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Hi! I just read on Wikipedia that Henri de la Rochejaquelein was at the Tuileries on August 10 and that it was his first battle?!? You've written about him before, and I wondered if you knew anything more about it & how tf he survived that.
Hi! Thank you for the question. Itâs only fitting I answer it today, 28 January, the day Henri died. And itâs a fun one, because if thereâs one thing that makes Henri interesting, itâs that his life sometimes reads like an adventure novel, and his escape from the Tuileries is no exception.
The short answer is that Wikipedia is roughly right: Henri de La Rochejaquelein was at the Tuileries on 10 August 1792, on the kingâs side, and he survived a day that killed a lot of people in broadly the same position. The âfirst battleâ claim is only half true. Heâd already had his âbaptism of fireâ in a small order-maintenance operation near Lauzun (Agenais) in 1790. That said, 10 August is his first experience of large-scale violence and real casualties.
The Royal Constitutional Guardsman
So first: what was the son of a provincial noble from fuck-nowhere Bas-Poitou doing at the Tuileries in the first place?
The short answer, again, is that in some bizarre way it was his job. As Wikipedia says, by late 1791 heâd agreed to enter the kingâs Constitutional Guard as a cavalry sub-lieutenant under dâHervilly (1). The Kingâs Constitutional Guard was a strange compromise: it let the king (whom people werenât exactly fans of after Varennes) have some kind of day-to-day protection, while trying to reduce the risk it turned into a private royal army.
In principle the corps combined infantry and cavalry and was funded through the kingâs Civil List (so paid as part of the monarchyâs household finances rather than as a line regiment). A commonly cited structure is 1,200 men on foot and 600 mounted, with the departments presenting candidates for the infantry while the king selected the mounted component. Its intended role was protective and ceremonial: guarding the royal apartments and escorting the royal family.
You donât need to be a specialist in the French Revolution to see why this went down badly. After Varennes, a guard chosen by the king looked suspicious by definition. The Guard quickly acquired a reputation, fair or not, as an âaristocraticâ body. Rumours circulated that it would be used to engineer a counter-revolutionary coup, or to facilitate a(nother) royal escape. It was also very clearly the queenâs project, right down to uniform choices, which tells you what sort of loyalty it demanded, what it was meant to represent, and why people in Paris werenât thrilled.
So why did Henri actually join? The reason he ended up there is open to speculation, because while heâd been a soldier since thirteen in various units, this wasnât an obvious career move. On the contrary. Service in the Kingâs Constitutional Guard didnât offer the normal route of advancement in the wider army; promotion would largely be confined inside that body. So he plainly wasnât doing it for some straightforward material purpose.
Whether he wanted it, or whether his father wanted it, is also up for speculation. When notified by the duc de Brissac (2)Â on 30 November 1791 that Louis XVI had named him to the corps, what we do know is that he didnât accept instantly, since the Minister of War had to send a reminder on 16 December asking him to confirm by 1 January 1792 whether he intended to join. He does accept, and someone somewhere really wants him in, because thereâs a small administrative detail that has to be fudged: the Guard required men to be between twenty and thirty. Henri was nineteen. His age is quietly adjusted by two years on the rolls so he meets the requirement. So either he, or someone acting for him, really wanted the boy to join.
But if you know anything about the short-lived Kingâs Constitutional Guard, youâll look at me and ask: but umm⊠werenât they disbanded in late May 1792?
Partially correct. Louis XVI accepted the dismissal of his guard, and the disarmament took place at the Tuileries, after which the former guards were publicly abused. That was the formal end of the corps.
The informal reality is that the guards, and some other nobles seen as loyal, were told to remain in Paris. Former members were effectively kept on standby and were still paid, still expected to respond if the king called on them. They were harassed in public to the point that officers advised them not to appear in uniform, so they continued to mount guard in civilian clothing.
Henri at the Tuileries
So: 10 August. As insurrection becomes imminent, Louis XVI calls in defenders: Swiss Guards, National Guardsmen of uncertain reliability, and former constitutional guardsmen now in plain clothes, plus various gentlemen who rush in because they genuinely believe defending the king is their duty. He calls them, but he doesnât arm them properly, and he puts an eighty-year-old in charge.
Various biographies report that Henri wanted to follow the king and was fairly vociferous about it. The king refuses, repeatedly, insisting only the National Guard will escort him. The queen orders the gentlemen to stay.
Once the royal family leaves the palace, the defendersâ position becomes hopeless. The attack begins. The Swiss fire and briefly hold the assailants back, but the king sends an order for the Swiss to cease fire, and they comply. Command then collapses, and different groups improvise exits or attempt to break out.
Henri, like many others, does the same. He reaches the river, detaches a boat, and crosses to the left bank, which is quieter. He briefly returns to his lodging, but decides itâs unsafe to stay: heâs known as a former member of the kingâs Constitutional Guard and could be denounced.
Enter another familiar figure, and Henriâs cousin: the marquis de Lescure, who is trying to secure passports through the local section. Lescure has the luck to run into Thomassin, his former governor, now a commander in the Paris National Guard and still personally loyal to him. Thomassin has obtained passports for Lescure and his wife, and heâs prepared to do the same for La Rochejaquelein and dâAutichamps, but procedure requires a lodging declaration and two witnesses to attest the applicants are housed where they claim. Lescure makes the declaration and finds a cooperative first witness; Thomassin brings a second.
When they all go to the Section du Roule, theyâre delayed in a queue, and during the wait the second witness reads a posted warning that false witnesses will be punished with two years in irons. He panics, goes straight to the secretary, and admits he doesnât know these men at all. When their turn finally comes, the secretary quietly tells Lescure, âYou are lost, get out,â while outwardly fobbing them off with a complaint that he has no time and they must return later. They run, and theyâre lucky they escape with their lives.
To publish the Works of Robespierre is to rehabilitate a name around which so many unjust prejudices have gathered; it is, at the same time, to provide the people with an abundant source of enlightenment and instruction. How many men who have never so much as glanced at Robespierreâs writings or speeches are convinced, on the authority of the aristocracyâs paid writers, that Robespierre was a villain. Let them read his works, and they will arrive at a fairer judgement of his feelings and his heart.
Robespierreâs works are the best answer to the frenzied declamations of his equally frenzied detractors. To slander, insult and shriek is not to reason. Those who, for want of better arguments, heap insult upon slander against a man prove one thing: that there is not a single fact in that manâs life which might support a reasonable and conscientious attack upon him.
Did Robespierre err? That is what I shall examine in the historical notice with which I shall preface his works. But it is above all through those works themselves, by reading and reflecting upon them, that one may become convinced that Robespierre was cruelly slandered. It is by closely examining his conduct and his political actions from 1789 until 9 Thermidor that one will recognise in him the purest defender of the rights of humanity.
Whoever reads Robespierre is inwardly consumed by a more ardent love of country and liberty, and by a deeper hatred of the tyrants who crush humankind. Whoever reads him sees a new universe unfolding before his eyes. He feels, touches and understands his rights; he identifies himself with them; he becomes worthy of the noble name of man, worthy of the great title of citizen.
About the text:
Albert Laponneraye was a republican activist, journalist, teacher and one of the earliest nineteenth-century defenders of Robespierre. He devoted much of his career to recovering Robespierreâs writings and challenging the version of him inherited from Thermidor.
I disagree with Laponneraye on many points, not least his misogyny. He supported some civil emancipation for women, but rejected their political equality and regarded politically active women with marked hostility.
As a historian, and I use the term very loosely, Laponneraye wrote militant, highly literary history intended as much to educate and persuade as to reconstruct the past. His heroes and villains were firmly fixed, his tone could be excessively reverential, and his treatment of sources was often careless. He belongs firmly to the politically committed historiography of the early nineteenth century.
Still, in this prospectus to his edition of Robespierreâs works, I think he makes a good and rather basic point with considerable eloquence: people should read Robespierre before deciding what he stood for [1].Â
Note
[1] It goes without saying that the same applies to any other historical figure you can think of...
This has absolutely nothing to do with anything I usually post on this blog , but today Iâve had my Disney princess moment and I really wanted to share it đ
And then my advances were rejected by a bear with a salmon
OK ⊠Iâm done now . I promise the next time I post, it will be relevant đ
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Usually when an English speaker is getting into the history of the French Revolution and wants to go beyond Wikipedia, they stumble on The Twelve Who Ruled. Itâs inevitable. Since 1941 it has been a staple of lecture halls and history aficionados alike.
For me it was one of the first things I read, many years ago, and it shaped, to some extent, how I approached the period. I read it again last year, expecting to see it differently. I didnât. Itâs an old book. But still, by the standards of 21st-century historiography, largely accurate.
So since itâs a book a lot of beginners encounter, and since Iâve had half a mind to review some of the dozens of books on the French Revolution I own, I thought it would be a good place to start.
I will be assessing this book (and all others I review) on a scale from 1 to 5 in eight categories:
Before we start, remember two things:
This is my review, which means it is, by definition, biased. I try to stay as neutral as possible, but no one is fully objective.
You should never take anything as fact. I research things. I enjoy researching things. I spend far too much time researching things. But Iâm human, and that means I make mistakes. Challenge everything you read, including this.
