#feyerabend

Pensamientos a partir de la siguiente cita:

"La ciencia institucionalizada es la religión más dogmática de nuestro tiempo" (Feyerabend, 1981).

I guess the following entry will be a very daring argument, which merely represents some of my thoughts that arised in my head because I'm currently reading Against Method by Paul Feyerabend. I do not claim that this argument is flawless. Comments - especially by people who are more familiar with Feyerabend's philosophy of science - are welcome!

The consistency condition as a false advisor

The consistency condition which demands that new hypotheses agree with accepted theories is unreasonable because it preserves the older theory, and not the better theory. Hypotheses contradicting well-confirmed theories give us evidence that cannot be obtained in any other way. Proliferation of theories is beneficial for science, while uniformity impairs its critical power. Uniformity also endangers the free development of the individual. (p. 24 [1])

What Feyerabend denotes by the consistency condition seems to be the source of our unease when it comes to quantum mechanics. One of the sacred principles of physics is locality, i.e. the fact, established from special relativity, that there can be no superluminal action/signalling/causation. Special relativity (published in 1905) is the older theory compared to the orthodox formalism of quantum mechanics (developed in the 1920s). As a result it seems to be obvious that the usually adopted interpretations of the orthodox quantum formalism try to maintain locality as well. Later, in 1952, Bohm published the paper in which he proposes his hidden variable theory of quantum mechanics - Bohmian Mechanics as it is called today. His theory embraces nonlocality and therefore contradicts the idea of locality of special relativity. A common view among today's physicists seems to adopt exactly the reasoning of the consistency condition: Why should one accept any absurd concept such as nonlocality if the older theory, special relativity, demands its absence?

Feyerabend points out the problems of the consistency condition as it is supposedly applied in the sciences in general. Regarding quantum theory in particular, his argument might also have an impact on the commonly adopted view about quantum mechanics:

Had the younger theory been there first, then the consistency condition would have worked in its favour. [...] It [the consistency condition] contributes to the preservation of the old and familiar not because of any inherent advantage in it but because it is old and familiar. (p. 25 [1])

Following Feyerabend, the fact that today's physicists most often try to avoid nonlocality based on its roots in special relativity seems to be not viable anymore. If there would have been the formulation of Bohmian Mechanics before the standard, orthodox formulation and the accompanied "anti-real", local interpretations, scientists might have doubted the fundamental necessity of locality earlier - in the end, to some extent, it is arbirtrary which theoretical framework is formulated first.

Success of the orthodox theory as a false advisor

An additional further argument, that most physicists apply in order to justify their exclusion of alternative theoretical frameworks of quantum mechanics such as Bohmian Mechanics, GRW or Spekken's psi-epistemic approach, is the claim that the (epistemic) success of the orthodox theory shows its correspondence with the real world, hence its truth.

In allen diesen Fällen wird die Anwendung der Konsistenzbedingung und die Ausscheidung anderer Ansätze mit dem Hinweis auf den ungeheuren Erfolg der orthodoxen Auffassung verteidigt, behindert aber in Wirklichkeit nur die gründliche Untersuchung dieses Erfolgs. So macht die Berufung auf die Erfahrung und den bisherigen Erfolg aus guter Wissenschaft leicht schlechte, nämlich starre Metaphysik. (p. 62 [2]). In all of these cases, the application of the consistency condition as well as the exclusion of alternative approaches, while emphasizing the massive success of the orthodox theory, are defended. Actually this hinders the thorough investigation of its success. Hence the reference to experience and previous success easily results from decent science in rigid metaphysics. (p. 62 [2]).

By excluding theories such as Bohmian Mechanics results in "rigid metaphysics", i.e. metaphysics that excludes "realism" (in the sense of the existence of ontic entities prior to measurement) for the sake of preserving locality. The fact that Bohmian Mechanics exactly reproduces the results of orthodox QM shows that the epistemic success cannot be the judge between the true character of either of the theories - claiming differently simply diminishes the metaphysical diversity.

Which is the better theory then?

