Clarity begins when the idea of total autonomy collapses.
If humans lack free will, then they cannot truly act without being driven by instincts related to rewards and conserving energy. This means that all their actions would be influenced by these basic instincts rather than being freely chosen.
If behavior is governed by biological drives, prediction loops, and energy optimization, then it seems impossible for a human system to deliberately produce an action that is completely outside those mechanisms. If there is no free will in the strong sense, then the organism cannot step outside its architecture and design a truly reward-free act.
What people like G. I. Gurdjieff were probably aiming at was not literal independence from the nervous system. That would indeed be impossible. The brain cannot exit its own operating rules. What such exercises try to do is narrower and more mechanical, they attempt to shift which subsystem controls the action. Normally, behavior is driven by habit loops, emotional drives, or reward prediction. When a person imposes a small arbitrary rule and executes it consistently, the action is not coming from instinctive reward pursuit but from a constructed constraint. That is a different control pathway, even if it still uses the same brain.
In other words, the exercise is less about eliminating reward and more about weakening the dominance of automatic loops. The organism is still saving energy and still responding to signals, but now there is a competing pattern
If behavior is governed by biological drives, prediction loops, and energy optimization, then it seems impossible for a human system to deliberately produce an action that is completely outside those mechanisms. In that strict sense, if there is no free will in the strong sense, then the organism cannot step outside its architecture and design a truly reward-free act.
What people like G. I. Gurdjieff were probably aiming at was not literal independence from the nervous system. That would indeed be impossible. The brain cannot exit its own operating rules. What such exercises try to do is narrower and more mechanical, they attempt to shift which subsystem controls the action. Normally, behavior is driven by habit loops, emotional drives, or reward prediction. When a person imposes a small arbitrary rule and executes it consistently, the action is not coming from instinctive reward pursuit but from a constructed constraint. That is a different control pathway, even if it still uses the same brain.
In other words, the exercise is less about eliminating reward and more about weakening the dominance of automatic loops. The organism is still saving energy and still responding to signals, but now there is a competing pattern in the form of a rule that does not align with the usual optimization logic. When people try this, they often discover something uncomfortable, the system resists tiny arbitrary commands much more than it resists large instinct-driven actions. That tells you something about how limited voluntary control actually is.
The skepticism about free will fits with several modern models of mind. For example, philosophers like Thomas Metzinger argue that what we call the âselfâ that chooses actions is a model generated by the brain rather than an independent controller. From that perspective, most behavior is indeed produced before the narrative of choice appears. The no reward exercise does not prove free will, and it cannot bypass instinct completely. What it can reveal is how much of your behavior is automatic and how narrow the channel of deliberate constraint actually is. That is a diagnostic, not a liberation from biology.
The energy is also important here. Living systems evolved to minimize wasted expenditure. An action that appears pointless is therefore flagged as suspicious by the system. When you still perform it, you are not escaping instinct but temporarily overriding one optimization rule with another rule you installed. But that override itself is fragile and limited. So the honest conclusion is that a completely reward-free action is probably impossible. At best, the exercise exposes the machinery that keeps generating rewards and justifications. In plain terms, the experiment is not about purity of intention; it is about watching the machine try to reclaim control.And the uncomfortable implication remains. Much of what people call âdecidingâ may simply be the moment when one internal process wins over another.