Twelve Who Ruled: An In-depth Review
Historical Accuracy
For a book published in the 1940s, Twelve Who Ruled is remarkable in how much of it remains uncontested, especially given that archival access in France was impossible during the war. Using only the printed sources available to him, Palmer built a richly detailed narrative of Year II. He avoided major factual errors and did not indulge in the lurid exaggerations or mythologising that often plagued earlier accounts of the Revolution.
On the contrary, Palmerâs portraits of key figures and events have stood the test of time. His depiction of Robespierre, for example, was unmatched in its balance, nuance and restraint when the book was published. Subsequent scholarship has generally confirmed Palmerâs factual claims. Indeed, many of his interpretations have been validated by later evidence: for instance, he is one of the first to advance the argument that the Terrorâs policies were reactive responses to severe crises, rather than a premeditated program of mass violence, and that Robespierre never exercised dictatorial authority.
When situating The Twelve Who Ruled within the landscape of French Revolution historiography, it is important to remember that Palmer was writing in 1941, before most of the major scholarly camps had fully taken shape. His work does not fit neatly into the classic categories of Marxist, Revisionist, or post-Revisionist schools (1), though it engaged with and later influenced those debates.
Palmerâs approach was essentially a liberal narrative of the Revolutionâs most turbulent phase. He focused on the pragmatic demands of governance during an existential crisis, rather than on class struggle or ideological abstraction. This already set him apart from the Marxist tradition. His attention remained squarely on the actions and dilemmas of the twelve men on the Committee of Public Safety, and on the political and military pressures that shaped their decisions.
He also diverged from what would later become the Revisionist school. While Palmer shared their scepticism of class determinism, he did not embrace their emphasis on ideology as the primary driver. His account treats the Terror less as a product of revolutionary rhetoric than as a contingent response to internal collapse and foreign invasion. He was wary of overly ideological explanations.
In short, The Twelve Who Ruled occupies a distinctive historiographical position. As the first serious monograph on the Committee of Public Safety, it predates the Cold War polarities that shaped later scholarship. In my opinion, Palmer might best be described as a pragmatic liberal historian of the French Revolution. He did not write in the Marxist tradition of Lefebvre or Soboul (though he admired Lefebvre enough to translate his work), nor did he share the iconoclastic edge of later revisionists like Cobban or Furet (2).
Use of Primary Sources
Writing during World War II from the United States, Palmer relied entirely on published primary sources available in America. These included a wide range of printed materials: the proceedings and debates of the National Convention, official documents and reports of the Committee of Public Safety, as well as memoirs, letters, and revolutionary newspapers.
This breadth of material allowed him to reconstruct the Committeeâs decisions and actions almost day by day, giving his narrative credibility. Crucially, Palmer did not confine himself to Paris. Because he was interested in the representatives on mission and provincial enforcement of the Terror, he also consulted sources on events in Lyon, Alsace, and Brittany. For its time, the study had a notably wide geographic scope.
Even so, Palmerâs research was limited to what was in print. He lacked access to unpublished archives, local records, or police files that later historians would use to deepen the field of social history. His source base is political and governmental. It reflects the perspective of the revolutionary authorities, not that of ordinary people.
In short, Palmer worked almost entirely with documents written by the deputies and officials (all men) who âruled.â As a result, the book pays less attention to marginal voices (3). The result is a body of sources broad in political scope, if limited in social depth.
Palmerâs use of sources is generally careful and even-handed. He provides context for the material he cites and avoids cherry-picking. His work relies on French-language sources, as expected for the subject (4). While not archive-based in the modern sense, the research was solid enough that the bookâs factual foundation has remained largely intact even after eighy years of further research.
Methodological Rigor
The Twelve who Ruled is not overtly theoretical; its strength lies in a coherent narrative framework and a clear analytical focus. In an era when many academic historians were often abandoning narrative and turning to structural or conceptual models, Palmer resisted the trend. He showed that storytelling, when anchored in analysis, could still carry serious weight. He did not invoke grand theories (Marxist class theory, Tocquevillian social theory, etc.), nor did he fill the text with historiographical jargon. Instead, he focused on applying a steady interpretive lens to the events of 1793â1794.
The idea that the Revolutionâs survival hinged on creating a unified, legitimate, and forceful authority during the crisis is the leitmotif of the book. Every chapter, whether addressing the war effort, economic controls, or factional purges, returns to this analytical core. In methodological terms, Palmerâs approach can be described as problem-driven narrative.He identifies the central issue (governing amid chaos) and examines how various factors (personalities, ideologies, circumstances) shaped the response attempted by the Committee of Public Safety. The result is a tightly focused analysis. Despite covering a tumultuous year, the reader always understands why events unfold as they do: because the revolutionaries were trying, with varying degrees of success and virtue, to resolve the Republicâs existential crisis.
In discussing key concepts such as ârevolution,â âterror,â and âvirtue,â Palmer adopts sensible, if traditional, definitions. He uses the term âTerrorâ in his title and narrative because it was (and remains) the conventional label for the period, but he is careful to unpack what it meant in practice. He does not treat âThe Terrorâ as a monolithic or abstract force. Instead, he breaks it down into specific policies and events (the Law of Suspects, the Revolutionary Tribunalâs activities, pressure from the sans-culottes etc.) to show how violence was implemented pragmatically, not philosophically.
Notably, Palmer did not anachronistically impose the term âReign of Terrorâ on everything, he knew that the term gained currency mainly after Robespierreâs fall. His narrative implies, in line with modern findings, that the revolutionary government itself did not treat âTerrorâ as a coherent policy slogan (5). Palmerâs treatment of terror as a concept is methodological. He presents it as an emergency government and analyses the mechanics and morality of state violence without becoming entangled in a semantic argument.
His treatment of ârevolutionâ and âvirtueâ follows the same logic. He presents the Revolution as a struggle to preserve the Republic against its enemies, even at the cost of violating some of its founding principles. He regularly cites the ideals of liberty and equality, and the 1789 Constitution, not to celebrate them but to underline the irony of their suspension âuntil the peace.â The term âvirtueâ appears mainly in the context of revolutionary rhetoric, particularly Robespierreâs vision of republican virtue. Palmer does not deliver a philosophical essay on the term. He lets Robespierre and Saint-Just speak for themselves, then examines the consequences. His analysis makes it clear that he understands Jacobin virtue as a kind of austere civic morality, which he implicitly weighs against liberal values.
Methodologically, Palmer is rigorous and consistent. He poses an implicit question: how did twelve men govern a revolution in crisis?âand answers it through a chronological but analytical narrative. His framework is free of glaring contradictions. He weaves political, military, and economic history into a single, unified argument.
The clarity of Palmerâs conceptual handling is evident in how easily the argument can be distilled. Readers never wonder what Palmer thinks the Terror was. He sees it as a revolutionary dictatorship, a term he uses without apology. It was, in some respects, effective (securing military victory), in others, creative (experimenting with democratic forms and state control), and in many, morally troubling.
Narrative Style
This is a subjective category, but one of Palmerâs greatest strengths lies in his narrative style, which is both clear and engaging. Unlike some academic history books, Twelve Who Ruled reads almost like a story, albeit a richly documented one, of a dramatic year in French history. Palmerâs prose is accessible and relatively free of jargon. He was writing for an educated audience, but not exclusively for specialists, and this shows in the readability of the text.
The story is driven by the vivid personalities of the twelve Committee members and the high-stakes drama they lived through. At times, Palmer almost novelistically follows individual members into the provinces or captures the atmosphere in the Convention, which helps the reader visualise events. This blend of narrative colour and historical evidence keeps the text grounded.
That said, the book does not read like a novel throughout. Twelve Who Ruled is densely detailed, and Palmer does not simplify the complexity of Year II. Some sections, for example those on the organisation of war production or the Committeeâs internal bureaucracy, are dry and require the reader to absorb a large amount of technical information. However, these are consistently interwoven with more dramatic material such as battles, trials, and political confrontations. The balance keeps the pacing steady across the text.
Perhaps most striking is the absence of pretension in Palmerâs style.His prose has a classic literary quality: measured, erudite, but never self-important. Compared to many writers of historical research, Palmerâs style is disciplined. He doesnât try to prove his intelligence with a flood of ornate language. He simply writes well.
Originality and Contribution
Upon publication, Twelve Who Ruled was an innovative and ground-breaking contribution to French Revolutionary studies. R. R. Palmer effectively pioneered the focused study of the Committee of Public Safety, a subject that, surprisingly, had never before been treated in a comprehensive monograph. In 1941, historiography on the French Revolution was rich in general narratives and class analyses of 1789 or the broader revolutionary period, but the intense year of the Terror and its governing body had received no sustained study. Palmer filled that gap brilliantly.
At the time, interpretations of the Terror tended to fall into polemical extremes, either apologetic or scathing. Palmerâs contribution was to demystify the Terror. He did not glorify it or denounce it in moral absolutes. He analysed it as a political and historical reality. That stance was unusual in 1941, especially for an American historian. His work managed to synthesise insights from competing schools: it acknowledged the Terrorâs necessity in context, a point later taken up by leftist historians, while also recognising its moral and strategic failures, a view more often stressed by revisionists.