I do not claim that realistic theoris such as Bohmian Mechanics are necessarily "better" than any other more usually adopted "anti-real" interpretation of orthodox quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, strictly excluding the possible value of realist, nonlocal theories is not reasonable, since it results (to put it in a cynical way) in the myth of orthodox quantum mechanics - as if it was the only reasonable way to make sense of quantum mechanics. I shall close with a further quote by Feyerabend:

Unanimity of opinion may be fitting for a rigid church, for the frightened or greedy victims of some (ancient, or modern) myth, or for the weak and willing followers of some tyrant. Variety of opinion is necessary for objective knowledge. And a method that encourages variety is also the only method that is compatible with a humanitarian outlook. (p. 31-32 [1])

Final remarks

To clarify: My claim is of course not, that i think locality is a principle not worth maintaining, it is just that excluding nonlocality primarily based on the argument that special relativity (the older theory) demands locality, might not be valid if one adopts a view such as Feyerabend did. I'm well aware that maintaining locality has its benefits beyond the simple fact that it was established due to special relativity. And to be honest: The argument above would partly work for giving up "realism" as well, since this is also a well established idea from older theories. No matter what, if one does not adopt a simple instrumentalist view of QM, at least one beloved classical principle must be given up. But my claim emphasizes that a pluralism of alternative approaches of QM should not be limited intentionally - otherwise we end up with "rigid metaphysics" or to put it more cynical, with the myth/church of orthodox QM.

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[1] Paul Feyerabend - Against Method, 1975

Por más atractiva que parezca una empresa tan ambiciosa, la más ambiciosa quizás, de totalizar al conocimiento en una sola entidad que defina toda la existencia, es evidente que por naturaleza nuestras metodologías, nuestro lenguaje y nuestro pensamiento nos dejan muy cortos. Creo que quien se acercó más a lograrlo fue Levinas cuando habló del significado, la significancia y el significante. La teoría de propagación de conocimiento está incompleta, dice correctamente el autor, pero como Feyerabend enseñó, todas las teorías están incompletas. No obstante, las disciplinas de conocimiento ya totalizan, categóricamente, el todo de la vida. Todo es lenguaje. Todo es saber. Todo es discurso. Todo es historia. Todo es deseo. Todo es existencia. El marco teórico de un Terreno Común del conocimiento acaba por ordenar el procesamiento del conocimiento de la siguiente manera: hay una situación que se contextualiza, se buscan patrones de repetición en los contextos, se decodifican su símbolos y se transforman, a través del lenguaje, en el pensamiento que descubre o esclarece el conocimiento. La humanidad está sobrecargada de conocimiento. Hay conocimiento verdadero, fisionómico o abstracto, y conocimiento falso, la ficción. Por motivo de supervivencia, se aprende a diferenciar el verdadero del falso, el útil del inútil. Con el advenimiento de la tecnología, la comunicación se volvió instantánea, la información accesible como nunca antes. Hay un exceso de información, de conocimiento, y las categorías sirven para distinguir no sólo cómo nos servimos de él en la vida, sino cuál es el que, según nuestro contexto, mejor nos corresponde. No es inesperado que, al estar atravesado por el lenguaje, el género humano tenga un Terreno Común, ya que tiene la herramienta para expresarlo e identificarlo en sus semejantes. El Terreno Común es vasto, comprende todo lo que llamamos cultura, que también ha costado  diferenciarse de la naturaleza (se ha cuestionado si ésta existe, gracias a la introducción e influencia de lo artificial). El hecho de que se comparta una existencia prácticamente obliga al individuo a pensarse en un conjunto, por lo que su discurso no puede quedar aislado. El conocimiento está implicado en todo, incluso en el lenguaje con el que lo pensamos. El conocimiento se vive.

Notas adicionales:

1. El ensayo refiere al texto “Tipos de conocimientos en el procesamiento del discurso” de Teun A. van Dijk.

2. Los libros de autores aludidos son Humanismo del Otro Hombre de Levinas y Contra el Método de Feyerabend.

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I would no like to introduce you to my new favouritest word, which I will be adding to my daily lexicon:

“If philosophy really is bullshittery, then scientists have a lot to worry about — because it would mean that the underpinnings of fields like (all of) mathematics, physics, biology, chemistry, economics, psychology, and sociology are at least faulty and at most nothing more than handy axiomatic assumptions.”

...

Parafraseando: "El Estado y la ciencia deben separarse como se separaron Estado e Iglesia" (Chalmers, 2000).