or vocal noises, brings this pop logic to the fore, and plays with it in productive ways. Some Juke tracks are built around words or phrases that could easily be seen as violent, casually misogynist, or as objectifying women. The most interesting work done by Juke occurs when words and phrases are repeated so many times, in such rapid succession, that not only do they cease to hold any meaning, they actually begin to sound like other words and phrases. The function of the voice in manufactured pop music is taken to such an extreme that the music travels through meaninglessness and discovers a new territory of possible meanings. These are possible meanings, and are very much undetermined, as the new meanings will be decided upon by the brain of each listener as it begins to test different interpretations of the vocal sounds being heard. (âWhen I came?â âWhen I gave?â âWhen I cave?â âSpinn?â âSpit?â âSpill?â âRashad?â âUr-sher?â âWatch out?â) This is an crucial part of Jukeâs transgression and even perhaps its utopian potential.
Whereas manufactured pop presents its listener with a centrally produced object of narrow, superficial perfection, Juke takes rough, imperfect elements from the world around it, combines them in an initially jarring manner, and in the process creates transcendent, ecstatic moments which are legitimately surprising. Absolutely nothing is surprising about the feelings which manufactured pop music is supposed to instill in you as a listener and a body; each element of the music is engineered to sickly extremes in an attempt to elicit specific, expected reactions, inviting you into a false contemporary paradise. Juke invites listeners to join in an unfolding process of creating utopian situations. It suggests that utopia is not something that that will be sold to us, but that utopia is something we can find, something we can construct from elements of the world around us, even if they may be ugly and mundane.
Part 2: Real Existing Pop Dystopia
Continuing dialogue in a case like this might be of limited productivity â thereâs much talking at cross purposes, for many different reasons, but Iâm still very pleased that Trevor Link took the time to write a considered response to my broadside (all one really can ask) as a means of clarifying his own position, even if most of my points were either not understood or flatly rejected. Iâll take the opportunity to also write a second rejoinder in which I can strive for further clarity, even if most of his points I will not understand or flatly reject.
While I believe there are some irreducible differences in opinion here, much of the misunderstanding or disagreement may stem from very different definitions and usage of language. This was probably inevitable when the word most central to the discussion was âpop,â a word that has been stretched near the point of illegibility. One of my the two main motivations for writing âWe Need To Talk About (The Intrinsic Fascism Of) Manufactured Pop Musicâ was to try to work out exactly what Link meant when he used the word âpopâ in talking about music. His pop utopia doesnât include the music that those fascistic rockists might enjoy (how odd is that he says âHow many sophisticated consumers of music wouldnât be caught dead listening to, say, the Beach Boysâ when, have you ever heard of Pet Sounds, one of historyâs most critically fawned-over albums? Or does âThe Beach Boysâ here mean âSurfinâ USAâ and âKokomo?â), and the âsophisticatedâ music âwhich strives for the pleasureableness of pop music but which intellectualizes this pleasure and subdues it.â This could not be the world of pop I recognized, that gloriously multivarious constellation of all those musics that come from outside the academy and the court and donât aim at abstract extremes (Serialism, Noise, and certain other explicitly experimental genres â not that they donât have their merits, but they could quite reasonably denied the label âpopâ) that I derived great pleasure from. The pop that Link discusses must be something different, something narrower, and there must be some attributes that delineate it from the greater body. From what I could tell, what set the âpopâ he was discussing apart was that it did not have any âlimitsâ â that it took its focus on âpleasureâ to extremes. This was something that seemed familiar â this described as a category so many of the unpleasant songs that I had been made to listen to by radio stations, bars, clubs, and those friends and acquaintances who will justify the worth of any song with the phrase âitâs so catchy!â or âI miss the 90âs!â âManufactured Pop,â then, to describe this subset of pop music which passes the test of being âunintellectualâ enough to be authentic and truly pleasurable. (And may I note how bemusingly surreal it is be called over-intellectual for my response to a 7600+ word essay on pop utopianism that cites Deleuze. DELEUZE.)
To mirror the numbered list of replies in ââPop Utopianismâ And Its Discontentsâ at times perhaps being indulgently glib, before making a final attempt at clarity:
1. Link writes:
If I do focus on chart-based pop, itâs precisely because there is a tacit assumption in, at the very least, North American culture that itâs okay to dismiss and ignore this type of music. Until that changes, Iâll continue to champion it, though wholly out of love and never out of mere contrarianism.
First of all, this ignores a distinct shift in âalternativeâ and âmainstreamâ music criticism in the last decade towards an embrace of more and more chart-based pop music in the last decade â simply find search for Pitchfork Mediaâs reviews from the 90âs, then compared those to their list of Top 20 albums of 2000 and then to their track and album best-ofs for the last few years. If youâre feeling a bit masochistic, you could even subject yourself to the writing of Sasha-Frere Jones. The image of the snooty music journalist dismissive of âpopâ is outdated, at least among the under-60 crowd. Thatâs only focusing on critics and those who actively seek out their advice â on a broader view, itâs simply absurd to say about âchart-based popâ that in North American culture âitâs okay to dismiss and ignore this type of musicâ â exactly the music that more than any other (except perhaps a few classical pieces which have been given particular social functions) is impossible to dismiss and ignore because there are commercial and social structures which deliver it to as many physical and social spaces as possible.
2. I failed to engage with the ideas about the politics and taste of music âi.e. how rock can be linked to authoritarian ideologiesâ because it was easily the weakest part of âPop Utopianism.â Rock music (entirely ignoring Rockâs root identity as, and frequent return to, hip-swiveling R&B) is, via Dyer, assigned âthrusting and phallic qualitiesâŚwhich in turn suggests a verticality, an âup-and-downâ-ness, that is very potentially authoritarian and hierarchical at root (hence the elitism so prevalent in rock music cultures.)â This is garbage pseudo-Freudianism which doesnât hold up to any interrogation. (Is the up-and-down-ness in the bodily movement that accompanies some rock subgenres and subcultures? Are mosh pits authoritarian? Are the screaming teenage girls at a Beatles concert jumping up and down all trying to assert their dominance over the lowly subordinate screaming teenage girls who are merely clapping and swaying? Are they subliminally embodying the hierarchical patriarchy that flows through that Liverpudlian White Male Rock & Roll? Is the up-and-down-ness sexual? Is all male sexuality authoritarian? Is the ghost of Andrea Dworkin haunting this space? All of this would hardly, in any case, seem consistent with the pleasure-above-all mentality of âPop Utopianism.â)
More importantly, this attempt to brand rock snobs authoritarian drastically misconstrues the nature of authoritarianism, particular its fascist strands. No fascist movement Iâm familiar with has ever been about cultural distinction, sophistication, or intellectual purity. They instead focus on the right and necessity for certain groups to have power over others due to tradition, strength or notions of purity â inherent qualities which put them at the apex of a natural order. The qualities of those chosen groups cannot be reasoned with or denied, just as we are asked not to reason with or deny âpureâ pop music and the pure, uncomplicated feelings they engender. My reference to FĂźhrerprinzip was in no way facetious; the FĂźhrer is supposed to function as the conduit and amplifier for the collective desires of the volk (excluding those nasty degenerate intellectuals who spoil all the fun) in a similar way the pop mega-star functions as the conduit for the collective desires of the modern consumer-citizen. Fortunately, the pop mega-star does not have the same evil role, but the logic is analogous.
Itâs a bit hard for me to understand how one criticizes the hierarchical nature of rockism and then turns around to credit the church with a function of âactualizing social desireâ similar to the dance floor (is David Guetta Cardinal Ratzinger?) but that is a small point that doesnât go much of anywhere, except to Lady Gaga, who, again, is a chart-pop figure we have been told to take very seriously by many critical voices in quite a number of publications, and again, I find largely but not entirely unlistenable, due in large part due to awful, overloaded production.