This balance gave the book lasting academic value. This synthesis gave the book a lasting academic impact, as it could be read profitably by people on different sides of the interpretive spectrum.
Authorial Bias and Political Agenda
Palmerâs personal values and context inevitably informed his work, yet Twelve Who Ruled is notably measured and fair-minded, without a heavy-handed political agenda. R. R. Palmer was a liberal-democratic American intellectual, and someone who valued the ideals of the Enlightenment and constitutional government. That perspective quietly shapes the book. Palmer clearly admires certain principles of 1789 and he often reminds the reader of what was lost when the Terror regime suspended civil liberties and elections. His sympathy for liberal democracy leads him to approach the Committee of Public Safety with a critical eye, especially regarding their use of coercion and violence. He does not defend the guillotine or the repression of dissent. On the contrary, he treats those as regrettable, if at times understandable, choices.
Crucially, Palmerâs liberalism does not reduce his book to a simple anti-revolutionary stance. If anything, there is a degree of admiration for the Committeeâs sense of duty and purpose, even as he remains aware of the compromises they made. He describes the Committeeâs rule as a âdictatorship,â but one born of necessity, reflecting a liberalâs reluctant concession that extreme times may call for extreme measures. His relief when the Terror ends is unmistakable. The tone around Thermidor suggests a welcome return to politics as usual, though he does not spare the Thermidorians from criticism either.
Throughout, Palmer shows a clear preference for moderation. He tends to praise figures like BarĂšre or Carnot when they show pragmatism or hesitation toward the use of violence. BarĂšre is labelled, for instance, a âreluctant terrorist,â someone who chose expediency over fanaticism. In contrast, Palmer is more critical of those he sees as driven by ideology. Figures such as Billaud-Varenne or Collot dâHerbois are portrayed less sympathetically, as hardliners whose insistence on revolutionary purity helped drive repression too far.
Even here, Palmer does not resort to caricature. He places the actions of extremists in context, explaining their behaviour as a product of pressure rather than inherent cruelty. His bias, to the extent that it appears, leans toward moderate, pragmatic politics. He gives implicit approval when the Committee acts with competence and restraint. He shows clear discomfort when ideological rigidity overrides practical judgment.
If anything, the book carries a mild Whiggish tone (6). Palmer seems to view the Terror as a detour from the path of democratic progress, a necessary detour but a detour nonetheless. This aligns with a classical liberal reading of the Revolution, where 1789 and 1793 are seen not as a permanent rupture, but as part of the long and painful emergence of liberal democracy. In the final chapters, Palmerâs relief at the Republicâs military victories and the subsiding of emergency measures feels almost celebratory, implying a return to the Revolutionâs original liberal course. Yet, he also soberly concludes with the personal tragedies of the twelve, showing that historyâs verdict is complicated.
It is also worth noting what Palmer does not do. Namely, propaganda.
Twelve Who Ruled is not a cautionary tale or propaganda tract. Given that it was written in 1941, with fascism on the rise, one might expect an American liberal to use the French Terror to denounce totalitarianism. But Palmer avoids crude analogies. He lets readers draw their own conclusions. A reader in 1941 might well think of Hitler or Stalin while reading about the dangers of concentrated power, but Palmer does not push that comparison. His portrait of the Committee, a dictatorial body that nevertheless saved France, complicates any simple moral about dictatorship. The lesson is not imposed.
Suitability for Teaching or Further Research
Over the years, Twelve Who Ruled has proven highly effective for teaching the French Revolution and remains a reliable point of entry for further research. Its structured narrative and wide scope make it a strong introduction for students and general readers, while its analytical precision offers more experienced readers material for reflection and debate. Within Anglophone historiography, few works cover Year II with the same aplomb.
Its limitations are those of its time. Now more than eighty years old, the book does not reflect more recent developments in the field. Questions of gender, global context, symbolic culture, and the experience of ordinary people are not part of Palmerâs framework.
Most importantly, the book is so well-written that even someone unaccustomed to reading non-fiction will find it engaging. It does not demand specialist knowledge, but it never talks down to the reader. As an introduction to the French Revolution, it is hard to beat. Few works manage to be this serious, this readable, and this enduring at the same time. It remains a book worth reading, not just for what it says about 1793, but for how well it says it.
Notes
(1) This is worth a post of its own, but in shortâand this is an extremely simplified summaryâthe historiography of the French Revolution can be broadly outlined as follows:
Conservative reaction (1790s to 1890s): Sees the Revolution as a catastrophe that overturned legitimate order. Authors: Edmund Burke, Hippolyte Taine, Louis de Bonald.
Liberal narrative (1820s to 1910s): Praises the moderate reforms of 1789, condemns later extremism, and stresses continuity with the Old Regime. Authors: Adolphe Thiers, Alexis de Tocqueville, François Guizot.
Radical republican and proto-socialist (1840s to 1930s): Celebrates popular egalitarianism and defends Jacobin democracy. Authors: Jules Michelet, Louis Blanc, Jean JaurĂšs.
Marxist classical social school (1920s to mid-1960s): Frames the Revolution as a bourgeois class struggle that abolished feudalism and views the Terror as a necessary defence. Authors: Albert Mathiez, Georges Lefebvre, Albert Soboul, Michel Vovelle.
Revisionist critique (mid-1960s to late 1980s): Rejects the class model, emphasises political contingency and the culture of violence. Authors: Alfred Cobban, William Doyle, François Furet, Simon Schama, Patrice Gueniffey.
There are also several other areas of research like Gender History and Colonial Perspectives which emerged in the 1980s and 1990s.
(2) It goes without saying that recent post-revisionist trends, including cultural and gender-focused approaches, lie outside Palmerâs scope. These methodologies only emerged decades after 1941. Palmer does not, for example, examine revolutionary festivals, political symbols, or the âculture of citizenshipâ as later cultural historians would.
(3) This is not unique to Palmer. Most scholarship of his time ignores marginalised groups, including women, the poor, enslaved people, and colonial subjects.
(4) PSA: if you are reading a history book on a specific country or event, and most of its sources are not in that countryâs language, stop reading.
(5) Palmer does recount the demand of 5 September 1793 to make terror âthe order of the day,â but he treats it as a historical moment rather than an ideological programme.
(6) Whiggish refers to a teleological view of history, typically associated with 19th-century liberal thought. It sees the past as a steady march toward progress, constitutional government, and political liberty. A âWhiggishâ historian tends to interpret events as steps on the road to modern democracy, even when those steps include violent detours.
This weekend my oldest gremlin had a birthday party because she is now almost six and has friends and a social life far more active than mine. The youngest gremlin was left at home to sulk without her older sister because, at three, she does not yet have a social life. So I loaded the youngest gremlin into the car and went somewhere she could find an enriching activity that lets me feel reasonably competent as a mother, without making me want to repeatedly bang my head against the nearest available surface because it is too loud and smells wrong: a museum.
Namely, La Boverie in LiĂšge, for its tenth anniversary exhibition.
I had wanted to see the exhibition for a while because, instead of merely lining up famous paintings, it also looks at what makes a museum work: conservation, restoration, scientific imaging, loans, storage, exhibition design, the whole quiet bureaucracy of museum life.
It is a big thing, almost absurdly so, and therefore entirely Napoleonic. Bonaparte is shown full-length, life-size, wrapped in very fetching red, one hand tucked into his waistcoat, the other resting on the document promising the reconstruction of AmercĆur, the LiĂšge suburb devastated during the wars of the 1790s. Behind him, through a window, appears the cathedral of Saint-Lambert, although by 1804 the cathedral was no longer standing. It had been destroyed after LiĂšgeâs Happy Revolution.
Bonaparte does not appear as the young general of Arcole, hair flying, sword drawn, soldiers following behind him with suicidal enthusiasm. He appears as a statesman. A lawgiver. A man who signs decrees, repairs suburbs, and reconciles churches. The sword is still there, of course. The sword is always there. But it is not the star of the performance. The document is.
Which makes sense. This painting was a gift in 1805 from Bonaparte himself to the city of LiĂšge. It was a work for the citizens of LiĂšge, for their eyes. The message was for them.
The cathedral in the background is even more eloquent. Saint-Lambert appears whole, but conveniently as a background piece. This is a symbolic nod to the Concordat of 1801, the agreement between Bonaparte and Pope Pius VII which restored public Catholic worship in France while keeping the Church firmly under state supervision. The Catholic religion was recognised as that of the great majority of French citizens, but the settlement gave the state enormous leverage over bishops, salaries, and ecclesiastical administration.
The message of the painting is clear. It does not say, âI have conquered LiĂšge.â That would be vulgar. It says, âI have repaired LiĂšge.â It does not say, âThe Church submits.â That would be crude. It shows the cathedral framed by curtains, subordinated by scale, and made decorative. It does not say, âI am becoming a monarch.â It places Bonaparte in a red costume, beside a throne-like chair, with an ornamental sword, and lets the viewer draw their own conclusions.
