Quantum Computing Supply Chain risk: NATO’s warn for the U.S
The growing concern of relying on foreign sources for quantum technology is highlighted in NATO's urgent statement to the United States. Find out what steps are being done and why this could change the way that the world defends itself.
When the transformative potential of quantum technology advances beyond proof-of-concept demonstrations to actual deployment, supply chain resilience a critical but commonly overlooked weakness has emerged. Experts warn that improving qubit coherence times is no longer as crucial as ensuring dependable access to necessary inputs.
Money and experience are vital for innovation, but a company or research facility can't produce or grow without reliable parts. If one link in the supply chain breaks, research and development may stop, which could worry researchers and investors. To stay ahead in quantum technology, the US must have reliable access to crucial materials.
No matter the qubit modality, quantum systems require specialised components that are not yet commercially scalable, which increases lead times and limits deployment timelines. In a May 2025 NATO Transatlantic Quantum Community study, these flaws were mapped across seven supporting technologies and four primary qubit types (superconducting, trapped ion, photonic, and semiconductor spin). This exam was graded using five metrics, and any component that received a score of 2.0 or higher requires immediate attention.
Risk of the Quantum Computing Supply Chain
The Coldest Region: Cryogenics and Extremely Low Temperatures
Helium-3 and dilution-freezers are the two primary chokepoints that make it difficult to provide the severe cold needed for multiple quantum processors.
The bottleneck in the dilution refrigerator
The most significant bottleneck in superconducting and some spin-qubit systems is believed to be the dilution refrigerator. In order to maintain coherence, superconducting qubits need incredibly complex cryogenic systems that chill quantum processors to temperatures hundreds of times lower than space's temperature below 10 millikelvin.
The market is currently dominated by three major vendors: Bluefors (Finland, which has a large U.S. production capacity in Syracuse, New York), Janis Research (United States), and Oxford Instruments (United Kingdom). Colorado native Maybell Quantum is also starting to play. Market leader Bluefors has installed more than 1,500 dilution refrigerator units globally. Lead times are currently between six and nine months, even with a daily manufacturing flow of about one system.
These lead times present significant constraints because makers of quantum computers typically iterate their hardware every 12 to 18 months. Large-scale systems like IBM's Quantum System Two and Google's Willow chip, which use Bluefors' KIDE platform for systems with more than 1,000 qubits, require this infrastructure. A disruption in the supply of dilution-freezers will effectively halt U.S. superconducting quantum progress within months. Multisite operations, like Bluefors' Syracuse location, which oversees all cryocooler manufacturing, offer a certain level of resiliency.
Helium-3 is the "specialised fuel" needed for quantum refrigeration. Dilution refrigerators provide exceptionally low temperatures by combining the rare helium-3 isotope with helium-4. Helium-3 is very rare because it is not present in nature in large quantities. In nuclear weapons projects, it is mostly obtained as a byproduct of tritium decay.
The quantum community has repeatedly identified dependence on Helium-3 as a distinct, high-priority risk. Even if Bluefors employs closed-loop technologies to recycle and conserve the gas, easing some of the immediate supply pressure, any major expansion that requires scaling to hundreds or tens of thousands of quantum computers requires securing reliable new sources. Apart from an agreement with Interlune (under the Department of Energy Isotope Program), the United States does not currently have a clear plan to acquire Helium-3 at the required scale.
Hazards of Concentration and Critical Minerals
Processing concentration rather than a shortage is the primary problem with rare earth elements and speciality optical materials.
Export Regulations and Rare Earth Components
For instance, rare earth elements (elements 57–71) are necessary for both photonic quantum systems, which rely on erbium and ytterbium for optical components, and neutral atom systems, which rely on alkali metals such as strontium and rubidium. Even though these elements are not truly rare, almost 90 percent of the required high-purity rare earth processing takes place outside of NATO territory.
China has 69% of the world's rare earth reserves and controls 90% of the processing. Furthermore, export restrictions have been expanded to encompass any dual-use items that account for 0.1 percent or more of the value of the exported product if they contain rare earths produced in China. Even if quantum applications only need small amounts (kilogrammes per year), these limitations are significant.
Given the small amounts required, developing domestic acquisition and refinement capabilities through a "pilot program" could offer a path to resilience before a broader domestic scale.
The Hidden Crystal Hazard of Lithium Niobate
Lithium niobate (barium titanate), a specialised nonlinear optical material, is crucial for photonic quantum information processing because it enables photons to be routed and controlled with the least amount of quantum information loss. The two biggest manufacturers of commercial lithium niobate wafers are CASTECH in China and Sumitomo Metal Mining in Japan; the latter is said to hold 60–70% of the market for premium crystal boules.
Even while American companies like ADVR and HyperLight are selling components, no American provider has demonstrated the capacity to produce the large-diameter, high-purity wafers needed for scalable photonic quantum computing. Even though the intellectual property needed to process and etch lithium niobate was developed in the US, the bulk of scaled manufacturing is anticipated to occur outside of the US. In contrast to the massive investments required for semiconductor fabrication facilities, a modest investment, likely between $100 and $300 million, perhaps encouraged by the Defence Production Act, could be used to develop significant domestic crystal growth and processing capacity for quantum applications.
The Common Denominator Risk in Semiconductors
A cross-cutting problem that affects practically all quantum platforms is semiconductor manufacturing.
Control electronics for all qubit types superconducting, trapped ion, photonic, and neutral atoms rely on specialised circuits like FPGAs and ASICs, and Asian manufacturing facilities dominate the production of advanced nodes.
The requirement for isotopically pure silicon-28 is a unique issue for semiconductor spin qubits, which store information in silicon electron spins. Standard silicon contains silicon-29, a magnetic substance that destroys quantum coherence. Only a few facilities have the state-of-the-art 300mm-scale processing equipment needed to manufacture the material, and this purification is expensive and specialised. Despite the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act filling some gaps, quantum-specific manufacturing demands remain unmet. businesses have requested a specialised line of quantum semiconductors, perhaps spearheaded by businesses such as Applied Materials or Intel, that aggregates demand across quantum modalities in order to reduce reliance on foreign infrastructure.
Resilience and Specialised Elements
Several specialised components have immediate single points of failure. These include ion pumps (needed for ultra-high vacuum), pulse tubes (produced in the US, Japan, and Europe for cryogenic cooling), and photodetectors (required for photonic readout).
Most importantly, Element Six, a UK subsidiary of De Beers, is the sole trustworthy source in the West for electronic-grade diamond, a material necessary for quantum memory and sensing applications. As a result of this capacity constraint, academic researchers have been often contacted by Chinese suppliers of advanced diamond substrates.
These supply chain vulnerabilities are not just theoretical; they actually impact the speed and scale at which quantum systems may scale from producing tens of units per year to thousands. Policy interventions must be swiftly implemented not over five-year plans, but through manufacturing investments, procurement decisions, and regulatory changes that can be put into effect in as short as 18 to 24 months in order to move from risk to preparedness.