The accusation of ethnocentricity is quite easy to laugh off: Iâm accused of displaying âno real knowledge of what K-pop means in the Korean context or what makes K-pop different from other forms of pop music.â But âPop Utopianismâ / We Need To Talk About K-Pop is centered around the idea that K-Pop exemplifies the positive qualities found in manufactured pop universally, so Iâm not even sure what Iâm being accused of. Yes, K-Pop as a phenomenon is portrayed by Link as superior â especially in its sincerity â to American strains of global manufactured pop, and I would agree that the pop mixtures being made now in Korea are distinctive. If itâs agreed that both strains are, fundamentally, Linkâs Pop, what I label manufactured pop, then itâs irrelevant to the argument what exactly the smaller differences are. In regards to Linkâs âformative academic period in lifeâŚspent researching indigenous cultures and religionsâ which makes my supposed âsuspicio[n] of anything that overturns individualityâ he finds in my writing to be âsomewhat offensive,â I find the implied flattening of difference between âindigenousâ socialities and the socialities of industrialized, specialized, mass-media connected cultures to be deeply puzzling coming from what is portrayed as an anthropological perspective.
3. Link dismisses my âreductive,â âsimplistic,â âendlessly repeatedâ use of the phrase âmanufactured pop music,â which, again, is a term summoned to deal with the narrowing, reductive definition of pop used in the Manifesto. One of his reasons for casting doubt on the phrase is its power to invoke critiques of the classical Hollywood system. I actually think this is a productive analogy: both genres produced many works of worth and diverse qualities, and many works of questionable worth, but the system in which all these works are produced and distributing has problematic, ideologically destructive and dystopic elements; thereâs a reason why Godard could love Hollywood films and so hate Hollywood.
Link casts the assembly-line metaphor as denigrating the care, attention and artistry put into the actual creation of pop tracks:
Teddy Park can be a hit-maker for YG Entertainment, but heâs also purely an artist as well, no different from any other artist throughout history. (And if you ask me, heâs a really good one too.) The authorâs description of âa new hit pumped out of YG Entertainmentâ strikes me as crude, a degrading way to describe what is a highly creative process.
But each pop song can be both â the specific creation of an individual and the interchangeable new hit pumped out of YG Entertainment â thereâs nothing contradictory about this. Stargate and Ester Dean can care greatly about the music they make, but ultimately most of their material will also be input for a system seeking revenue and market share.
The maximization of hookiness and forcefulness in manufactured pop music is also responsible for how tiringly formulaic it can be if the system calls for a musical product that can reliably command the widest possible spectrum of listeners, then the music will tend to use a narrow set of elements and structures, in a more limiting way than the sense in which any music of an identifiable genre must use some common and therefore predictable elements. That Nickelback is both singularly horrid and hugely successful is tied to the fact that you can play two of their hits over each other. Certainly artists can innovate at the same time they aim for the common denominator, and there are plenty of good to great songs that can be found within the system of manufactured pop. (I invoked Motown in a clumsy attempt to preempt questions of well-pop-has-always-been-manufactured-whatâs-different now? I certainly have no desire to valorize any period as a golden age of pop music â plenty of the material released on Motown and contemporary labels is rather forgettable, no less than in any era, but a particular production aesthetic renders that forgettable material less actively unpleasant as bad or mediocre pop music from other pop eras. While I do delight in connecting with a well-written pop song, my listening is broadly more driven by considerations of timbre and overall sonic texture. Thereâs no reason to deny that production sounds change withtechnology and fashion, and that along with new creative opportunities come misuses and new chances to bludgeon listeners.)
4. Link contests that as my rebuttal gets closer to speaking directly about K-Pop, it gets worse. I âexpress surpriseâ (actually, I donât, but thanks anyway) that I actually find âa coupleâ of K-Pop songs I can enjoy (in the We Have To Talk About K-Pop mix, I have heard K-Pop before and they number more than two) and my implication that âK-pop as a whole is largely unlistenableâ is ârather offensiveâŚmostly because it assumes that there might be some objective grounds on which he can write off and condescend to an entire nationâs pop industry.â For Link,
personally, I could never imagine making such statements about any countryâs musical output, even if I had little interest in it, because what I value as a music listener is the idea that thereâs good music everywhere.
On the other hand, its easy for me to imagine making such statements about any countryâs musical output because I would make that statement about ALL countries with pop music, and I would do so precisely because I deeply believe in the idea thatâs there good music everywhere. That belief has lead me to spend enough time searching for good music from anywhere and everywhere that I have encountered very large volumes of bad or painfully mediocre music from all around the globe. For each sublime tune or intoxicating eddy in the global pop flows, there are many blandly derivative copies of commercial forms and schmaltzy traditional performances. Music is amazing and thereâs a terrible lot of it thatâs not very good. Bad music, however, can not only vary in how good or bad â how pleasurable or unpleasant â it is judged to be from the perspectives of different listeners, it can take on new qualities in different times and different places and when it is taken as inspiration or reappropriated for sampling â small moments in otherwise unremarkable bodies of work can become the nutrient matter for rich, lively new forms.
The one statement to which I actually do take offense comes when Link says he âhate hate hate[s]â the âfacile comparison of pop music to junk foodâ because itâs âsilly and ungrounded, and again, it betrays another kind of class prejudice.â Here, the accusation of class prejudice actually bristles: if you (this is the generic âyouâ) canât accept that any serious opposition to the system of industrial agriculture, which has fast food as its quintessential distributional form, includes a fundamental insistence to the right of all people to the healthy food denied them by the socio-economic system of which agro-industrial production is a central part, and instead fall back on lazy stereotypes of privileged Whole Foods Liberals (and, by the way: fuck them) then youâre a slimy reactionary who has no right to speak of utopias.
The analogy holds. Preparing sweet or fatty foods is not evil, just as making saccharine pop songs is not evil. Some of the end results may be transcendently delicious, many will be basically satisfying in expected ways, some will be unpleasantly overwhelming in their over-use of certain ingredients, and this reaction will be determined to a great degree by the predilections and sensitivities of the recipient. None of the results is unethical. However, the system of fast food and industrial agriculture that commoditizes and distributes sweet or fatty foods on a massive scale is harmful in very real ways that are much more than a matter of aesthetic snobbishness.
This is the second and much more important reason I had for writing âWe Need To Talk About (The Intrinsic Fascism Of) Manufactured Pop Musicâ â the conception of âPop Utopianismâ needs to be problematized and interrogated because it ignores the ways in which manufactured pop is embedded in the real existing dystopia of the contemporary global economic system, which functions by presenting us with a continual supply of commodities which provide certain narrow, easy forms of pleasure, and it asks us to not think further about or reassess this initial pleasurable reaction, instead continuing to acquire similar commodities (perhaps with some added superficial novelty) which will elicit similar pleasurable reactions. This is precisely what the Manifesto asks of us â donât over-intellectualize, simply be happy with a product so wonderfully tuned to illicit pleasurable reactions in your brain-body interface.
Pleasure is vital to any true utopian vision, because it is vital to human experience and any true utopian vision has a deep consideration for human wellness and flourishing (but it canât just be one person being âreally really happy,â unless youâre arguing from a solipsistic or peculiarly monist perspective.) Yet we can see that the simple vision of unreflective pleasure presented in âPop Utopianismâ cannot serve as a utopian model because it is already the model of the still far more dystopian economic model that rules the world around us. The effects of production, distribution and consumption for manufactured pop music are innocuous compared to most of the tangible commodities we consume â some artists are taken advantage of, some music industry executives get too much money they donât deserve, some snobs like me have to repeatedly hear a set of songs they donât like (one can also consider the socially corrosive settings that manufactured pop is often experienced in â the âdismal clubs of forced-fun musicâ that Gavin Mueller dubbed âutopias of date rape;â I wouldnât emphasize this aspect as much, first due to the troubles of proving causation, and second because the manufactured pop form Link is specifically celebrating may not have the same correlation.) The point is that the uncritical relationship to superficial pleasures is much the same. Moving beyond our real existing dystopia will involve reflecting deeply on the pleasures presented to us, their richness or shallowness, their quickness or longevity, and their wider implications. As rhetorically or personally abrasive as I may have been at times in this essay, I am sorry that Trevor Link experiences clinical depression, and (I think) I can understand how that could make intense pleasures all that more important, but it must be recognized that pleasures can be qualitatively different from each other, that they can be deep or fleeting, healing or destructive.