Ingres was only twenty-three when he painted this. He had trained within the academic tradition and under the long shadow of Jacques-Louis David. Bonaparte did not sit for Ingres. The young painter relied on an earlier 1802 portrait by Antoine-Jean Gros. Grosâs Bonaparte, First Consul had already presented the general transformed into chief of state. Ingres takes some of those elements and reuses them in his own version, but gives Bonaparte a more stately, less lively look. To me, Ingresâs Bonaparte looks like he could use a few cups of coffee.
The scientific display beside the painting is one of the best parts of the exhibition. Infrared reflectography reveals the underdrawing, the decisions, the hesitations, and the second thoughts of the artist. Bonaparte was moved closer to the centre of the composition; the costume, especially the collar, was adjusted; the carpet once had star motifs; the window originally had no curtain.
As someone who dabbles in painting, I actually enjoyed reading the pigment analysis. The exhibition lists lead white, Naples yellow, chrome yellow, carbon black, Prussian blue, vermilion, and earth pigments based on iron and manganese oxides. It is a very rich palette that skews rather warm, which I presume was a conscious choice to make Bonaparte appear more approachable.
Personally, I am not a big fan of his expression. To me he looks a bit dead, and I think Ingresâs later paintings, including the one of Napoleon on his imperial throne, do a better job of conveying emotion in the face. But the details of the waistcoat, the room, and the background are gorgeous. I spent a good five minutes admiring the waistcoat and the throne before the little gremlin screamed âmama bunnyâ to show me another painting with a dead bunny (the joys of parenting...).
And not just anyone. People who actually know the subject.
So this is not some random person online (me, for instance) telling you what âRobespierreistâ is. It is a group of some of the best specialists on the question, all of whom have recent work on Robespierre:
Peter McPhee is Emeritus Professor at the University of Melbourne and one of the major English-language historians of modern France and the French Revolution. For anyone interested in Robespierre who cannot read French, I cannot recommend Robespierre: A Revolutionary Life enough.
Marisa Linton is Professor Emerita in History at Kingston University. Her work covers the French Revolution, eighteenth-century political culture, virtue, friendship, authenticity, conspiracy, and Jacobin politics. Her book Choosing Terror is one of the most humanising studies of the Jacobins, and a very good account of how revolutionary friendship, trust, fear, and factional suspicion shaped political choices.
Last but not least, Nicolas Soulas organises and questions the exchange. He has worked on political, social, urban, family, and cultural history in the later early modern period and the French Revolution, with a particular interest in politicisation, border spaces, and the Payan family.
As I said, this is not really an article as such. It is closer to an interview, where seven specialists answer seven questions.
So⊠are you a robespierriste?
This is probably the least interesting point in the article for anyone who has read quite bit about the French Revolution, and a foundational one for anyone just starting to learn about Robespierre. What was robespierrisme? Who were the robespierristes?
Both the article and this random person on the internet (me) will give you the same unsatisfying answer: it depends who used the word, when, against whom, and for what purpose.
Robespierrisme was not, despite how it sounds, Robespierreâs political system. Robespierre had plenty of political beliefs (respect for rights, popular sovereignty, support for male universal suffrage, public virtue, suspicion of executive power, and so on) which others certainly shared and defended. But these were not labelled robespierrisme during his lifetime. In fact, the word had a few rare polemical appearances before Thermidor (4), but it only really spread after Robespierreâs fall, when it became tied to Tallienâs âsystem of terrorâ. From there, it is extended to the exceptional policies of Year II (5). Thirty years later, in the 1830s and 1840s, admirers of Robespierre give the word a positive meaning, treating it as a democratic or revolutionary inheritance.
The word robespierristes is even more loaded. From the summer of 1794, it was used to stigmatise people as supposed partisans of Robespierre, initially linked to the 108 supposed âaccomplicesâ executed after him. The Thermidorian fanfiction imagines that Robespierre had placed his people ( the robespierristes) in strategic posts and built a dictatorship.Â
That said, if you had walked down the street in May 1794, met the man, and told him you were a robespierriste, he would probably have looked at you with a very blank expression. Nobody openly called themselves robespierriste while Robespierre was alive. That self-identification appears much later, especially among nineteenth-century left-wing militants. Before Thermidor, the people later labelled robespierristes would have called themselves Montagnards (6), Jacobins (7), patriots, or republicans (8). Not robespierristes.
That said, Belissa and Bosc make a very good point in the article: although robespierrisme did not exist as a self-conscious doctrine, there was a shared Montagnard political culture. For them, this included democratic control of legislative and executive power, plus an economy regulated by the natural right to existence. In the early Directoire (9), robespierrisme could then come to mean the republicanism of Year II, especially for the left, once former Montagnards who accepted the new regime were cut off from that inheritance.
In the same vein, both McPhee and Leuwers accept that Robespierre had a recognisable republican political philosophy, and that this philosophy had supporters. So, for them, there is no stable Robespierrist doctrine, but there is a Robespierrean democratic orientation.
First, letâs clear up one thing that may surprise anyone who has only read biased accounts of Robespierre as a dictator: Robespierre had supporters, friends, people who liked him, people he liked in return. He had a whole network around him. They were not his minions.
Linton gives a richer account of how personal connections and trust shaped his work within the Committee of Public Safety and the Committee of General Security (11). The most interesting point she makes is that ideology alone does not explain loyalty or rupture among the members of the Committee of Public Safety.
In short, she argues that people within the Committee could sometimes agree on certain issues while distrusting each other, and, conversely, they could disagree on things while still remaining friends. She cautions against equating political alignment with personal relationships. She uses Saint-Just and his undelivered speech of 9 Thermidor to show this.Â
Saint-Just carefully avoids identifying himself as a political supporter of Robespierre, and chooses instead to defend him as a friend. She also points out that Saint-Just would not have been chosen to give the speech in the first place if the other members of the Committee of Public Safety had seen him as a ârobespierristeâ.She suggests that, in the final weeks, a gap had opened between Saint-Just and Robespierre and yet Saint-Just still tried to defend him. It was his decision to defend Robespierre without submitting the report to the committees that made him ârobespierristeâ in the eyes of Thermidor and posterity, not the other way around.
So what were the supporters called?
We have established that Robespierreâs supporters, during his lifetime, would not have called themselves robespierristes. And it makes sense. Doing so would have amounted to social suicide, even before Thermidor.
Marisa Linton further stresses that being labelled someoneâs follower was dangerous, because republican legitimacy was supposed to come from loyalty to the people and the public good, not from personal patronage. What actually existed around Robespierre, she argues, were networks of friendship, trust, and emotional confidence, rather than a disciplined ideological school.
There was a name for his supporters, but it was meant to mock them: Robespierrots. It was designed to ridicule Robespierre himself by associating him with the theatrical figure of Pierrot. (12)
In Year II, the more common terms for Robespierre and those close to his politics were Jacobins and Montagnards. McPhee says that Robespierre himself thought in terms of patriots, people, Jacobins, and Montagnards, and would probably have been horrified by robespierriste.
The weaponisation of ârobespierristeâ
As mentioned before, being part of a faction was bad, and it had already been used as an accusation. The Thermidorians did not invent the concept. What they did was apply their propaganda machine and turn ârobespierristeâ into a weapon of post-Thermidorian purification.
Martin points out that immediately after 9 Thermidor, the concept of ârobespierristeâ did not yet exist. For roughly a month, letters to the Convention still mixed praise and condemnation of Robespierre. This confusion came from slow circulation of information and censorship. Then the term spread through pamphlets and newspapers, especially alongside âterroristeâ. It became a tool for constructing a supposed âfaction robespierristeâ, even appearing in a decree of 30 Frimaire Year III concerning Fouquier-Tinville, Pache, Bouchotte, and their alleged accomplices.
McPhee highlights how hundreds were arrested or judged as Robespierreâs supposed accomplices, sometimes on very thin evidence. Robespierre and his allies were quickly described as tyrants, conspirators against liberty, enemies of the Republic, or promoters of a âsystem of Robespierreâ. The terms ârobespierristeâ and âterroristeâ became interchangeable in local purges.
Belissa and Bosc agree that ârobespierrismeâ and âjacobinismeâ were at once counter-revolutionary inventions, Thermidorian political categories, and later historiographical categories. According to them, in Fructidor, ârobespierrismeâ and ârobespierristeâ emerge as elastic non-categories, whose boundaries expand or contract according to political need. Under Year III and the Directoire, almost any militant of Year II who had not joined the reaction could be labelled a creature of Robespierre, an agent of anarchy, or an enemy of property.
Were Babeuf, Buonarroti, and the neo-Jacobins robespierristes?
Kind of. Maybe. Partly, but with caveats.
Belissa and Bosc are quite clear on one point: Babeuf explicitly equated robespierrisme with democracy in 1796. Babeuf (13) and Buonarroti (14) rejected the Directoireâs constitution because they saw it as a confiscation of the peopleâs natural rights, and they rallied around the Constitution of 1793 instead. They were especially interested in Robespierreâs draft Declaration of Rights, because it placed property below the right to existence. Still, overlap is not identity. Babeuf and Robespierre did not have the same ideas, and they certainly did not have the same methods.
What does ârobespierristeâ mean for the historian?
So we know the Thermidorians were a tad bit biased. Fine. But what about the next two hundred years or so? Surely, with enough distance, people knew better.
