"His Majesty desires to have such imposing forces at his disposition, that even the most audacious rebels will have no other option than to submit."
Breteuil seeking further Swiss reinforcements, June 1791. The Road from Versailles by Munro Price (2002, p. 176)
I struggle with the idea — emphasized by every monarchy-POV book & seemingly the monarchy & monarchists themselves — that the king & queen wanted above all to avoid violence & civil war. I don't necessarily doubt that this was the ideal in their hearts, but in practical terms, they hoped to bring about peace by building up force to intimidate or beat the revolutionaries into submission.
Breteuil isn't just an emigrée nor an ally of Louis' virulently counter-revolutionary brothers Artois & Provence. He is working directly with the king and queen, negotiating on their behalf with the other European powers, having been given plenipotentiary powers, or the "full authority to act on [the king's] behalf" (p. 115) (emphasis mine)
The Road from Versailles is so far my favorite book about the monarchy, even though I disagree with some of its framing. I did come away with a deep sympathy for the monarchs and an understanding of the severe manipulation they were subject to by their Court allies and the personal traumas, which must've shaped their views and decisions.
But this book contrasts with other monarchy-centric books I've read, which emphasize the innocence of the king & queen and how much they (well, at least, Louis) wanted to compromise with the revolutionaries. That kind of emphasis makes it feel like the revolutionaries were being unreasonable and that the bloodshed & strife could've been avoided if only they'd been reasonable and compromised with the monarchy. The Road from Versailles, on the other hand, doesn't sugarcoat the king & queen's intentions and their ultimate goals, stating plainly:
"Despite the obvious dangers, from the summer of 1790, they embarked on a secret counter-revolutionary diplomacy aimed at restoring as much of the royal authority as possible."
I find myself wanting to come away from this book convinced of their innocence but am simultaneously convinced more and more of their efforts to subvert even the moderate progress of the early Revolution. Reading about the attempts to build up forces and giving the revolutionaries "no other option than to submit", it's hard not to feel a deep sense of betrayal, as though every concession, every "compromise" was a lie, or at least an attempt to minimize real progress.
And then I imagine how much deeper that betrayal would feel for their own people at the time.
This book keeps coming back to the king's declaration of June 23, 1789 (tiny paragraph in English Wikipedia, but it has its own French WP page), which addressed some of the National Assembly's wishes and effectively "transformed France's absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy" (p. 65). Munro Price argues that — rather than seeking to roll back reforms completely and return to an absolute(ish) monarchy — the king and queen were working toward this earlier state of reform. However, he also acknowledges that:
"...as the decision on voting made clear [encouraging but not commanding the first & second estates to deliberate and vote with the third on some issues], this was to be a constitutional monarchy in partnership with the privileged orders, not the third estate."
So I find little comfort — and no exoneration for the monarchy — in any arguments that they weren't trying to erase all the progress since the Estates General and return to absolutism. That's probably true. But they were trying to roll back a great deal of it, and to do it by force if necessary.
I could quote quite a lot from this book, and I'm sure I will later, since I keep referring back to it. But for now I'll leave you with the larger context of the first quote (all emphasis mine):
"In the meantime, [the marquis de] Bombelles was to strengthen his hand by going to Bern and taking the city's chief magistrate, the avoyer Steiger, into his confidence. Steiger was well disposed to the French royalists, had great influence throughout the cantons, and would make a powerful ally. Accordingly, [the baron de] Breteuil left a note for Bombelles to present to him. Just as he had assured Mercy when asking for Austrian military support, the baron stressed that the Swiss militia were unlikely to be used in battle and would not be needed for long:
'The king is sure of the loyalty of the overwhelming majority of his troops, but since his main wish is to avoid spilling any of his subjects' blood, His Majesty desires to have such imposing forces at his disposition, that even the most audacious rebels will have no other option than to submit…
The plan calls for the French and auxiliary soldiers less to give battle than to overawe and contain the excesses of a multitude of so-called National Guards, with no unity, no discipline, and who for the most part either lack arms and ammunition or do not know how to use them.
Everything thus announces that numerous faithful subjects of all classes will soon be gathered to restore the rights of the throne, yet prudence and the long-term maintenance of order demands that the king increase the number of foreign regiments in his service. This will very shortly be done, and will bring forward the time when the militia will be able to return home.'
This letter sheds important light on Breteuil's thinking in the last days before the flight to Varennes. His consistent wish ever since
July 1789, that the threat of force rather than its actual use should prove sufficient to restore the royal power, is more clearly expressed than ever. While prepared for civil war, he hoped to avoid it if it was humanly possible. Yet his prediction that the king would have to enrol more foreign regiments betrayed his basic lack of faith in the loyalty of French troops. Shrewdly, he turned this to advantage in his overture to Steiger: the promise to recruit more of their soldiers would be a powerful incentive to the Swiss, for whom hiring out mercenaries was a traditional and lucrative source of income. Whether they were used or not, the restoration of Louis XVI's authority would rest at least in part on foreign bayonets."