We inch closer to utopia by both celebrating and critiquing our pleasures; by constructing truly wild, diverse, changing, decentralized, heterodox ecologies of music, which will include ABBA, Juke, K-Pop, and all the âover-intellectualizedâ âhalf-pleasuresâ that âPop Utopianismâ maligns.
If we can imagine evolving beyond capitalism and the other dystopias we struggle with, we can imagine moving beyond pop music and non-pop music.
In the relation thus put together, i.e., constructed, let us observe three (logical) moments:
a  general, abstract, metaphysical: the relation of the âsoulâ with society in general, represented as a whole;
b  particular, positive, pragmatic: since he perceives society as a given, the problem for the individual is to establish a determined relation with this given society, in given conditions;
c  singular, mystic, personal: the representation which the individual has of himself as difference and in-difference, as irreducible originality and as personality.
Thus the active representation and the âlivedâ which it represents enter into the logical pattern of classic syllogism: general/particular/singular. Each logical âmomentâ implies another, and they all assume substance and reality independently of each other. Thus in the everyday reality of existing (bourgeois) society we find the general type, the particular type and the singular type, each one emphasizing a logical element or moment; what is more, at the heart of each class or type we rediscover all the other moments, in a subordinated or recessive state. For example, in the class (in the logical sense of the term), i.e., in the general type, we will recognize one general type (or subclass, or subtype), another particular one and another singular one. Thus we will have a formal combination: A.B.C.; A (a,b,c), B (a,b,c), C (a,b,c); A (aa, ab, ac âŚ) with implied types, subtypes and sub-subtypes.
A. The general type. This is the highest class or type; he considers the relation with society consciously and takes it as a constant object of thought and meditation; however, his consciousness of the social remains abstract.
A.a. The Utopian. Utopianism poses the fundamental problem of the individual/society relation in such perfectly clear terms that the absurdity of formulating it abstractly by means of two mutually independent and external terms becomes blindingly obvious. The Utopian knows that the truth of praxis consists in a conscious oneness: the everyday/the whole, the individual/society, or even the individual/the human race. However he sees this truth as a pure ideal outside the real, something to be created ex nihilo. He cannot see that this oneness already exists, but in an incomplete way, mutilated, alienated, mainly because it lacks conscious expression. Thus the Utopian in the classic sense of the term wishes to create a new society and an entirely new life, with new men, individuals united in their desire to sign up to a new social contract. He thinks this is easy to achieve, since it relies merely on the consent of a certain number of minds similar to his own. He is not very aware of the practical conditions and problems. For him, the principle of the identicalness and oneness of the âindividual/societyâ relation remains general, logical and abstract, rather than being concrete and dialectical. Devoid of means, the pure aim becomes a false one. Mankind will fail, but the failure will be a noble one.
Subtypes: âIdealistsâ in the commonplace sense; dreamers, reformers and founders of sects; leaders of literary or artistic movements, etc.
Sub-subtypes: the misunderstood, martyrs, minor poets âŚ
A.b. The man of action. The opposite of the Utopian, and his complement, he gives priority to the real, realization and means. For him, the data of problems are solid ground. He uses them as a foothold. He has little concern for what may be in the distance. He accepts goals which come from beyond himself and his own thought. He spends little time mulling over the goals and a lot of time on the interests and on the solid means of action. In the case of the Utopian, only the ends counted, and without means, the true goal became a false one. In the case of the man who wants action for actionâs sake, good and genuine means become dubious if the goal for which they are used is an uncertain one. He thinks he is free, but he is the unconscious slave of real historical forces. If genuine freedom can be defined as knowledge and mastery of necessity, the freedom of the pure man of action can be defined as ignorance of his own enslavement. Among the humbler representatives of this type we find agents and hired men â among its more illustrious representatives are enlightened despots, and certain captains of industry and kings of finance. They can only âsucceedâ by exploiting the stupidity of other people; their careers end tragically and they cannot understand what has happened to them.
Opposed subtypes: the activist and the militant; the organizer and organizational man; the politician; the boss; the male âRastignacâ and the female one (a recent species).27
A.c. The thinker. He despises the Utopian because the Utopian is not a man of action. He despises the man of action because the man of action is not a Utopian. He is a thinker, therefore he thinks. He is particularly fond of problems of method. He tends to emphasize personality, which he understands to be the opposite of the social, but he tries to reconcile this opposition by being adaptable. In fact, the thinker is a subordinate of the Utopians in ideological terms, and a subordinate of the men of action in practical terms. Deluded by his own methodological or âintellectualâ efficiency, he effortlessly combines the inactivity of the former with the lack of awareness of the latter. He interprets the world, and thinks he has transformed it. He comes to believe that ideas act by themselves, or ends up adopting an ideology which justifies his real life.
Opposed and complementary subtypes: the systematic philosopher; the essayist; the eternally misunderstood; the resigned woman; the embittered cuckold, etc.
B. The particular type. The âindividual/socialâ relation ceases to be perceived as such. If there is any awareness of the social, it is as the postulate of a limited practical activity. Thus the relation is reduced to the particularity of the individual within a limited group. In the words of this individual, philosophers are not practical, and there is no social problem; everything is a mere question of force and adaption, whether by constraint or by consent.
B.a. The civil servant (the bureaucrat). With a bit of preferential treatment, a little savvy, a serious attitude and a couple of qualifications, all will be well. Remember the respect we owe to the hierarchy inside which we are on the up and up. Things being what they are, all we need do is to be virtuous in principle, i.e., to make virtue the principle of the state and to make decency the principle of bureaucracy.
Subtypes: the conformist; the specialist; the well-informed man who has his finger on the pulse of things; the pedant (the policeman of knowledge); the citizen; the matron or eternal mother; the member of the AcadÊmie française.
B.b. The middleman or the bohemian. The reverse and the complement of the bureaucrat, this ersatz civil servant tries to occupy every available hole in the social automatism to which he owes his appointment. Although this has no status, and comes to him from outside, he considers it to be the freest and most internalized act of his own personal initiative. Although his function is to act as a safety valve or conductor, he sees himself at the summit of the hierarchy. He despises bureaucracy for being too staid and too pragmatic, and thinks he is using it. In fact, by sweetening its brutal methods and by adapting it to local conditions, it is he who is being used by bureaucracy.
Opposed and complementary subtypes: people in âpublic relationsâ and âpersonnel managementâ; publicity agents; literary critics (benign ones); lawyers; well-meaning little priests; brokers; masters of ceremony; detectives, etc.
B.c. The independent man. He believes that conscientious work is the only road to success. âAfter all, we need right-minded folk who do an honest dayâs work and who are not there merely for the show. Maybe us lot arenât famous, but at least weâre our own men. The state, civil servants, thinkers and what they think, art, religion â whatâs it all for if not to be made use of and to make our lives that little bit more enjoyable âŚ?â Such are the independent manâs thoughts as he sets up his little business. A good husband and a good father, off he goes to war to get conveniently killed for his country. Is he the unknown soldier? He certainly is. On fixed days of the year he remembers that he is a citizen, and goes to vote. His life may revolve around himself and his relationships, but he has a clear conscience, for surely his way of life is essential not only to himself but also for the well-being and existence of society. âIf everyone thought only of themselves, and if God thought of everyone, what a wonderful world it would be.â
Opposed and complementary subtypes: the criminal; the scab; the professional double-dealer; the expert; the pure glance and the voyeur.
