#ontological argument

On first glance this seems yuckily circular, however, Kurt Gödel, mathematical logic extraordinaire, converted it into a rigorous argument in 2nd order modal logic. Here’s a link to the Wikipedia page, check it out!

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Q: What are the three most compelling arguments for the existence of gods - concise answer, name it if it has a formal name. And what are the most straightforward refutations of these arguments - concise answer.

Grok: Arguments for the Existence of Gods:

1. Cosmological Argument:

Description: The argument posits that everything that exists has a cause, and there must be a first cause or "uncaused cause" which is God.

Refutation: The universe might be eternal, negating the need for a first cause, or the cause could be an impersonal force rather than a personal deity.

2. Teleological Argument (or Design Argument):

Description: The complexity and apparent design of the universe suggest a designer, akin to how a watch implies a watchmaker.

Refutation: Complex structures can emerge from natural processes (evolution by natural selection), and the universe might not be precisely "designed" for life, considering most of the cosmos is hostile to it.

3. Ontological Argument:

Description: Proposed by Anselm, it argues that God is the greatest conceivable being; existence in reality is greater than existence in the mind alone, hence God must exist.

Refutation: Existence isn't necessarily a property that can be predicated in this manner; the argument might commit the fallacy of assuming that because something can be thought, it must exist.

Straightforward Refutations:

Cosmological: Challenges the necessity of a personal first cause by suggesting naturalistic explanations like the Big Bang or an eternal universe.

Teleological: Points out that apparent design can result from natural selection and physical laws without a designer.

Ontological: Criticizes the logic by arguing that "existence" isn't a property like "redness" or "largeness" that can be part of a definition.

These arguments and their refutations highlight the ongoing philosophical debate about the existence of deities, showing that each argument has its strengths but also faces significant challenges.

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Ok phloomer. Suppose there was a greatest conceivable entity, E. Clearly, we may easily conceive of its creator, the E-generator g(E), which is obviously greater.

Theists often tie themselves up in knots about this as a part of what they call the “ontological argument”. 

One of their common claims is that "everything must have started somewhere", and hence a god is necessary. The inevitable response from the atheist is that if "everything must have started somewhere", where did the god start? This logic hole is patched up by stating that god did not have a beginning, or exists "outside time".

Let’s start with well-known, often disputed verses:

For the Lord your God is God of gods and Lord of lords, the great, the mighty, and the awesome God, who is not partial and takes no bribe. Deuteronomy 10:17

God has taken his place in the divine council; in the midst of the gods he holds judgment. Psalms 82:1

There is none like you among the gods, O Lord, nor are there any works like yours.Psalms 86:8

And the king shall do as he wills. He shall exalt himself and magnify himself above every god, and shall speak astonishing things against the God of gods. He shall prosper till the indignation is accomplished; for what is decreed shall be done. Daniel 11:36

Recently, I brought up the fact that modern Christians are polytheists. On the one hand, they believe in the God of the Bible and on the other, the so-called god of philosophers or as they would put it, the god of monotheism. A commenter on my post over on Wordpress brought up the fact that the early Jews were polytheists. He provided a number of verses like the ones above. I responded to him and stated that Christians have a go-to copout. They’ll argue that this is a merely a recognition that people at the time worshipped other gods, gods that were mere idols. That, however, demonstrates that they are either ignorant of historical context or they know of the context and yet ignore it. We can discuss the polytheistic origins of Judaism further, but that’s not my purpose here. 

My purpose here is to debase the notion of a god of (mono)theism, to disrupt that convenient narrative. A Christian on Facebook recently offered an ontological argument he confused with Godel’s Ontological Argument. That wasn’t the argument he offered. He offered another ontological argument in where ‘God’ could be replaced with ‘Allah’ or ‘Ahura Mazda’ and the result wouldn’t change. Two other people then responded and said that the refutation fails because the argument sets out to prove the god of monotheism. 