Well. Not quite.
I have said this so many times on this blog that I am probably a broken record by now: no one is truly objective. Historians write through the lenses of their politics, environment, preferences, and beliefs. Even when modern historians acknowledge their biases and try to correct for them, sometimes even overcorrect, those biases still colour their analysis and conclusions to some extent. Nineteenth and early twentieth-century historians were not even especially shy about their political preferences. So the meaning of robespierriste, like the reputation of Robespierre himself, shifted depending on who was writing, and when.
But enough of me waxing poetic. Letâs go back to the experts.
Belissa and Bosc frame the historiographical story through moments when a positive memory of Robespierre returns to public debate. After 1830, radical republicanism and socialism built a golden legend to counter Thermidorian slander. Louis Blanc (17) and Ernest Hamel (18) later associate Robespierre with the concept of republican fraternity.
Unsurprisingly, Pouffary gives the most detailed account of this positive robespierriste memory. Under the July Monarchy, radical republicans disappointed by the conservative settlement used Robespierre as a tutelary figure for political equality, social equality, the right of insurrection, and a religion of fraternity. This produced the golden legend of Robespierre as a secular saint.
Yet Pouffaryâs lexicometric (19) analysis shows something interesting: robespierrisme and robespierriste remained rare in nineteenth- and twentieth-century printed material, and were usually negative or neutral rather than positive names for a political current. So even these favourable authors rarely present Robespierre as the leader of a clear group. Linton argues that the stigma created by Thermidorian propaganda was so strong that even admirers of Robespierre found it difficult to claim him openly. A more sympathetic memory owed much to Ălisabeth Le Bas and Charlotte Robespierre, though their memories were published late and mediated by men. Naturally.
After 1848, with Michelet (21), Quinet (22), and Aulard (23), much republican historiography distances itself from Robespierre and prefers Danton. Blanquists (24) attack the âRobespierre-priestâ. Under the Front Populaire(25), Robespierre returns as a figure of republican danger and mobilisation, while the anti-totalitarian wave of the 1980s revives Thermidorian themes.
McPhee makes a similar point. For parts of the French left, Robespierre still stands for social justice and civic virtue, especially the refusal to compromise democratic and social principles. But he also warns against pretending that todayâs crises are the same as those of the late eighteenth century. They are not.Â
Pouffary concludes that Robespierreâs political uses today resemble those of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He is invoked above all for equality, social justice, popular sovereignty, and the legitimacy of contesting representatives. During the gilets jaunes (33) movement, his memory could be linked to the right of insurrection. But she does not think there is still a militant robespierriste historiography in the old sense.
There is broad agreement among the historians that current scholarship is far from Hamelâs hagiography, or from the politically marked works of Mathiez and Walter. They are politically subjective, sometimes openly so, but they still circulate because they retain real scholarly value.
No present-day academic historian claims robespierrisme in the Mathiez sense. Mathiez used robespierriste as both a historical and political identity. For him, defending Robespierre meant defending a whole democratic-social tradition: popular sovereignty, equality, the Constitution of 1793 (34), the right to existence, and the revolutionary Republic. When he asked âPourquoi sommes-nous robespierristes ?â, he was not being coy. He was openly claiming Robespierre as a political ancestor.
Recent scholarship, even when sympathetic, is less hagiographic and more attentive to context, complexity, and choice.
Martin makes a strong methodological point here. He rejects the idea that historians can simply separate the âreal Robespierreâ from later judgements about him, because the exceptional condemnation of Robespierre is itself part of his historical reality. For him, we cannot understand Robespierre without comparing him to contemporaries such as Brissot, Danton, BarĂšre, Vadier, and others. Nor can we understand him without studying how the monster legend of August 1794 shaped every later reading of the Revolution.Â
In conclusion
PSA: be careful who you annoy, because they may turn you and your friends into a dictatorship after your death.
Jokes aside, the articleâs strongest conclusion is basically this: robespierrisme is less a stable doctrine than an evolving term. It tells us more about the people using it than about any fixed meaning of its own.
During Robespierreâs life, there were Montagnards, Jacobins, patriots, friendships, committees, patronage networks, shared principles, rivalries, and crises. After Thermidor, all of that was compressed into an accusation: Robespierre had supposedly led a faction and a system of Terror.
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that accusation was rejected, reversed, or reworked by republicans, socialists, communists, anti-Jacobins, and historians. Today, the term can still point to a democratic-social republican inheritance.Â
From a historianâs perspective, the label should be used carefully: it was created after the fact, shaped by political conflict, and never described a clearly organised doctrine or party.
(4) 9 Thermidor, or 27 July 1794 in the Gregorian calendar, was the day Robespierre was denounced and arrested. He was guillotined the next day.
(5) The Revolutionary Calendar, with Year II, Year III, Frimaire, Fructidor, and so on, was what happened when the revolutionaries scrapped the Christian calendar and started counting again from the founding of the Republic in 1792. As a rough guide: Year II is 1793â94, Year III is 1794â95. Frimaire falls in late autumn, Fructidor in late summer.
(6) The Montagnards, or the Montagne, âthe Mountainâ, were the most radical bloc in the revolutionary parliament, so called because they sat on the highest benches.
(7) The Jacobin Club was named after the former Dominican, locally âJacobinâ, convent in Paris where it met. It stood at the head of a nationwide network of affiliated clubs, which gave the radicals their organisation and reach. It was shut down soon after Thermidor.
(8) In this period, these were loaded political self-descriptions, not neutral words. A âpatriotâ meant a supporter of the Revolution; a ârepublicanâ meant someone committed to a France without a king.
(9) The government that ran France from 1795 to 1799.
(10) Jean-Lambert Tallien (1767â1820) was a Convention deputy who had himself presided over savage repression at Bordeaux, then turned on Robespierre, partly to save his own neck and that of his lover. He was a ringleader of 9 Thermidor, which is exactly why his self-serving talk of a âsystem of terrorâ deserves a healthy dose of scepticism.
(11) The Committee of Public Safety and the Committee of General Security were the two committees that effectively governed France during Year II. The first handled war and high policy; the second ran internal policing and surveillance.
(12) Pierrot was the foolish, lovelorn clown of French pantomime.
(13) Gracchus Babeuf (1760â1797) was a radical egalitarian who took the Roman name âGracchusâ and demanded equality and forms of common ownership. His âConspiracy of Equalsâ against the Directory failed, and he was executed, but his programme, transmitted by Buonarroti, made him a founding hero of later communism.
(14) Philippe Buonarroti (1761â1837) was an Italian revolutionary and Babeufâs comrade. His memoir of the conspiracy, published in 1828, shaped revolutionary movements across nineteenth-century Europe.
(17) Louis Blanc (1811â1882) was a socialist and a minister in the short-lived revolutionary government of 1848, later an exile in London. His twelve-volume history of the Revolution rehabilitated Robespierre as the prophet of a fraternal, social republic.
(18) Ernest Hamel (1826â1898) was a republican journalist who, in the 1860s, produced the first enormous, wholly admiring biography of Robespierre. It is effectively the founding monument of the âgolden legendâ.
(19) Lexicometric analysis is a computer-assisted method that counts and maps word frequencies across large bodies of text, to track how usage changes over time.
(23) Alphonse Aulard (1849â1928) was a historian who held the first university chair dedicated to the history of the Revolution, at the Sorbonne, and helped build the disciplineâs âscientificâ, document-based method. He was a partisan of Danton, and his own student Mathiez broke with him precisely on that point.
(24) Louis-Auguste Blanqui (1805â1881) was an insurrectionist whose followers were called âBlanquistsâ. He spent more than thirty years in prison for plotting armed risings, and embodied a rival, atheist, conspiratorial strand of the revolutionary left that had little use for Robespierreâs deism.
(25) The Popular Front, or Front populaire, was a coalition of socialists, communists, and radicals that won power in 1936. It is remembered above all for paid holidays and the forty-hour week.
(27) Georges Lefebvre (1874â1959) was perhaps the most influential academic historian of the Revolution in the twentieth century, and a pioneer of âhistory from belowâ, meaning the study of peasants and crowds rather than only leaders. His work gave weight to a broadly sympathetic, socially minded reading of the First Republic.
(28) Albert Soboul (1914â1982) was a Marxist historian best known for his landmark study of the Parisian sans-culottes. He was the leading post-war figure of the classic social interpretation, which read the Revolution as a bourgeois revolution driven by class.
(29) Michel Vovelle (1933â2018) was a Marxist historian of collective âmentalitiesâ who held the same Sorbonne chair, and served as the semi-official historical voice of the 1989 bicentenary, squaring off against the revisionists.
(30) Claude Mazauric (born 1932) was a Marxist historian in the Lefebvre-Soboul line, and editor of collections of Robespierreâs and Babeufâs writings. He is remembered above all for his fierce public quarrel with François Furet in the 1970s, defending the social interpretation against the revisionist claim that the Revolution had been fundamentally misread.
(31) Historiography is the study of how history has been written: its changing interpretations, schools, and biases. In other words, not the events themselves, but what people have done with them afterwards.
