Music moves us; in doing so, it appropriates us. It does this affectivelyâthrough âaffection.â What is called in our world today âappropriationââthe taking of something and making it ours, making it belong to usâoperates in a fluid way in the realm of sound where the interaction of different sounds, which is called âharmonyâ or ârhythm,â is manifestly a mutual appropriation. The sound world requires us to think through the possibility of âappropriationâ precisely in the Heideggerian sense of a âbelonging togetherâ that is not a unity. The sound world âtakes us out of ourselvesâ (ecstasis), and yet we experience that which takes us out of ourselves as part of ourselves, because we are emotionally affected, and we identify ourselves with our ability to âhaveâ emotions.
David Byrne struggles with this in his essay accompanying the reissue of [My Life in the] Bush of Ghosts when he writes about an emotionally affective music that is composed through montage, which âtricks the emotionsâ because it is not a representation of an authentic performance. But in the realm of sound, the affective power of sound is not the product of authentic expressions of particular subjectivities, despite the tradition of writing about music in the west that takes this point of view. This tradition would be the Platonic tradition that Heidegger is criticizing, in which identity is an essence that is revealed by an expression or representation. A variety of non-Western musical traditions around the world have developed rituals, practices, and cultures built around this appropriative potential of sound. Possession by deities and spirits is initiated through drums and percussion throughout the African-Atlantic Diaspora, as well as the Islamic world, from Morocco to Indonesia. In Hindustani classical music, singers and musicians evoke the spirit of a raga by performing it; a successful performance is measured by the appearance of the spirit, which is simultaneously a sound form, a picture, a color, a mood, and a deity. In all of these situations, the performers make no claim that the power of the music is the result of a particular personal subjectivity revealing itself.
âŠ
All technology, as Heidegger tells us, is a framing. Within the framing, certain kinds of appropriation are possible, in that certain materials are taken, transformed, and renamed. Thus, the whole history of recorded sound constitutes a framing of sound and music, turning it into a kind of raw material that stands ready to be called forth and used by humans. It may be the case that the appropriation of human voices, as opposed to musical instruments, is particularly problematic, because voices are particularly unmediated sources of sound. These voices have not only been copied, but also edited and manipulated, and they thus have the intense ambiguity around them that surrounds all montages. Anthropologist Michael Taussig has written about the power of defacement as a way of negating and politicizing form (the montages of John Heartfield or Adbusters come to mind). However, any sonic appropriation (meaning a sound taken and used outside of its âoriginalâ context), regardless of the intention behind the appropriation, might be considered a defacement if those who claim the ownership of the sounds object to the editing or recontextualization. Montage is disrespectful of form. What montage reveals is the inherent mutability of all forms. As Taussig shows, the incendiary effects of montage reveal the politics of form, of what is appropriate, and the ways in which what is believed to be appropriate is enforced. In other words, montage reveals the power structures that give to us the form of the appropriate and the inappropriate, as well as the fragility and delicacy of particular forms.
A few hot takes on this. Iâve been thinking about the politics of Brian Enoâs work for a while now, which seem hugely significant given Enoâs colossal influence on the landscape of contemporary music. And yesterday I came across this piece, and in it this vexing and captivating passage. Iâll try to sum up my thoughts: I think Boonâs stance on issues of power and dispossession here and elsewhere makes an exemplary case that liberalism and artistic avant-gardism are, far from being antagonistic, actually quite reconcilable and mutually informing. To take up just one thread of the argument, my feeling is that music like Eno & Byrneâs doesnât not trouble dominant constructions of the lyric subjectâitâs just ( âjust!â ) that the idea of somehow transcending subjectivity to access a general underlying category of Being is a dangerous fantasy of universalism thatâs fundamentally wrapped up in / poisoned by white supremacy and capitalism. Besides (but not besides)âwhoâs profiting from Byrne and Enoâs appropriations? They are, not the voices they take up. And the mechanisms of sampling, remixing, and distributing of these voices obfuscate rather than â[reveal] the power structures that give to us the form of the appropriate and the inappropriate.â My Life in the Bush of Ghosts scrubs the voices, rhythms, and styles it samples of their particularities, treating themâin keeping with the long modernist tradition of so-called primitivismâas mysterious and exotic, commodifying their difference. What Boonâs claim point to is, to my mind, a limited and unspecific approach to relationality and the shaping of subjectivities that disregards the particular ways discourse and capital come to bear unevenly on bodies and bodies politic and spaces.