C. The singular type. In the previous two classes of types, the relation with the social existed, but in a mystified form and reconstructed misleadingly in a representation. So in A.a, the relation appears as goodwill, followed by an inability to make it real. In A.b, the relation is as sharply presented as it is in A.a, but in a negative form: the strength of this positive character comes from his negative completeness. This type of individual has sold his goodwill in exchange for success. He imagines that the structure of society is there to serve him, and that by exploiting it he has overcome the âindividual/societyâ division or the âprivate/publicâ division to his personal advantage. In fact, although he is using society for his own ends and is controlling it for that purpose, he is allowing himself to become enslaved by the reactionary social forces of that society, without knowing how, and without even realizing it. In A.c, the relation degenerates somewhat more, both in practice and in its representation. Rather than being negative, it becomes indifferent. The individual puts himself âabove societyâ. This is why the philosopher finds it so easy to imagine that he has overcome the fundamental contradictions, in the Mind, or in his system.
In the B groups, we no longer find society as a whole, either as a practice or as a representation. The relation is between delimited spheres, and society as a whole disintegrates into particular groups. Every individual in these groups enters into contact with one or several âcirclesâ which he takes to be society as a whole. In this way the civil servant, or even the professional intellectual, believes in the generality of his experience, whereas in fact all he has experienced is a sum total of particularities and particular groups. The middleman imagines that he has a strategy for overcoming the fragmentation and the division of labour: to travel everywhere, to see the world. He thinks he has grasped the totality, whereas in fact he is fulfilling a function: he links people together. As for the independent type, he buries his head in the realness of a fragmented activity and thinks he has resolved the same problem.
In group C, we witness the complete degeneration of the âindividual/socialâ relation. Not only does it become blurred; it also dissolves and vanishes. The term âsocietyâ disappears from consciousness; but the only way it can really disappear is as a result of a pathological state. Thus society appears to be completely disguised, and the return to generality is achieved by the invention of completely phoney representations. So logical structure does not stop alienation. This is two-sided, and consists of a weakening of any concrete link, and of a series of arbitrary representations (ethical, aesthetic, etc.). The individual man of type C sees himself facing the âworldâ alone, and he tries to attain it without the mediation of the social, of history and of practice. An intuitive sense of a pure âselfâ leads him from a lived, everyday situation into irrefutable fetishisms. Here, character per se disappears. Everything becomes attitude, role-play, theatricals, acted out on the theoretical stage of a vulgar empiricism.
C.a. The fanatic. A coarsely egotistical âselfâ disguises itself under cosmic banners: god, nature, âworldâ. This individual sees himself facing the universe, and his only relation is with the âworldâ. Thus he believes himself to be universal, whereas in fact nobody could be more singular. He asserts himself hypocritically by using the âworldâ as a sphere of influence and self-justification. This character, or rather this attitude, encompasses various stages and variants, from the cold-blooded calculator disguised as a Kindly Soul to the religious fanatic. This type is forceful and ferocious in equal measure.
Subtypes: the Lady; the pseudo-poet; the Kindly Souls.
C.b. The oppositionist. In C.a. there is a conscious emphasis on the âworldâ. In C.b., the emphasis is expressly on the Self. C.a. says yes; C.b. says no. C.a. is a hypocrite; C.b. is a facile cynic. The type whose character is oppositional defines his âselfâ as the contrary of someone or something, and often as the contrary of everything which is not him. He is âpro everything anti, and anti everything proâ. He thinks he is more sharp-witted and human than the fanatic; and yet although his disposition is the complete opposite, he performs the same kind of social (i.e., antisocial) actions. Deep within his consciousnessâunconsciousness he is often frustrated. Of all the types, this is probably the most unstable. Sometimes his relation with praxis sinks even lower, i.e., even farther from that of a genuine consciousness. Sometimes he finds a way out; he escapes from the prison of his own character. We can often detect traces of infantility in him, as well as many flagrant contradictions (for example, the superstitious atheist).
Subtypes: the ostentatious anarchist and the ostentatious anticleric; the hypercritic.
C.c. The pompous idiot. This one is well anchored in the everyday; he collects its most commonplace contents and inflates them crudely. He uses triviality to discover wisdom, a philosophy, a vision of the world. For example, he extracts proverbial sayings from their ironic context, their mutual oppositions and corrections, and turns them into eternal truths. There will always be rich people and there will always be poor people. Those people donât suffer as we do. Money canât buy you happiness. There will always be wars. You canât make an omelette without breaking eggs. We arenât choirboys. Iâd rather be a happy pig than an unhappy Socrates. Thereâs a nip in the air, etc.âŚ
The pompous idiots are so stupid that they seem harmless. Because of their retarded and blinkered individualism, they are easy prey for demagogues. Through the inertia and mechanical nature of their stupidity, they go farther than others more treacherous or more intelligent than themselves in disintegrating the social and the human.
Subtypes: these are innumerable: the sententious sage; the sermonizer; the avid reader; the âpublic-spiritedâ man, etc.28
The idea that the audiovisual as it was lived in archaic communities (in scenes of magic) could be reconstituted is laughable and frivolous. The mass media strip the magic of presence from what was the presence of magic: participation â real, active or potential. Sitting in his armchair, surrounded by his wife and children, the television viewer witnesses the universe. At the same time, day in and day out, news, signs and significations roll over him like a succession of waves, churned out and repeated and already indistinguishable by the simple fact that they are pure spectacle: they are overpowering, they are hypnotic. The ânewsâ submerges viewers in a monotonous sea of newness and topicality which blunts sensitivity and wears down the desire to know. Certainly, people are becoming more cultivated. Vulgar encyclopedism is all the rage. The observer may well suspect that when communication becomes incorporated in private life to this degree it becomes non-communication.
...
At the extreme, signs and significations which are nothing more than significations lose all meaning. At the extreme looms the shadow of what we will call âthe great pleonasmâ: the unmediated passing immediately into the unmediated and the everyday recorded just as it is in the everyday â the event grasped, pulverized and transmitted as rapidly as light and consciousness â the repetition of the identical in a wild whirling dance devoid of Dionysian rapture, since the ânewsâ never contains anything really new. If this extreme were reached, the closed circuit of communication and information would jeopardize the unmediated and the mediated alike. It would merge them in a monotonous and Babel-like confusion. The reign of the global would also be the reign of a gigantic tautology, which would kill all dramas after having exploited them shamelessly.
Of course, this extreme situation is still a long way away. It would be a closed circuit, a circuit from hell, a perfect circle in which the absence of communication and communication pushed to the point of paroxysm would meet and their identities would merge. But it will never come full circle. There will always be something new and unforeseen, if only in terms of sheer horror. There will be âcreationsâ which will stimulate informative energy and allow for a massive injection of new information. This extreme exists only in the mindâs eye as a distant possibility, in the same way as the debasement of informational energy and the triumph of entropy are. And yet, this extreme allows us to imagine and determine certain aspects of âthe realâ. The very least we can be sure of is that the mass media have not yet incorporated the everyday into a vaster, richer whole, such as spontaneity or culture. They have left it to its âprivationâ while moving into this privation and taking it over. It is the generalization of private life. At one and the same time the mass media have unified and broadcast the everyday; they have disintegrated it by integrating it with âworldâ current events in a way which is both too real and utterly superficial. What is more or less certain is that they are dissociating an acquired, traditional culture, the culture of books, from written discourse and Logos. We cannot say what the outcome of this destructuring process will be.