(33) The gilets jaunes, or yellow vests, were a leaderless protest movement that erupted in late 2018 over fuel taxes and the cost of living. They were named after the high-visibility vests French drivers are required to carry.
(34) The Constitution of 1793 was the most democratic charter of the era, approved by popular referendum, with universal male suffrage and a right of insurrection. It was suspended âuntil the peaceâ and never actually applied.
Anyway, since I started experimenting with paint earlier this year, I have had to get used to the idea that art has an âugly phaseâ, and that the ugly phase can last for a while.
I do have an issue with it. Not with its artistic merit. It is very much of its period, and the Bonchamps here is clearly inspired by the classical figure on the tomb by David dâAngers. My issue is simpler: Degeorgeâs Bonchamps is too pretty. Too composed. Too noble.
Death is not pretty. And I feel making him look so graceful takes something away from the gesture itself.
At Cholet, on 17 October 1793, Bonchamps was shot in the abdomen. It was a fatal wound. It also meant a long, agonising death, lasting more or less a day. There were very few options for pain relief. Very little that could be done. (1)
The man was in agony. And in his agony, he ordered 5,000 prisoners spared.
The Bonchamps of the original painting looks a little too composed for my taste. Mine is still unfinished, but one of the things I want to work on is making his face look more like that of a dying man, without making it grotesque.
And the best part about painting (and, frankly, the useful lesson for someone who likes planning and has perfectionist habits) is that I have no idea how this is going to end up looking. I hope it will looks good.
Notes
(1) There is a post on this blog dedicated to Bonchamp's death and his impressive tomb by David d'Angers. Just take a look at the Bonchamps tag.
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I meant to show off that Iâve framed Robespierre and put him on my office wall, but my dog has commandeered the armchair, and Iâm not about to move my fluffy tyrant.
So here âŠmy dog, aesthetically fitting into the study decor đ
What about Lucile? How did Robespierre feel about Lucileâs arrest and execution?
Hi, thank you so much for the question!
Unfortunately, as with Camilleâs execution, Robespierre left no record of his feelings. All we can do is speculate from his actions, and even then with caution, given that there were several overlapping factors that may have influenced him during that period, beyond Lucileâs execution alone.
What we do know for certain is that Robespierre was one of the eight committee members who signed Lucileâs arrest warrant on the eve of Camilleâs execution. She was executed on 13 April 1794. At that point, Robespierre and the whole Committee of Public Safety were still dealing with the aftermath of the prison plot.
"O Robespierre, if there is still time, save the most innocent of creatures, save the unfortunate wife of Camille from death! It is a mother in despair who appeals to you. My daughter is on the verge of succumbing under the weight of the most infamous of slanders. Today she is to be judged. Tell the judges to suspend their verdict, tell them to spare innocence, candour, and every virtue combined. [âŠ] You are the only person in the world to whom I can turn with confidence, because I know the greatness of your soul and because I am ready to succumb under the weight of misfortune."
Whether he received the letter or not, as far as I know, he made no attempt to save her. Why âŠis quite honestly, anyoneâs guess.Â
For one thing, there is a case to be made that Robespierre did save people implicated in the same plot. Albert Mathiez speculates that, while he allowed the executions of Lucile Desmoulins and others to proceed, he actively tried to save the former constituent Jacques Guillaume Thouret, who had also been implicated in the prison conspiracy. The main basis for this is that Robespierreâs signature was the only one missing from Thouretâs arrest warrant. Robespierre also shielded Madame Philippeaux from being drawn into her husbandâs trial.
Take that as you wish. In my opinion, his actions can be interpreted in several different ways.Â
After the fatal verdict that sent Lucile to the guillotine, Madame Duplessis was so distraught that she allegedly wrote an unsent letter to Robespierre, calling him a tiger with a human face and accusing him of murdering both Camille and his wife.Â
In the aftermath of the trial and executions, his health seems to have deteriorated sharply. He continued to appear in public until 19 April, then withdrew completely and remained absent until 7 May. How much Lucileâs execution contributed to this mental strain is anyoneâs guess.
Sorry that I cannot give a more conclusive answer, but the best I can say is that we do not really know.
If youâre new to this corner of the internet, and what youâve mainly seen is the sensationalist side of French Revolution history, you probably picture Paris as a continuous procession of carts rolling toward the guillotine. And, by the same logic, youâre probably imagining the Revolutionary Tribunal as a kind of legalised abattoir: a place where everyone arrived as a suspect and left with their head in a basket.
Unfortunately, despite what some books, films, and even documentaries would have you think, the Tribunal was, for quite a long time, a fairly dull bureaucratic institution where you had a respectable chance of being told to go home.
And today, because I like numbers, Iâm not going to spend much time getting lyrical about the intricacies of the Tribunal or its most important cases. Iâm just going to show you the statistics of the cases it handled.
The Start in March
The Tribunal was created on 10 March 1793 while the Republic was pretty much a mess. France was fighting most of Europe and losing at its borders, and people at home were getting restless.
The idea was pushed by Georges Danton (1), who famously argued that the state needed to be terrible so the Parisian mobs would not have to be. In other words, he wanted a formal court to deal with traitors before the public decided to deal with them itself, with pitchforks, as it had during the September Massacres (2).
In its first year, the Tribunal was very... judicial.
In fact, in 1793, most people brought before the Tribunal were acquitted. The Tribunal handled its highest volume of cases in July 1793, with a total of 66. That same month also saw the highest number of acquittals: 47. Death sentences reached their high point in September 1793 at 17. Seventeen for the whole month. Not exactly an abattoir, is it?
The Great Centralisation
By the spring of 1794, the revolutionary government decided to shut down most of the special provincial courts. Revolutionary justice would now be dispensed, strictly, in Paris. Decrees passed in April and May ordered that suspects from across the Republic be sent directly to the capital.
This created a serious bottleneck.
But to secure convictions in high-profile political show trials, the government had already started stripping away legal protections in a fairly methodical way. During the trial of the Girondins (3) in October 1793, the Convention decreed that juries could simply stop deliberating after three days if their consciences had been sufficiently enlightened. When Danton used his oratorical skill to dominate his own trial (4), the Convention passed another decree allowing the court to silence and remove defendants who resisted or insulted the justice of the nation.
In other words, the protections given to suspects were already being worn away before what is so often presented as âthe law of the Great Terror,â and as the final proof that Robespierre wanted to become a dictator and purge his enemies: the Law of 22 Prairial.
The Law of Prairial
First, let me state my bias plainly: I am not especially fond of the Law of Prairial. I think parts of it should have been thought through a good deal better (for example, the whole acquit-or-die arrangement... the military-court atmosphere... I understand why those things are there, but on moral grounds, I am not a fan). That said, I also do not really see it as some uniquely bloodthirsty innovation. If anything, it looks more like a continuation of what had already been happening for several months.
The law redefined several basic parts of the judicial process. It officially removed the old category of âsuspects,â replacing it with a new one: âenemies of the people.â However, this new definition remained extremely broad, covering anyone accused of trying to destroy public liberty, deceive the people, protect traitors, spread defeatism, or obstruct food supplies.
To speed trials up, the law removed the right to defence counsel and allowed juries to convict on the basis of moral, verbal, or written proof, using their own common sense, sometimes without even hearing witnesses. Judges and juries were also limited to just two possible outcomes: full acquittal or death, with no possibility of appeal.
Now, if you are looking at your screen or phone and thinking, well, whoever wrote this must have been insane, bloodthirsty, or angling for dictatorship, allow me a moment.
I will not go into too much detail here, because I think the law deserves an article of its own, but in brief, Couthon (5) (because it was Couthon who wrote it) and Robespierre did not simply wake up one morning and say: âmuahhahahahah, we shall now dismantle a fair justice system so we can kill whoever we wantâ.
The law was not written in a vacuum. It was not some legal novelty appearing from nowhere. In fact, for the deputies of the Convention, the actual substance of the Law of Prairial was not necessarily a shocking innovation, because it directly repeated provisions from the decree of 23 VentĂŽse. The VentĂŽse decrees (6) had already begun the process of centralising revolutionary justice by suppressing existing tribunals and setting up six central commissions to judge the enemies of the Revolution under the tight supervision of the government committees.
The Law of Prairial effectively completed that process, bringing an end to the administrative confusion of earlier laws and to the incoherence of having several overlapping courts.
In fact, the only âinnovationâ that scandalised members of the Convention was the provision allowing deputies to be sent before the Revolutionary Tribunal without prior parliamentary approval. That was the real panic. (7)
Given that Paris was now responsible for all the cases coming before the Revolutionary Tribunal, both the workload and the number of death sentences went up. In six weeks, the court handed down 1,376 death sentences. Prosecutors used prison informers to draft indictments grouping together multiple suspects who were often entirely unrelated. During the month of Messidor, 796 death sentences were pronounced.
That is a sharp increase. That is a great many deaths. That is something that needs to be put in context.
France had, at the time, 28 million people and was at war.
The Numbers in Context
After Robespierreâs death and the Thermidorian Reaction, the Revolutionary Tribunal survived for less than a year, until May 1795. In that span, between 1793 and 1795, the Paris Revolutionary Tribunal pronounced exactly 2,639 death sentences, while acquitting almost as many people: 2,357 individuals.