The god of (mono)theism, as William Lane Craig posits, is timeless, personal, omniscient, and so on. I’ll set exegesis aside because there are ways to prove otherwise given passages in the Bible (e.g. why did god ask Adam questions in Genesis 3 if he’s omniscient?). What I want to offer instead is a new argument against the notion of a so-called god of (mono)theism. We know from mathematics that there are different infinities. Since infinity is already a large value, if we can even call it such, there’s no way for the human mind to apprehend one infinity or another, let alone distinguish them. So given that line of thinking, there’s an element of vagueness we can introduce to debase the notion of a god of (mono)theism.

Take, for instance, timelessness. A Christian will posit that their god has no beginning; he’s eternal and exists outside of time. All well and good. Let’s say there’s another being who had a beginning outside of the universe billions of years ago, e.g., Satan. What disqualifies this being from being timeless as well, especially given that we can’t ascertain the beginning of this being’s existence? In other words, if god is present at point 0 and then Satan at point 0.00000005, what difference is there? There are some beginnings that result in a virtual eternity and so, just like there are different infinities, there are different eternities, different versions of timelessness.

The same goes for omniscience. What if there’s a being that knows all things except one thing; let’s suppose this being doesn’t know how to play billiards. What is the difference between an omniscient being who knows all things and another being who knows all things save the required know-how to play billiards? Again, as there are different infinities, there are different levels of omniscience and we simply wouldn’t be able to distinguish between a being who knows everything and one who knows everything except for how to play billiards.

Omnipotence, omnipresence, the capacity to be personal, and so on, all fall victim to vagueness, and as such, the same defeater that exists for Godel’s Ontological Argument, namely that parallel arguments work just as well (see Oppy 1996), also exists for the notion of the so-called god of monotheism. There is no such entity. It is logically possible that, given vagueness, there are millions of beings that fit the description. However, one should not draw ontological conclusions on the basis of logical considerations. Just because there could be a million such beings doesn’t mean they actually exist; likewise, just because one such being is logically possible doesn’t mean it actually exists. The god that apologetic arguments allude to is a product of Christian obfuscation.

Given that Christians are overly fond of deductive arguments, I will do my best to formulate an Argument From Vagueness, which isn’t necessarily an argument on its own. Let’s consider Plantinga’s Victorious Ontological Argument:

A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and

A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.

It is possible that there is a being that has maximal greatness.

Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being exists.

Therefore, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.

Now, consider a parallel Argument from Vagueness. D1 is crucial to the argument.

D1: A being with maximal excellence* has omnipotence* (which is to be so close to all-powerful that its lone incapacity is negligible; it once failed to push a universe to the left), omniscience* (which is to be virtually all-knowing; it doesn’t know how to play billiards), and perfectly good* (which is to be virtually morally perfect, but it once told a white lie). Maximal greatness* is to have maximal excellence* across all possible worlds.

A being has maximal excellence* in a given possible world W iff it is omnipotent*, omniscient*, and wholly good* in W.

A being has maximal greatness* if it has maximal excellence* in every possible world.

It is possible that there is a being that has maximal greatness*.

Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient*, omnipotent*, and perfectly good* being exists.

Therefore, it is necessarily true that an omniscient*, omnipotent* and perfectly good* being exists.

Other versions of the ontological argument in the past (Like the original posed by Anselm) go into the idea that since we can imagine something like god who is “maximally great/perfect/god” then this god must exist. Then Gödel came up with a model for the ontological argument that says if a god has a positive property, then that property is necessary and therefore exists.

The most recent version of the ontological argument was proposed by William Lane Craig, and it goes like this:

It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.

If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.

Therefore, a maximally great being exists

So the problem with the ontological argument at it’s core is that it assumes existence is better than non-existence. Except you can’t prove that objectively. So this argument would work fantastically if someone could prove that existence is objectively better than non-existence. The idea of a maximally great being- or to simplify, a perfect being- hinges on what the observer considers to be perfection. Once you flip the assumption and say that non-existence is perfect, rather than existence, you can use this model to argue that therefore a maximally great/perfect being such as god cannot exist.