Throughout Europe it was a common-place in the 1930s and 1940s that the South, through its systematic deprivation of the voting rights of blacks (and Mexicans and Native Americans), had embarked on the creation of something that looked unmistakably like the American version of a race-based fascist order. 'The Ku Klux Klan are the fascists of America,' a French author reported; they were a group founded in order to combat black enfranchisement. Bertram Schrieke, a Dutch ethnographer who published an interesting book on American race relations in 1936, declared that the southern 'process of undoing reconstructionâwith its violence, intimidation, open bribery, stuffing ballot boxes, manipulation and falsification of election returns, use of tissue ballots etc., all serving to eliminate Negro voters ⌠reminds one strongly of the rise of the Nazis in Germany'; '[o]n account of its one-party system and the precarious state of civil liberties,' wrote Gunnar Myrdal in 1944, 'the South is sometimes referred to as fascist.' Nevertheless, if Europeans widely shared this thought, it is especially striking to discover Nazis themselves expressing itâdeclaring, as Krieger did, that the Democratic Party of the South, through its 'racist election law,' had built a one-party system, and that the only remaining question was whether it would succeed, as the Nazis had done, in making 'the Party an organ of the State.'
James Q. Whitman, Hitlerâs American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law
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Cinemas are where we go to see capital. Expense itself is made visual. This film costs so many hundreds of millions of dollars, earning back so many hundreds of millions more. Where else would we ever know the total amount spent on the development of a product line, or its profitability? Only in the production of fictions does a consumer come close to an unmediated (or, more accurately, directly mediated) relationship to an industrial-scale production.
But capital cannot speak for itself; it must borrow the hands and mouths of others. Because of its dependence, in its guise as film, capital can be made to say strange things, verdant with productive ambiguities, brought into agreement with its antinomies. Here, the giant spectacle conglomerate is made to acknowledge: the earth has been salted. No, the land itself is salt. Nothing will grow. It will only bloom in sanguineous paroxysms of technoviolence. Â
Thereâs a great deal of money to be made from this intellectual property, but on a cursed, derelict planet, there is no time to do so. Yet it will happen. In The Last Jedi, characters have always run out of time, and then manage to escape from their fate anyway. Time in Star Wars is the cyclical, ahistorical time of myth. Myth is not the only timeless time. There is the time of waiting, stretching infinitely into the future. There is the time of impossibility, in which the sequence of events overflows timeâs causal capacity. (Six hours to catastrophe? Weâll just skip over to this other planet somewhere in the galaxy. Cut back to us whenever youâd like.) And there is the time of inevitability, in which time becomes irrelevant because all destinations are predetermined.
The Force Awakens existed in the timeless time of inevitability. It knew it was a Star Wars film because it knew it was a remake of A New Hope. That was its purpose, and it was a functional film. Last Jedi has the audacity to actually believe that it is a new Star Wars film, a 21st century version of a bizarre, goofy, pseudo-Daoist 70s sci-fi movie. It can be very difficult to see the films beneath the original trilogy. If you saw them at the right period in a certain kind of childhood, they occupy a distinct mental space. Thereâs Star Wars, and then there are all other films. Â They are of course in many ways bad films, a fact incapable of tarnishing their Star Wars-ness. With the prequel trilogy, George Lucas was too engrossed with telling his ponderous epic and innovating in the field of fast-aging CGI to even bother making films. There, Star Wars metastasized and overwhelmed its medium. The measured and canny Force Awakens, in its attempt to recreate the Star Wars-ness of Star Wars, was perhaps more an experiment in memory manipulation than a film. Many 'fans' are angrily disappointed in The Last Jedi. They are enraged by Last Jedi attempting to be a film. Abrams' finely-tuned homage delivered the idea of Star Wars directly to the part of the mind dedicated to it. Rian Johnson, impudently enough, seems to have at least tried to create something interesting.
In its willingness to be its own film, Last Jedi is willing to fail. Indeed, it makes failure its central theme, and in doing so, makes it the main thread running through the whole franchise. Yoda failed, Qui-Gon failed, Obi-Wan failed, and Luke failed. In the wake of his failure, Luke sees truer than his teachers, although perhaps all of them began to see clearly only after their defeats. He sees the vital unity of the Force, its absolute and uncontainable autonomy.
In his sublimation, does Luke fulfill the prophecy of bringing balance to the Force, having left behind only Kylo and Rey, the one dark and the other light? No. The prophecy of a chosen one bringing âbalanceâ to the Force was the ideology fantasy of a decadent theocratic order doomed to fall. In leaving the physical plane, Luke is letting go of the fantastic narrative which has structured his entire life. All those fashioning themselves âJediâ or âSithâ have fallen victim to the grandiose melodrama of the myths they have created. Kylo Ren is easily manipulated by Snokeâs tales of blood and destiny, which change so transparently to fit his strategic needs. But Snoke ends up believing in those same visions, and thereby becomes another victim. There is no grand narrative determining events; there is only the chaos of initiative, the ludicrous autopoietic power of the universe itself. This is the truth Luke finds in his hermitage. The future is continually made by the inherent dynamism of the moment.
The Jedi Order destroyed themselves, victims of the very ideology that sustained them as an institution. The Last Jedi is the first film in which we can clearly see why the Republic fell, and why its restoration after the jubilant toy-marketing victories of Return was so fragile and brief. This is because it is the first Star Wars film which takes political economy, and not just political intrigue, seriously. The endless marginalia that was the Extended Universe contained minutia of various Galactic mega-corporations, but this is the first time the question has been raised on screen - who makes all the death machines we see blown up in such quantities, film after film, and why? The why is simple: profit.
With the introduction of political economy comes a clearer view of what the Force is. It is not a biological quality waiting to be discovered and verified by celibate bureaucrat-monks. It is built out of quotidian routines and skills. It is not the inerrant ability that manifests in impossible podracing skills, it appears where the labor of the stable sweeper shades into magic.
If the Jedi have never been the genetically-chosen custodians of cosmic destiny, who are they? Like the Sith, they are merely people using power in pursuit of ends which are not guaranteed to be righteous or wise. The Sith and Jedi may draw from opposing valences of the Force, but this does not make one of them the inverse of the other. That idea is just another effect of their shared ideology. The dark and light sides were never synonyms for 'Evil' and 'Good,' they are simply politico-aesthetic moods. The Empire took control of the galaxy in a few decades because the military-industrial complex necessary had already been built under the Republic. The supposed heroes built the imperial structures, they just took on different management. The Jedi and Sith are the Democratic and Republican parties of a galaxy far, far away.
Tearing the veil of ideology from one's eyes, what does one do with the knowledge that everything is of one substance? Spinoza kept grinding lenses, and died from the effects of inhaling glass dust. Luke disappears in a puff of logic. Has he fulfilled his role, or abjured it? Regardless, everything will continue without him. Luke will not be the last Jedi. But while the future will bring forth more Jedi, âThe Jediâ must indeed come to an end. Their failures must be rectified, and they are not up to the task. But if we must do away with the past to preserve a future, how much must we destroy? The conflict between Millenial Kylo and Millenial Rey is about what it means to transcend the past, but they have both come to understand that it is necessary.
Last Jedi's productive ambiguity is this: the timeless temporality of the myth, of the eternal moment of infinitely accelerated capital circulation, is also the temporality of absolute contingency, of a radical break with the past. It is the condition of possibility for a landscape filled to the horizon with franchises and reboots, but also for building what must replace it. Our world is Disney's world. We live in multiple timeless times at once. We wait. We know things canât continue. Yet they do, somehow finding the remaining time that isnât there. Disney (which owns everything) believes things can continue, forever. It believes in the timeless infinity of capitalâs circuit. Disney believes in the mythic structure. JJ Abrams made A New Hope, and it doesnât ultimately matter what dark meandering the middle film goes on, because JJ Abrams will come back and make Return of the Jedi again. Everything will go as it has before. The money will be made.
The true horrors of the Anthropocene will not, at least initially, be the direct effects of climate change â sea level rise, more intense droughts, floods, and storms - but rather the collapse of complex human systems, and an increasing recourse to violence over cooperation to attain security for smaller and smaller groups as those systems fail. Even if one can point to many indices that the present is better than the past, even if the quotidian still seems more or less normal as ever, the present is marked by the feeling that something terrible is going to happen. Although the threat it poses is not directly tied to climate change, the Mosul Dam, which must be continually reinforced with injections of cement lest it give way and kill or displace millions along the Tigris, serves as a potent representation of how futurity is experienced in the Anthropocene: a massive body, still but containing within itself the constant threat of catastrophic eruption.