Again, more than 2,500 people is not a trivial number. But in a country of 28 million, in a national state of emergency, it is not exactly abattoir-level either.
If you widen the statistics to include incidental victims, such as those who died of disease in overcrowded prisons (usually estimated at between 10,000 and 12,000), and those summarily executed without any formal trial at all (another 10,000 to 12,000), the overall death toll of the Terror rises to somewhere between 35,000 and 40,000 people.
To put the Tribunalâs numbers in perspective, the 2,639 death sentences handed down in Paris over the course of the Terror is actually fewer than the 2,700 individuals condemned by French military courts during the First World War. Likewise, the total 16,594 official executions across all of France during the entire Reign of Terror is roughly equivalent to the 15,000 to 17,000 Communards executed in Paris in a single week in May 1871 (9)
Notes
(1) Georges Danton (1759â1794) was a major French revolutionary politician and orator, especially prominent in 1792â93. He was later tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal and executed in April 1794.
(2) The September Massacres were the killings of prisoners in Paris between 2 and 6 September 1792. They were carried out by crowds who feared invasion, counter-revolution, and plots inside the prisons.
(3) The Girondins were a loose group of republican deputies associated with provincial interests, economic liberalism, and distrust of Parisian radicalism. Their trial in October 1793 ended with the execution of leading members after a strongly political prosecution.
(4) Dantonâs trial took place in late March and early April 1794 and ended with his execution on 5 April. It happened in the context of the Indulgents, who were the more moderate revolutionary faction associated with a wish to ease the measures of the revolutionary government.
(5) Georges Couthon (1755â1794) was a deputy, member of the Committee of Public Safety, and close ally of Robespierre.
(6) The VentĂŽse decrees were laws passed in February and March 1794, mainly associated with Saint-Just, providing for the confiscation of property from those classed as enemies of the Revolution and its redistribution to needy patriots.
(7) Tellingly, the very first piece of the law to be repealed immediately after Robespierreâs execution was the article allowing deputies to be arrested without a prior Assembly hearing. Self-preservation, it turns out, is a powerful legislative motivator.
(9) In May 1871, Paris was in the final phase of the Paris Commune, an insurrection against the government based at Versailles. The month ended with the Bloody Week, when government troops retook the city and killed large numbers of Communards.
Sources
Greer, Donald. The Incidence of the Terror during the French Revolution: A Statistical Interpretation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935
How did Robespierre feel about Camille's arrest and subsequent execution? This was his friend and I am very curious about how he felt during and especially afterwards. How did Camille feel about Robespierre during the trial though? I know he blamed Saint-Just, at least I believe so, and Lucille blames both Saint-Just and Robespierre.
First of all, thank you so much for the question, and sorry it took me forever to answer. Since this past week marked the trial and execution of the Indulgents, it felt like the right moment to do it.
As usual, Iâm going to give a bit of context for anyone who is not very familiar with Desmoulins and Robespierre, so feel free to skip straight to the fourth section if you just want the actual answer. Yes, I know, Iâm unbearably long-winded as usual. :-)
How close were Camille and Robespierre?
Before we look at the messy, tragic business of April 1794, it is worth establishing just how close these two men actually were.
They started out as scholarship boys at the prestigious Louis-le-Grand college in Paris. Robespierre was a couple of years older, but they became fast friends.(1) By the early years of the Revolution, they were fighting alongside one another. They were so politically aligned that in March 1791, Camille proudly declared in print that he and Robespierre were the âJacobins of the Jacobins.â Camille frequently used his journal to praise his âdear college comrade,â famously calling him one of the âtwo Catos (2) of the Legislature.â He worshipped the man, praising his absolute incorruptibility and describing his speeches as âsublime.â
Their bond was not just political. When Camille married Lucile Duplessis on 29 December 1790, Robespierre was one of the official witnesses. Shortly afterwards, he wrote to tease Camille for getting too wrapped up in married life and neglecting politics:Â Robespierre informed "Monsieur Camille" that Lucile's beautiful eyes were no excuse for ignoring his work on the national guards. That is not the tone of a distant acquaintance. He even bounced their infant son, Horace, on his knee.(3)
Robespierre also sometimes gave Camille feedback on his work before it went to print. Before the publication of the highly influential Histoire des Brissotins (4), for instance, he read the proofs and urged him to remove certain passages attacking the Committee of Public Safety, warning him not to lose sight of the real target. Camille listened.
The Fracture
So how does a friendship like that unravel? Very publicly.
Things began to go wrong in the winter of 1793-1794. Alongside Georges Danton, Desmoulins launched a campaign for moderation and clemency through his new journal, Le Vieux Cordelier. At first, Robespierre approved. He even read and approved the proofs of the second issue, which attacked the âexaggeratedâ revolutionaries driving the de-Christianising movement. For a brief moment, Le Vieux Cordelier was widely seen as reflecting the line of both Danton and Robespierre.
Then Camille published the third issue.
There, drawing on Tacitus (5), he sketched a thinly veiled and deeply unsettling parallel between revolutionary France and the paranoid despotism of imperial Rome. Robespierre was clearly alarmed. But even then, he was not yet ready to abandon his friend.
It was a patronising defence, but it was still a defence. Robespierre offered the club a compromise: the offending issues of the journal should be burned, but Camille himself should remain among the Jacobins.
It was, politically speaking, a lifeline. And Camille, demonstrating a truly spectacular lack of survival instinct, refused it.
Proud and unwilling to retreat, he answered Robespierre with a line from Rousseau: âBurning is no answer!â (7) The rebuke landed badly. Robespierre, stung and angered, warned that if Camille were anyone else, such writings would not have been treated so lightly.
What is striking, though, is that even after this very public humiliation, Robespierre still did not entirely let him go. On 8 January, he tried to prevent the Jacobins from reading and discussing yet another controversial issue of the journal. And when the club voted on 10 January to expel Desmoulins, Robespierre intervened at the last moment and secured his reinstatement.
The Downfall of the Indulgents
The public dressing-down did nothing to stop Camille. He kept publishing.
He remained a leading voice among the Indulgents, the faction arguing that, now that the Republic was winning its wars, the worst of the crisis had passed (8). Danton wanted, quite simply, to enjoy the Republic. He thought the time had come to negotiate peace, which in turn meant making France appear a little less ferociously revolutionary. The Indulgents called for a general amnesty and the mass release of suspects.
Robespierre thought all this dangerously premature. He argued that it was frivolous to treat a few military victories as proof that the danger had passed. He feared, not without reason, that opening the prisons would unleash a violent counter-revolutionary reaction and tear the young Republic apart.
He was also thoroughly unimpressed by Dantonâs vision of a more relaxed Republic. Robespierre accused the Indulgents of treating the people like a herd to be exploited for their own luxury.
But his loudest attacks were aimed mainly at Danton. So why was Camille executed?
Because Robespierre was not a dictator.
For all the mythology that grew up around him, Maximilien did not possess absolute power over life and death. He was only one member of a committee of twelve, and Camille, with his viciously sharp pen, had managed to alienate a great many of them. Men like BarĂšre, Billaud-Varenne, and Collot dâHerbois had every reason to fear what he might write if left at liberty. Saint-Just despised him, which did not help.
Camille, or rather his writings, was also becoming dangerous to the Revolutionary Government, because they publicly undermined both its justification and its methods at a time when Robespierre still believed severe measures were essential to save the Republic.
All this led to an arrest and trial that was, to put it mildly, procedurally dubious.
Danton and Desmoulins were deliberately bundled into a show trial alongside foreigners and corrupt financiers. The government wanted to compromise the political defendants by association, leaning heavily on the idea of a vast âForeign Plotâ (9).
The difficulty was that the trial was public. Danton rose to the occasion and used his formidable gifts as an orator to batter the prosecution and win the sympathy of the galleries. He demanded that sixteen members of the Convention be called as witnesses. The court officials, alarmed by the possibility of an acquittal, turned to the Committee of Public Safety.
To stop Danton from swaying public opinion any further, a rumour was spread that a prison uprising was being prepared (10), and the Convention passed a decree allowing any prisoner who âresisted or insultedâ national justice to be silenced.
The tribunal used that decree to exclude the defendants from the proceedings. They were stripped of the right to defend themselves. Then, with the accused removed, the judge and prosecutor further manipulated the jury by secretly showing them a mysterious forged letter at the last moment.
The death sentence was delivered on the fourth day. The Indulgents were sent to the guillotine that same afternoon, on 5 April 1794.
Did Desmoulins blame Robespierre?Â
So how did Camille actually feel about his arrest and impending execution? After that long detour, we finally come to your question.
You might expect him to have felt utterly betrayed by his old friend. You might imagine him cursing Robespierre to hell. And yes, the sense of betrayal was clearly there. In an unsent letter to Lucile, written from prison, he seems shocked: âBut Robespierre, who signed the order for my dungeon! But the republic, after all I have done for it! That is the price I receive for so many virtues and sacrifices!â
He did blame Robespierre for his imprisonment. But he did not blame Robespierre alone. In fact, he seems to have clung, even then, to the hope that his old college friend might still intervene and save him.