This is also how the antagonists in Arrival see that filmâs alien spacecraft. While the various national groupings struggle to understand the alien Heptapods' language, this is how some begin to interpret their vessels, parked impossibly only a short distance above the ground: as a dark weight which will inevitable be transmuted into crashing violence.
Like most science fiction films not primarily concerned with war or contagion, Arrival reaffirms the values of liberal humanist universalism. Yet by the end of the film, this affirmation appears oddly faithless. Polyvalent, its failure or success hinges on this question: are we watching this liberal humanist universalism fail to take up the task of self-criticism, thus losing its self-belief, or does it point towards a successor faith?
The Heptapodsâ hovering cocoons are part 2001 monolith, part Angel of History, part iceberg. One side's flat eminence hides the other's gently curving protuberance. It is a physical manifestation of the film's message, taken in its most conventionally liberal humanist form: the looming horror of an Anthropocenic future is only an illusion arising from our ability to only see a two-dimensional plane of what is to come, an anxiety stoked by our baser instincts; the true substance and weight of the future is hidden just behind this plane; the Angel of History is not falling blindly into the future, but, blessed with transtemporality by its circular language, is simply looking back at us to give us aid.
But is the cocoon ultimately just a kind of technological, extraterrestrial magical negro? The cocoons melt into air, their work done. The central question the linguist protagonist is striving to answer: what is their purpose on Earth?, is only ever answered with: to help you. We never learn the real structure of their motivations, their desires. In the end, they only wish for what we ourselves might want â that we may survive into the future, and even improve, the Whiggish drama of history proceeding ever onward. Is this any better than Interstellar? Both appear to suggest the answer to the challenges of the future is simply that there must by necessity be an answer: humanity will be saved from itself by the very universe, which, it turns out, is actually humanity itself. The Angel of History is not just whispering hints, itâs a disguise our future selves wear to bodily lift our past selves up by the bootstraps.
But what makes Arrival so curious, so interdeterminate, what makes it either the faithless dying breath of liberal humanism or the first stirrings of something beyond, is that it is unclear whether this transtemporal solution offered to humanity is a solution at all. In this drama of the crisis of reproduction, the protagonistsâ child dies as a teen. Yes, there is a life, with its joys and sorrows, to be had after the event, but the next generation is doomed. Is this a fatalistic reassurance for the Last Generation Who Can Have Nice Things â that one can embrace one's life, even if one's children won't have the opportunity â or is it instead a model of faith after hope, a way of believing in the future even after premonition of disaster?
The film's animating contradiction is rooted in its dependence on an absurdly strong form of linguistic relativism. This appears as a modified form of Benjamin Lee Whorf's hasty (and entirely wrong) conclusion that the Hopi language has no elements which refer to time, and that thus, the Hopi do not have an experience of chronological time. The Heptapods' language, since its meaning does not unfold linearly in time, allows them to experience time in non-linear fashion. (And this alone, apparently, is a sufficiently powerful tool to save humanity, worth whatever investment it required of the aliens, because it allows for the arrow of causality to be reversed, the future determining the past, as when General Shang tells Louise Banks the words which, in the past, will go on to convince him to change course.) This ability can be bestowed on humans, because it is imparted by the language, rather than the language's atemporality being a by-product of a species characteristic. Louise Banks can become a heroic Billy Pilgrim.
Whorf's mistaken conclusion about Hopi, the language and the people, was a product of a humanist mission: to demonstrate that non-European languages had their own particular value, and were not simply primitive shadows of superior, more highly developed European languages. But the method of this universalist mission was to cast non-Europeans as even more essentially alien and irreconcilably different. This contradiction lives on in a film in which the United States is uncritically shown to be the main standard bearer for liberal humanist internationalism, and our geopolitical others â China and Russia â are, with no sign of irony, made to embody the sins of xenophobia, suspicion, and violence.
Any attempt to resolve the film's indeterminacies and contradictions must be found on the stage which acts as the filmâs core (and, I suspect, is the element which will be remembered as part of the film sci-fi canon) - the chamber within the cocoon where communication experiments with the Heptapods take place. A mixture of interrogation chamber and womb, it is bounded by a transparent barrier on one side and a reversal of gravity on the other.
In Fossil Capital, Andreas Malm argues that climate change demonstrates that the fashion within critical theory circles for declaring late capitalism to be the era of space's triumph over time was utterly mistaken â that the present is seeing precisely the opposite â the revenge of time, as the weight of the past (specifically past carbon emissions) ever more narrowly determines the present and forecloses possibilities for the future. Yet such a debate seems to arrive already obsolete in a post- Einsteinian world that acknowledges space-time, a single fabric. This unity in theory has struggled to become a conceptual unity. Perhaps this is what the experimental chamber is â a womb, but a womb where space and time are transmuted, where they are finally and actually joined: a space-time, a laboratory in which the fix the contradictions of a species which has bound together distant parts of the Earth by burning the consolidated time held within it. Arrival presents an image of the stage on which such a reconciliation might unfold, but it cannot show us its shape.
The tradition of the dead is breathing down the necks of the living, leaving them with two choices: smash their way out of business-as-usual â and the heavier the breath, the more extreme the measures must be â or succumb to an accumulated, unbearable destiny. As of this writing, both scenarios remain possible. The famed âwindow of opportunityâ for abolishing the fossil economy and stabilising climate within tolerable bounds â even returning it to safer conditions â is still there; if emissions were reduced to zero, the rise in temperatures would soon taper off. Such an enterprise would have to stage a full-scale onslaught on the structural nightmares bequeathed by the past. It would be a revolution against history, an exodus, an escape from it in the last moment, and it would have to know what it has to struggle against.
Another longtime dream of reformers was to do away with the antiquated and antidemocratic electoral college. The House had passed a bill for direct popular election of presidents in September of 1969 by vote of 338 to 70. But as Senator Strom Thurmond knew better than anyone else, the Southâs major political trump card was the threat of a renegade third-party presidential candidate using his electoral votes to keep either of the major parties from an electoral college majority. Thurmond had Senate Judiciary chair James Eastland of Mississippi bottle the bill up in committee. Birch Bayh threatened to block consideration of Harrold Carswell unless the debate came to the floor. When it did, in the summer of 1970, Thurmond, Eastland, and Sam Ervin filibustered...cloture failed, and the electoral college survived its greatest threat in two hundred years.
Otherwise said, representation was never a system invented to compensate for the growth of populations. It is not a form in which democracy has been adapted to modern times and vast spaces. It is, by rights, an oligarchic form, a representation of minorities who are entitled to take charge of public affairs. Historically, it is always first and foremost states, orders, possessions which are represented, whether they are regarded as entitling one to exercise power, or are occasionally given a consultative voice by a sovereign power. Nor is the vote in itself a democratic form by which the people makes its voice heard. It is originally the expression of a consent that a superior power requires and which is not really such unless it is unanimous. The self-evidence which assimilates democracy to a representative form of government resulting from an election is quite recent in history. Originally representation was the exact contrary of democracy. None ignored this at the time of the French and American revolutions. The Founding Fathers and a number of their French emulators saw in it precisely the means for the elite to exercise power de facto, and to do so in the name of the people that representation is obliged to recognize but that could not exercise power without ruining the very principle of government. Rousseauâs disciples, for their part, only admitted representation by repudiating the meaning of the word, that is, the representation of particular interests. The general will cannot be divided and the deputies only represent the nation in general. âRepresentative democracyâ might appear today as a pleonasm. But it was initially an oxymoron.