From his cell, he told Lucile that he was writing to Maximilien, adding: âno doubt he will answer you.â Lucile herself shared that hope, drafting her own appeal to Robespierre and reminding him of their long closeness.
When Camille drafted notes for his defence, he did not direct a single reproach at Robespierre. Instead, he reserved all his anger at the other men on the Committee (11). Politically, he seems to have tried to align himself, at least in part, with Robespierre. Whether that reflected genuine belief, or a last attempt not to estrange the only man he thought might still save him, we cannot know.
Camille was not blind to the reality of his situation. He seems to have understood that his fall was not simply the work of one man, but the result of a broader political purge, helped along by his own choices. In his final letter, he wrote that he was dying for two very specific things: his sharp, mocking pen, and his steadfast friendship with Danton. He denounced his âassassinsâ and the cowardice of his colleagues in the Convention, who had abandoned him and Danton to slander. Right to the end, he seems to have seen himself as a man destroyed for his courage.
Did Robespierre feel guilty?Â
While Camille left behind a clear paper trail from prison that allows us to glimpse his state of mind, Robespierre did not. There are no personal diaries, and no private letters in which he set down what he felt about the condemnation of two of his oldest political companions. If we want to understand his reaction, we are therefore forced to look at what he did, not at what he may have felt.
On 5 April 1794, the day Danton and Desmoulins went to the guillotine, Robespierre presented a public face of complete firmness. Nineteenth-century writers loved to dramatise the moment, imagining him pale and shaken in his room at the Duplay house, deeply affected by the sound of the carts carrying the condemned to execution (12). It is, for sure, an evocative image, but as far as I know, there is no real evidence for it.
What we do know is that he went to the Jacobin Club that very evening. There, he spoke, urged the members to remain vigilant, and insisted that the Republic could not relax its severe measures. In public, at least, he showed no sign of grief.
That said, it is possible that the whole episode took a heavy physical toll on him. Robespierre had a long history of falling ill during moments of extreme political strain. His punishing workload and austere way of life already left him physically fragile, prone to exhaustion and nervous collapse (13).
After the trial and executions, his health seems to have deteriorated sharply. He continued to appear in public for about ten days, then suddenly disappeared. By 19 April, he had withdrawn completely and would remain absent until 7 May.
When he returned, just after his thirty-sixth birthday, several contemporaries thought him changed. Paul Barras, who saw him during this period, described a man so pale and unnaturally still that he compared his face to marble and to the dead. Barras is hardly a neutral witness, and his testimony should be treated with caution, but the basic fact remains: Robespierre was away for three weeks because he was, apparently, seriously unwell.
Was this because of Camilleâs loss? There is no way to know for certain, and we can only speculate. My educated guess (so do not take it as absolute truth) is that the physical decline was most likely due to an accumulation of factors (14) but the loss of a close friend certainly did not help.
Notes
(1) In Twelve Who Ruled, R. R. Palmer goes so far as to describe their dynamic like this: âMaximilien looked on Camille, who was two years his junior, almost as on a younger brother who must be protected from his own caprices.â This strikes me as a bit exaggerated, but it is safe to say they were exceptionally good friends.
(2) Cato was Marcus Porcius Cato (Cato the Younger), a Roman statesman famous for his fierce moral integrity, stoicism, and unwavering defence of the Roman Republic against Julius Caesar.
(3) In 1794, when Camille was in prison, Lucile drafted a heartbreaking, unfinished letter to Robespierre begging for her husband's life. She reminded him of their intimacy, recalling how he had joined their hands in marriage and bounced their son on his knees.
(4) Histoire des Brissotins was a highly influential and fiercely satirical pamphlet published by Camille Desmoulins in mid-1793. It ruthlessly attacked the Girondin faction (often called Brissotins after their leader, Jacques-Pierre Brissot), successfully destroying their public reputation and paving the way for their political purge and eventual execution.
(5) Publius Cornelius Tacitus was a Roman historian who chronicled the reigns of the Roman emperors, heavily focusing on the corruption, paranoia, and tyranny of absolute power. By using Tacitus, Camille was not-so-subtly implying that the Committee of Public Safety had become the very despots they claimed to be fighting.
(6) The Jacobin Club was the most famous and influential political club of the French Revolution.
(7) Robespierre famously was very into Rousseau, so quoting Rousseau at him was a âburnâ in modern terms.
(8) It is worth noting their motives were not exactly pure. The Indulgent campaign was heavily motivated by corruption and self-preservation. They were actively seeking to protect political allies implicated in massive financial scandals, such as the liquidation of the India Company.
(9) The "foreign plot" refers to a persistent, paranoid conspiracy theory that alleged that various domestic factions were secretly funded by hostile foreign power, primarily William Pitt's Britain, to deliberately destabilise and destroy the Republic from within.
(10) The gist of the "prison plot" was that inmates across Paris, coordinated by people on the outside like Lucile Desmoulins, were stockpiling weapons and plotting to break out, slaughter the government committees, and overthrow the Republic. It ends up being the basis for Lucile's arrest and execution.
(11) He directed his fury entirely at men like Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, Bertrand BarĂšre, and Jean-Marie Collot d'Herbois.
(13) His doctor, Joseph Souberbielle, regularly treated him for a bleeding varicose ulcer on his leg, but unfortunately did not investigate or manage the nature of his deeper, more systemic exhaustion.
(14) ...his incredible workload being a primary one.Â
Palmer, R. R. Twelve Who Ruled: The Year of the Terror in the French Revolution. Princeton University Press, 1941. First Princeton Classic Edition, with a new foreword by Isser Woloch, 2005
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Survey: Which Woman of the French Revolution Do You Prefer Physically?
I was able to find descriptions of Manon Roland, Claire Lacombe, Elisabeth Le Bas, and Lucile Desmoulins. The description of Simone Evrard is thanks to @anotherhumaninthisworld.
Here are some women reputed either for being charming or very beautiful during the French Revolution (I will make another one about men of the french revolution next time). Which of these women would you prefer based on physical appearance?
Jean-Baptiste Laboureau, while she was imprisoned at Port-Libre, stated that she âis very mundane; passable features, terrible teeth, the voice of a fishwife, an awkward appearance, thatâs what constitutes Madame Momoro.â However, Laboureau was a spy who testified against Momoro and may have been deliberately cruel, so his description is likely unreliableâespecially since playing the Goddess of Reason required at least a minimally graceful physique.
Conte describes her as: âBlonde, with a porcelain complexion, she radiates beauty and charm.â Bernard, an aide-de-camp of Victor Hugues, describes her as âa lady of moving beauty.â
Among the Babouvists: Sophie Lapierre
Robert Legrand, in his book Babeuf et ses compagnons de route, describes her as a "pretty woman with Venetian blond hair".
According to Alphonse Esquiros, she had dark eyes. Even if it is uncertain that Hamel met her personally, he describes her as âone of the most charming blondes one could see.â
Although she describes herself in her memoirs as âof little beauty,â she notes that she had âa firm and graceful posture.â She describes her physical appearance when she was 14 in these terms:
âAt fourteen, like today, I was about five pieds (162 cm) tall; my size had acquired all its growth; the leg well shaped, the foot well placed, the hips very raised, the chest broad, the shoulders effaced, the attitude firm and graceful, the walk rapid and light; this is what first hit the eye. There was nothing striking about my face, only great freshness, a lot of softness and expression. By detailing each of the features, one can ask oneself: Where is the beauty? Nothing is regular, everything pleases. The mouth is a little big; there are a thousand prettier ones; not one has a more tender and seductive smile. The eyes, on the contrary, are not very large, their iris is a grey-chestnut; but placed not very deep in the sockets, with an open, frank, lively and gentle gaze, crowned with brown eyebrows the same colour as the hair, and well defined, they vary in their expression, like the affectionate soul whose movements they paint; serious and proud, they sometimes surprise; but they caress much more, and always wakes you up. My nose was causing me some pain, I found it a little big at the tip; however, I considered that overall, and especially in profile, it did not spoil anything else. The broad, bare forehead, little covered at that age, supported by the very high orbit of the eye, and in the middle of which veins in Greek vanished at the slightest emotion, was far from the the insignificance that one finds on so many faces. As for the fairly upturned chin, it has precisely the characteristics that the physiognomies indicate for those of voluptuousness; when I bring them together with everything that is particular to me, I doubt that anyone was ever more made for it, and enjoyed it less. Bright rather than very white complexion, dazzling colors, frequently enhanced by the sudden redness of boiling blood, excited by the most sensitive nerves; the soft skin, the rounded arm, the pleasant hand, without being small, because its elongated and slender fingers announce skill and retain grace; fresh, tidy teeth; the plumpness of perfect health: such are the treasures that nature had given me.I have lost many, especially those who are plump and fresh; those who remain with me still hide, without me using any art, five to six of my years; and the very people who see me every day need me to tell them my age, to believe that I am over thirty-two or thirty-three. [âŠ]My portrait has been drawn several times, painted and engraved: none of these imitations gives the idea of ââmy person; it is difficult to grasp because I have more soul than face, more expression than features. [âŠ]Camille Desmoulins was right to be surprised that at my age, and with so little beauty, I had what he calls admirers ».