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Whatâs most interesting about Disneyâs Marvel Cinematic Universe products, highlighted in the direct-to-Netflix offerings, are the regular reminders that the supernatural events are all happening on the same Earth we occupy: the present day, the ârealâ New York. What makes this interesting, rather than simply another special verisimilitude effect, is that (within the miniseries, at least) the Disney-Marvel superheroes play the same role in their world that Disney-Marvel superhero-based media products play in ours. Thus, in rooting for heroes, the audience comes to root for the proliferation of superhero media itself.
Itâs this parallelism that provides the frame which allows Luke Cage to diverge â to the extent that it does â from what would otherwise be the fundamentally right-wing (if occasionally democratic localist) politics that almost inevitably come with the action-hero genre: personal morality comes first, since politics is always a smokescreen for corruption; only community can be trusted; corporations are bad, but only to the extent that theyâre criminal enterprises; the police department may be corrupt, but thereâs always One Good Cop on whom you can depend. The moments when Luke Cage manifests an apparently progressive politics are made possible by the paradoxical preoccupation with futurity demanded by the conversion of this world into a world of superhero spectacle.
This message is not purveyed subtly in Luke Cage. The heroesâ recurring motto, after all, is âForward â always forward.â Exemplifying the current trend for backstory â always backstory â it focuses on past trauma and the need to let it go. Its central villain first makes his presence known with a 70s pop culture reference, to The Warriors of all things, a film in which the central tragedy is that the criminal lumpenproletariat doesnât unite in order to overthrow the police-enforced social order. For all the invocation of black cultural traditions and the history of Harlem, culminating in Cageâs feel-good police HQ monologue in the final episode, the more fundamental message is that the past must die, before it kills us. Itâs only by wiping away the past that we can make way for whatâs coming. The systems we have now (which are all corrupt anyhow) arenât up to the task in a world increasingly full of supernatural powers, and the cultural products we may have cherished yesterday have to make way for films, television shows and tie-ins to be produced on a strict calendar by the Disney-Marvel juggernaut. Even the much-vaunted âcommunityâ itself has to give way. As Cage says in a speech earlier in the series â âI donât believe in Harlem â I believe in the people of Harlem.â The place, the community, the idea of Harlem â these canât be relied upon, only each individual in Harlem stepping up the plate, doing their duty as a moral governor of the self, an ethical entrepreneur. There is no such thing as society. People donât binge-watch Netflix in crowds.
Belief in the idea of Harlem as a historically-determined place, as a specific community, is represented by the duplicitous, disingenuous, and ultimately murderous local politician who is constantly invoking the glories of Harlemâs past (and, just imagine, she actually wants to build public housing!) To the extent the show offers a sympathetic representation of the current movement against racist police violence, it can only do this by opposing this model of politics by networked, cell-phone wielding citizens to an outdated model based around professional (therefore grandstanding and venal) politicians and formal (therefore corrupt) organizations. In other words: it can engage with the politics of the present only as part of the larger Disneycapital project of destroying the past.
It might at first appear paradoxical that destruction of the past would be the motive force of a show which often lovingly dwells on the artifacts of black culture, and of a company and industry which is focused now more than ever on profitably rehashing inherited intellectual property. But the ultimate target in the war against the past is not any specific, concrete past but historical time itself, which must be sacrificed on the way to the eschaton of capital: its instantaneous, and therefore timeless, circulation. We can keep elements of the past, but only as flotsam in the swirling eddies of the infinite now. Thatâs the thing about dealing in simulacra, after all: thereâs no need to keep any originals around. Disney has long since advanced past simply presenting a sanitized, controlled, kitsch-utopian microcosm in its amusement parks, to serve as a model for the rest of world: it now strives to make the world identical to itself. This is, after all, the company which made a fictional sports team with a silly name from one of its films into an actual sports team with a silly name. The quest to become identical with the world continues in the consumption of large swaths of its intellectual property, which can be flipped and rebooted in a recirculation which slowly erases any distinction between past and present.
When one roots for the hero in Luke Cage, one is ultimately rooting for this. And one always roots for the hero, since the internal and external structure of the superhero narrative (including its familiarity, its very pastness) work to make this a foregone conclusion. Luke Cage can gesture to ambiguity and nuance, by telling the story of the trauma which made its villains villainous, or by having its Good Cop deliver sermons on the dangers of vigilante justice, but weâre precluded from reaching the conclusion that actually, super-powered people are a bad thing, or that it would be good if someone did find a way to definitively stop Cage, because we know from the beginning that Cage is right, because we know from the beginning that heâs the hero, and heâs the hero because heâs right. (Weâre great because weâre good. #ImWithHer.) Luke Cage puts us in the position of welcoming the transformation of this world by the proliferation of superheroes, and at the same time in the position of welcoming the transformation of this world by the proliferation of superhero media, which in the end is just a colorful avatar of capitalâs Todestrieb.
Applied to individualsâ own market-conforming self-formation, techniques of self-government are currently placed primarily in the service of economic valorization. However, when the presence of others is reduced to a capitalized product relation, the compulsion to prove oneâs own virtuosity becomes a self-referential and competitive servility. Virtuoso labour thus shows itself as âuniversal servile work'. When producing and acting coincide in the public, this action does not necessarily become political; on the contrary, it is not infrequently an action through which both the other and the self become economically governable.
Although such individualized virtuoso action takes place according to the old logic of a presumably sovereign self-formation independent of others, at the same time it is also an action of self-subjugation that is accompanied by fear. Hobbesâ fearsome sovereign, whom the subjects were supposed to obey, has long since been transformed - and to an extreme degree in neoliberalism - into a self-governing fear. Governmental precarization, (self-)governing through insecurity, currently still persists at the level of acting subjects in many places, in an anxious self-arrangement.
I believe this prize winning novelist believed that the mind has two places, the conscious and subconscious, and that literature could only come out of the subconscious mind, but that language preferred to live in the conscious one. This is wrong. Language prefers to live on the Internet.
Far from suppressing criticism of everyday life, modern technical progress realizes it. This technicity replaces the criticism of life through dreams, or ideas, or poetry, or those activities which rise above the everyday, by the critique of everyday life from within: the critique which everyday life makes of itself, the critique of the real by the possible and of one aspect of life by another. Compared with lower or degraded standards of living, everyday life with all the superior mod cons takes on the distance and remoteness and familiar strangeness of a dream.
Henri Lefebvre, A Critique of Everyday Life, Volume I, pg. 31.
For Lefebvre, the 'path towards Marx' would lead 'from the cult of "spirit" to dialectical materialism', as he explained as early as December 1932 in a reply to Denis de Rougemont's survey of young intellectuals in the Nouvelle Revue Française. He writes that there had been a few young people, himself included, who believed they could refuse 'a life in which the sole act is: buying and selling, selling oneself' by following 'a call to the life of the spirit, of poetry, of eternity'. But with the onset of the economic crisis, with all its attendant perils, 'the problem was reduced to its most basic elements': 'for many people it's a question of staying alive, purely and simply of staying alive'. Thus one must 'attack the base, come to grips with the conditions of the diabolical universe of capitalism', and only political revolution would be capable of changing life.
Henri Lefebvre, A Critique of Everyday Life, Volume I, Preface, p. 15
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That would be a succinct way to state the thesis of Welcome To Me (2014), a film which dramatizes the irresolvable tension between the democratic promise of autonomous individuality and the media of mass society, even in its apparently decentralized, diffuse âpostmodernâ form.
The filmâs critique flows from a simple narrative move: it takes the gospel of self-actualization pushed by Oprah and all the other assorted avatars of self-help and positive psychology that characterize the imperative of neoliberal subject (auto)formation, and, taking it at its word, feeds it back into the mechanisms of image-production, to reveal the cruel absurdity of its promise, its structural incompatibility with the message it transmits.
What the image-system sells as self-realization it can comprehend and consume only as spectacle. Forced to tell a single human story, without blinking, without recourse to a master narrative, or rather the multiplicity of structuring narratives that do its work and better, which typically allow for the possibility of a comforting, reconciliatory feint toward the regularizing (and regulatory) force of averaging, of relativizing, the array reels in both horror and delight.
Alice Klieg (Kristen Wiig) has borderline personality disorder: she is the liminal case who casts a shadow of doubt on the whole of the territory she borders. Klieg is the Knight of Faith: she believes in the Secret even though her life is a testament to its untruth, and in remaining attached to the unbelievable, she brings it impossibly into existence. She can begin to live the dream of individuality only by staging, and therefore disproving, its constituent dreams. Each must be put on display in all its cruel falsity to become true.
The inability, or unwillingness, to abandon, diminish or disguise past trauma, a personal register of dysfunction, becomes resistance to the End of History; and to the timeless pseudospace which the neoliberal subject requires to self-actualize without being limited by actual humanity in the formation of personality.
Self-help spirituality is the necessary product of the imperative to autoformation in a social environment defined by risk-management and fictional capital â the fortress casino of capitalism. The sweepstakes are Kliegâs ticket to stand at the doors of the casino. When she wins her $86 million, she must literalize this passage from the outside to the inside: she moves into a casino hotel, indefinitely. But the interior of the fortress casino of capital is still the realm of the culture of the immediate end of life. She has the money to produce a television program entirely about her â to transform the implicit promise of Oprah â that each episode is really about the emotional life of each individual viewer â into a reality. But she can only produce 100 episodes. She can shine at full luminosity, but she must burn down to the end.
The format of her show, in which cut-rate actors play past versions of Klieg acting out traumatic episodes of her life brings to mind a conference Donna Harway describes in Primate Visions, wherein the assembled women primatologists presented from the different selves they had been over the course of their lives and careers. The impossibility of forming a functional, self-actualizing neoliberal self is demonstrated by arraying a full range of past selves and their unique, varying traumas. Why are Kliegâs past selves portrayed by cheap actresses? Because they are not her, they are not capable of being integrated seamlessly into the present Klieg; the impossibility of unproblematic subsumption of past experience into an undivided subject is made obvious: if her past selves were âherâ, she would not be able to yell directions at them from the seat of her stage-traversing bicycle.
In the special finale episode of her show, she presents her closest friend with a novelty check for $7 million, all that remains from her lottery winnings, in recognition of all the help her friend provided over the years, the necessary sustenance without which she could not have reached that point. The fiction of the show-about-oneself is abandoned in favor of the reality of being constituted by others.
Returning to her swan-filled apartment, Klieg turns out the small camcorder she has just received as a gift. She tries out a pose in front of it. Taking a deep breath, she powers off a television that has always been on. The question of what comes next is left open. There may not be any easy answers, if there are any. But before there can be answers, the spectacle-machine must be deactivated.
While an entertaining read, this New Yorker article about Trumpâs ghostwriter brings out some internal inconsistencies in the âTrump must be stopped narrativeâ which suggest that a Trump presidency â while undoubtedly awful â might not be quite so specially apocalyptic as it is often pictured.Â
Letâs stipulate three pillars of the consensus Trump Must Be Stopped narrative: 1. Trump is an ignorant egomaniac with virtually no attention span and no knowledge of the issues or interest in acquiring it. (He is.)Â
2. Many to most of Trumpâs policy proposals, to the extent that he can be said to have policies and not just rambling soliloquies, are hideous. (They are.)Â
3. Trump therefore poses a unique threat to âAmerican Democracyâ / âThe Republic.â (Hmm.)Â
The combination of points one and two bring point three into question. While the Trumps have a long history of exploiting racism, from Fredâs gaining profitable contracts to build public housing and then working to bar minorities, to the full-page ads Donald took out condemning the Central Park Five, in contrast to a creep like Ted Cruz, Trump does not largely appear to be driven by ideological commitments. He is perhaps driven by a lust for power, but even more by a lust for attention.Â
Itâs been reported that the Trump camp made overtures to John Kasich in which he was made an offer to become âthe most powerful Vice President in history,â setting policy while Trump continued his showman role in the Oval Office. This could be interpreted as another example of Trump duplicity which Kasich wisely turned down, an attempt to exploit Kasichâs reputation as a âreasonable moderateâ during the election, and then leave him stranded as a powerless VP while the executive branch is run according to Trumpâs whims. From what we know of Trump, an equally if not more probable explanation is that this offer was entirely sincere: Trump began his campaign as another attention-grabbing form of self-glorification, he never expected to actually get the nomination, and while he couldnât possibly turn back now that the presidency seems like a real possibility, he continues to have no real interest in governing.Â
If Trump is an egomaniac with the attention span of a relatively savvy gnat, then his policy proposals, which again are truly hideous, donât represent ideological commitments that Trump might be expected to pursue with vigor if it proved to be the least bit difficult to put them into execution. Rather, his proclamations are merely what Trump, whose purity of id gives him a eerily direct connection to the most embittered, reactionary elements of U.S. society, knows will rally a segment of the electorate, which he might abandon as readily as everyone else in his life who has ceased to be of use to him. One could theorize that, if Trump truly is driven more by a will to power than a need for attention, once he has assumed the presidency, his need for further power could only be appeased by seeing his insane policies put in place. I would venture that it is more likely that he would be satisfied by the raucous, unending media attention which his presidency would be afforded.Â
If the latter is the case, then one might imagine that his deal with Mike Pence is much the same as with John Kasich: Iâll be the clownish showman, you do the govern-y bits. Trump â16 would then be, for most intents and purposes, four years of a Race Bannon mannequin plodding along behind a veil of 24/7 media circus: terrible, yes, but not noticeably worse than the average Republican in the early 21st century. If this is the case, then the case for Stopping Trump is not so different from the standard Democratic appeal of the last two decades, to vote for them because of how bad the Republicans are.Â
That brings us to the third pillar of Trump eschatology, the notion that Trump poses a unique threat to âThe Republic,â to the very system of electoral representation and the normal functioning of government. Yet much of the functioning of the government  are quite stable and slow to change due to the influence of career bureaucrats, Congressional sclerosis, the power of corporate lobbying, and broad areas of ideological agreement among those with access to state power. The notion that having Trump at head of the executive branch would be an immediate threat the present-day form of U.S. government demonstrates a certain lack of faith in the structural integrity of U.S. institutions. This lack of faith is in turn the predictable result of an interminable Presidential campaign which continually exaggerates the central importance of big personalities vying for the big office. (I derive some small amusement from the irony that some of those warning of the dire Trump threat also argued that advocating for a Sanders presidency was useless because he wouldnât be able to forge compromises in a gridlocked or GOP-controlled Congress.) Â
Ignoring the broad continuities of U.S. government in order to dramatize the stark contrast between two candidates functions to stage a scenario in which the myth of causal efficacy of the individual vote acquires coherence. That mythic efficacy is a vital element of our civic religion as currently constituted.Â
This is not to downplay that I still believe that the appeal of Trumpâs campaign is fundamentally Fascistic, but only to question whether Trump is substantially (more) committed (than other presidential candidates) to using state power for Fascist ends. Possibly, the real danger lies not in Trumpâs potential actions, but the emboldening of the worst elements that support him: the growth of white nationalist groups, the spread of racist vigilante violence, the hardening of the most reactionary elements of the security services, and the license that could be taken by the pre-Trump right-wing of the Republican Party. (It is easy to imagine that Fox News would enthusiastically fall into lock-step with Trump once he assumed all the dignity of our nationâs highest office.) This would accord with a developed understanding of how the Fuhrerprinzip actually functioned: Nazi atrocities were propelled not so much by the lone functioning of Hitlerâs will, but by competition within the Party to live up to an increasingly deranged ideal image of what Hitler might have been supposed to desire. In the end, the threat of a Trump presidency and a Republican-controlled Congress is no different than the threat posed by GOP control of both the legislative and executive branch: the unleashing of the worst of the right-wing imagination. The problem is less Trump than Trumpism, and Trumpism was here well before this stupid circus began.
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